Rather, the footage is of the coup d’etat in Honduras, including scenes of the Honduras military confronting Honduran protestors, as well as the Honduran president-in-exile’s airplane and its attempt to land in the capitol. (For the exact clip, see the video at 00:29.) That this video is not about Urumchi is indicated by the Chinese headline, which reads: 洪都拉斯政变：回国受阻–塞拉亚转飞尼加拉瓜 (translation: Honduras Coup d’Etat: Blocked from Returning to the Country — Zelaya’s Plane Redirected to Nicaragua).

That this clip is unrelated to the riots in Xinjiang was not made clear; instead, it makes it appear to Turkish audiences that, not only are there riots in Xinjiang, but that the Chinese military has called in an air strike on the Uyghurs. One could argue that this was a mere oversight on the part of Zaman’s editors. However, given the previous statements made about the Urumchi riots by numerous Turkish government officials, and Zaman’s proximity to the current ruling political party, the AKP, one wonders if this was an intentional error meant to stoke outrage amongst the populace.

新华网乌鲁木齐８月５日电  记者５日从新疆维吾尔自治区公安厅了解到，８月４日发生在新疆喀什的暴力袭击案件，警方在现场抓获两名犯罪嫌疑人，均为男性，喀什人，年龄分别为２８岁、３３岁，其中一人为出租车司机，另一人为菜贩

Xinhua Network, Urumqi, 5 August – Reporters have learned from the XUAR Public Security Department, that the two suspects apprehended after the violent surprise attack in Kashgar, Xinjiang are males, from Kashgar, are 28 and 33 years old, with one being a taxi driver and the other a vegetable seller.

The article also claims that the attacks were premeditated and that the 9 explosives and one home made gun were similar to the ones seized during the notorious raid on a “terrorist stronghold” in Akto last January. Interestingly, the article also mentions that somehow, from two of the “fearsome” knives retrieved from the scene of attack, the authorities are certain that “Holy War” was their motive.

Also, if you’re into, let’s call it “dark humor,” check out some of the gratuitous “artist’s conceptions” of the attack that ESWN pulled from the Hong Kong tabloid “Apple Daily”:

Go to ESWN’s page on the pictures for more sensational comic-book style images, including one where the nasty terrorist gets his arm blown off!

与人民为敌的，最终结果是自取灭亡！！！

For those against the people, the end result is to bring annihilation upon oneself!

向烈士致敬，一路走好

I salute the martyrs, and bid them farewell!

向死难的官兵表示最沉痛的哀悼,
恐怖行为，必须采取非常手段严厉镇压.

To those officers who died during the incident, I express my deepest sorrow.

As for the terrorist activities, we must implement extreme measures to thoroughly suppress them.

唉~~~缠头干的事。

Yeah… the towelheads did this.

恐怖行为越来越猖狂了，必须采取非常手段严厉镇压

Terrorist activities are getting even more savage, we must implement extreme measures to thoroughly suppress them.

哎~~~瞅瞅,咱中国办个奥运容易嘛…

Ah… can’t we Chinese host the Olympics in peace?

维吾尔族 的朋友们，我们都是同胞，我们都是中华民族，新疆自古以来就是中国的一部分，大部分的维族朋友们，是非常好客的，也是非常欢迎我们其他民族的，不过有极少 部分维族朋友，不满于现在的生活，不满于现在的政策。有时你们该想想，就算继续这样继续下去“继续100年200年还是这样“或者自取灭亡“`那又 是何必呢“知足常乐`！

My Uyghur friends, we are all fellow countrymen, we are all nationalities of China, Xinjiang has from ancient times remained a part of China, most Uyghurs are really friendly, and they genuinely welcome other nationalities, however, an extremely small amount of our Uyghur friends are unsatisfied with life today, are unsatisfied with current policies, sometimes they should think a bit, if things continue like this they’ll go on and on for 100 years or 200 years just like this, eventually bringing destruction upon themselves, or they can think “There’s no need for that!” and that’s enough to bring about real satisfaction.

早晚收拾他们

We should take care of them sooner or later.

我是新疆人“`
但我看到这些很伤心“`
这种极端的败类应该彻底消失“`
不然新疆永远都是一颗定时炸弹

I’m from Xinjiang

But when I see this it really gets to me

These kinds of extremist scum should really disappear

Otherwise Xinjiang will always be a time bomb

发生了那么大的事啊~快顶上首页给大家看~一定会是头条~奥运近了~危险近了~那些垃圾在作乱~

Something really big has happened… hurry and rate this video so it will reach the front page and everyone will see it… it really is a lead story… the Olympics are approaching… danger is near… those trash are blowing things up…

我是新疆人,当我早上看到这条新闻.我很震惊!
我是汉族,我有很多朋友是 维族 哈族. 他们跟我们一样都热爱伟大的祖国!
那只是少数的极端分子 蓄意破坏边疆的安宁与稳定.
我坚信少数极端分裂主义分子的阴谋不会得逞!
伟大的祖国只会越来越强大!
中国万岁!
中华民族万岁!

I’m from Xinjiang, when I saw the news this morning I was really shocked!

I’m Han, but I have many Uyghur and Kazakh friends. They’re just like us and really love the great motherland.

It’s only a small amount of extremists who plan on disrupting the peace and stability of the borderlands.

I firmly believe that the separatist ideology of this tiny minority will not succeed.

The mighty motherland will become more and more great!

Long live China!

Long live the people of China!

作为一个普通的维吾尔人，绝大多数维吾尔人是热爱祖国大家庭的，所以极少数分裂分子的阴谋是不会得逞的，我们反对分裂，维护统一；我为和平祈祷，为奥运的圆满举行祈祷。

As an ordinary Uyghur I can say, a large number of Uyghurs love the great family of the motherland, so the conspiracies of these few separatists will not succeed, we are against splittism, we are for unity, we pray for peace, and we pray for the success of the olympics.

奥运后，国家必须要采取强硬方法解决此类事件了，严惩不贷，彻底解决，还老百姓一安家和睦中国，中国加油！

After the Olympics, we must implement tough measures to resolve these types of incidents, we have to punish without excuses, completely resolve the problem, and give the ordinary people a calm and friendly China, go China!

And those are some of the interesting ones for now. Some themes: rapid unity over the death of the young officers, similar unity around fury towards the perpetrators. Note that although as of right now no news agency has made an explicit connection between Uyghurs and the attack, this is already a given in the discussion among the public. Several people have come forward urging calm among their (implied Han) countrymen, to not direct their anger in Uyghurs in general and repeating the mantra distributed by the state that the discontent is isolated among an extremely small majority, also, people coming forward and claiming themselves to be Uyghur while saying that the attackers do not represent the will of the majoriy (they invariably use the phrase 大家庭, or “great family” of which all the minorities are metaphorically a part of).

Also interesting are comments that state tough measures should be carried out after the Olympics. I find this fascinating. It seems to indicate to me that the ordinary citizens of China perceive all the tidying up that occurred before the games – including, one would imagine, the relaxation of censorship and the lip service to human rights – to only be temporary measures whereas analysts in the West have been praying (albeit with little hope) that the Olympics would be a catalyst for permanent changes. Instead, we can see here that even the 老百姓 ordinary Chinese are clearly aware that the stuff the government has been doing lately has been only for the Olympics and that the “normal Chinese way of doing things,” for example, harsh crackdowns, can return to the forefront when all the bleeding heart Westerners leave after the Olympics. Intriguing…

Of course, we can always count on some folks to throw in some comic relief…

杀死韩国猪

Kill the Korean pigs

喀什的事件 跟韩国猪什么关系？莫非你认为喀什和韩国相邻？你真的该学学地理了

What does the incident in Kashgar have to do with “Korean Pigs”? Could you possibly think that Kashgar is near Korea? You really should brush up on your geography

And as usual, there are some interesting points to look at when the three categories of news stories are taken as a whole – firstly, a number of the Western agencies are reporting that a police station itself was attacked, going so far to say that the explosives part of the attack involved throwing grenades directly into the police barracks. But the Xinhua article in English now says that the attack was carried out as the joggers were going past the Yiquan hotel (strangely called “Yiquan” in Xinhua’s own English version of the article, in Chinese, it’s called 怡金, or Yijin), 200 meters away from the station, and that there are now witnesses who were guests at the hotel. This is just most likely information getting more clear as time passes but for now the Western reports are still a little behind. Nothing underhanded, I believe.

However, another conspicuous point of note is the difference currently between the way the state news agency is covering the incident in its English language and Mandarin language presses. We’ve noted before here on The New Dominion that there is a clear tendency for Xinhua to cover things differently depending on if they’re talking to their Western audience (English) or their domestic audience (Mandarin). In English, the story is very prominently located on the front page, and the language makes it very clear that this was a “terrorist attack” and that the dreaded specter ETIM/TIP was probably involved.

Terrorist plot was suspected in the violent attack targeting border police in China’s westernmost city of Kashi, which left at least 16 policemen killed and 16 others injured Monday.

The regional public security department said it had got intelligence that the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement” planned to make terrorist attacks during Aug. 1-8, just ahead of the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing.

Yet in Chinese, the story is modestly buried way near the bottom of small-font links (albeit on the front page) as I’ve captured in this picture:

Furthermore, the actual Xinhua article itself is probably an eighth of the size of the article created by the same agency on the same incident in English, stating only that two “criminal suspects” (犯罪嫌疑人) carried out a “surprise attack” (袭击). There is no reference to terrorism or ETIM whatsoever in this carefully camoflagued post. Again, as we have seen before, there is a strategy that drives the state to report the scary gory details to the foreign press but remain subdued at home (though the effect of private reporting – we’re talking blogs and twitter clones – remains unscrutinized for now).

We’ll stay on top of this story and report any more details that may come out. Something very unprecedented is that the attacks were neither remote, as with timed bus bombs, nor suicide, as with the hijacking attempt earlier this year, but ended with the arrest of both attackers, one with a “leg injury”, were apprehended, perhaps giving us more of an opportunity to discover (after the Chinese interrogators get to work and after the censorship bureaus decide what’s kosher) more about the motivations and origins of the attacks.

Not much can be said until we have an opportunity to view the video. The last time there was a buzz about an East Turkestan Islamic movement produced video, the resultant surprise and concern were quickly quashed by the content of the actual video itself which, as we covered here at The New Dominion, contained a number of inconsistencies and puzzling questions, all but ruling out the authenticity of the video’s claims.

Yet even with what little information we have, there are a number of eyebrow-raising points to consider…

First, why the delay? Why would such an organization carry out these attacks only wait until now to claim ownership of the violence?

Why would China remain silent on such issues even if they had the slightest inkling that East Turkestan terrorists were responsible for the acts? There’s a trend among the government to exploit every opportunity to justify increased Olympics security and crackdowns in restive minority areas, as evidenced by the glowing report released recently on “busting up terrorist cells”, as well as the intense domestic press coverage of incidents with really spurious, if not entirely fabricated links to religious terrorism. One would assume that these bus bombing incidents would also be revealed to the public as the machinations of Muslim terrorists, and thus further justify both iron security at the Olympics and massive crackdowns in Xinjiang – though I also acknowledge the possibility of a face issue, where the CCP is willing to acknowledge the threat itself but not actual instances where terrorists slipped through cracks in the Great Security Wall. It remains a fact, however, that the official government word on both the Kunming and Shanghai bus incidents is that while they definitely weren’t accidents, they aren’t linked to terrorism or the Olympics. Obviously the CCP and Seyfullah can’t both be correct.

Who is Seyfullah? What is the Turkestan Islamic Party? Much scholastic criticism concerning Chinese and American policy towards the East Turkestan Islamic Party (which apparently also goes by Turkestan Islamic Party, which also happens to be another possible name for the successor of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which may or may not have been eradicated) centers around the question of whether or not such an organization even exists on a structurally significant level. I’m willing to wager that if we were actually see this video we could ascertain just from the content whether or not there are genuine links to Uyghur-related unrest or if it is a deliberate but sloppy attempt to agitate, as the last video appeared to be. I would be interested to see what kind of background Seyfullah delivers his statement in front of, what language he speaks in, what kind of attire he wears.

What are the abilities of this shadowy movement? Violence attributed to Uyghurs has been on the decline for the past decade, yet suddenly there’s a Uyghur movement that is capable of striking in places as distant as Wenzhou, Kunming, Shanghai, and Guangzhou? Just as I believe the Chinese government is not beyond attributing Islamic, terroristic motives to secular hooligan gang violence in Urumqi, I wouldn’t put it past international agitators to attempt to weave a pattern between various violent occurrences, a pattern with no real basis in reality.

So basically, as is the case for most information coming out of China concerning Xinjiang or the Uyghurs – it’s time to suspend judgement. There are reasons this could be legit, and there are (probably far more) reasons this could be just troublemakers throwing fuel onto the pre-Olympic fire. But until we can see some primary sources on our own – rather than receiving information filtered through layer after layer of various news organizations – it’s hard to say what’s what. Trying to report on the facts about Xinjiang reminds me of what terrorism and “the war on terrorism” is all about – in the end, much of it is information warfare – it’s out-mis-informing the misinformation of the other side, until nobody knows what the hell is going on. That’s basically the situation we’re looking at when we try to analyze East Turkestani terrorism.

For now, we’ll just try to point out what we can and encourage a critical analysis and discussion beyond what reliable is simplly verbatim repitition of either Xinhua or “the terrorists” on the parts of the major news agencies. And in that spirit, if anyone has any comments, observations, or better yet, links to the alleged video, please do share in the comments below or in the contact form above.

The internet has been positively buzzing the past few days over the sentencing of 15 Uyghurs for terrorist activities in Kashgar a few days ago, particularly because the trial was public and because it resulted in the instant executions of two of the suspects. While most of the major news agencies remain rather conservative with reporting on the details, the RFA article claims that according to a woman who was at the public trial (allegedly, the community members were forced to attend), the sentenced and executed individuals were the scheming terrorists who were apprehended during the Akto daring raid of January 2007. The RFA articles as well as the bigger news companies name the two executed parties as Mukhtar Setiwaldi and Abduweli Imin.

This is where things get slightly confusing for us writers here at The New Dominion.

I’d like to direct your attention to one of our very first posts way back in November, that’s when we were still maintaining the painstakingly time consuming “News Roundups” which involved taking Chinese language news stories and providing English language summaries. One of the more notable stories we found buried in Xinjiang’s massive and unorganized pile of Mandarin-language reports was a lengthy summary of a recently concluded terrorism case, where six individuals were sentenced for terrorism activities that had gone on for a year and a half until they were apprehended almost a year before, in January of 2007. I quote what we wrote then:

Six defendants in what has been dubbed the Kashgar “12-25″ Threat to National Security Case have been sentenced for attempting to split the country. Under the charges of splittist activities, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the illegal production of explosives, 4 death sentences and 2 life imprisonment sentences were passed down. The Xinhua article announcing this sentence also includes a detailed list of the alleged suspects’ activities, including running a terrorist training camp for two months with the Hollywood name of “Black Canyon,” conducting an explosives collecting operation dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn,” resisting PLA counterinsurgency efforts by sabatoging communications facilities, blowing up public buses, and occupying the Kusilafu village’s government building and declaring independence. Kusilafu is a village in Akto County (Location in Google Earth), a hotbed of resistance to Chinese rule.

Here’s the clincher: the two individuals who were singled out as ringleaders for the terrorism operation and summarily executed in November of 2007 were named Abduwali Yiming (阿不都外力·依明) and Muhataer Setiwalidi (穆合塔尔·色提瓦力迪) – or, the Chinese transliterations of Abduweli Imin and Mukhtar Setiwaldi.

So, therein lies the mystery: what exactly is going on here? RFA claims that on the 9th, these two individuals were executed summarily after a public trial, during which they were accused of plotting terrorist activities and managing a hidden terrorist base of operations starting from August 2005. The plot was broken up when the police raided their hideout in January of 2007. However, we found a Chinese language article describing an uncannily similar trial being conducted in November of last year, with the same charges against the same individuals, with the same result (two summary executions, two delayed executions, and a number of other non-capital sentences). I vividly remember recalling when we looked at the article at the time being quite surprised that no international news agencies were picking up on the execution of alleged East Turkestan terrorists – only to be quite surprised to find out they finally picked up the scent, only 8 months later. We are thus facing a time-traveling trial and execution: did this happen just a few days ago, or did it happen last November?

I think the most obvious evidence for the trial occuring in November is the fact that the Chinese-language article describing the trial and dated in November is still up and viewable. While it’s possible that the two immediate executions were stayed for 8 months, particularly in light of new laws in the PRC mandating that executions be reviewed by higher courts, even if that should be the case the fact remains that the trial was done a while ago, and not recently, unless this second, public trial was intended to be a show trial to intimidate the local Uyghurs. After all, if we do a little sleuthing, we find that the original source of this new information is indeed the RFA article (all the other articles out for now are just repeating what the RFA said), and thus the RFA could be mistaken, or, it possibly doesn’t have the complete picture. RFA is known for basing most of its stories on reports by disgruntled locals, Han, Uyghur, or otherwise, making clandestine calls to their international hotlines. Via this manner RFA may have learned from local Uyghurs that a show trial and execution occured, but may be unware of the official sentences passed in November.

The second possibility, more sinister, sheds light on the fact that the CCP regime, with its struggle between increasingly uncontrolled and rabidly nationalistic domestic “flash media” and completely uncontrolled foreign media, has adopted a strategy of sometimes providing different versions of events in Mandarin and in English – one for home consumers, one for abroad consumers. Again, I bring up how surprised I was that there was such a detailed report on the trial and sentencing of alleged Uyghur terrorists that hardly made a blip on the international media – we’re talking juicy, sensational stuff like snap executions and crazy Muslims storming town halls. But perhaps the Mandarin language report was deliberately shoved into the rather mundane procession of daily news rather than plasted all over front pages for a reason – so that the “International Edition” could be unleashed at a more strategic time, say, when China publishes reports on Uyghur terrorist activities over the past half year to justify its current anti-terrorism agenda.

Under the break, I have a full English-language translation of the Chinese language article from November. For some great “Law and Order” style drama and some crazy allegations of what these folks allegedly did during their reign of terror, read on:

Sentences have been pronounced in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case; 6 individuals will be punished for attempting to split the nation. (2007-11-09)

The sentences in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case, which was tried in a Kasghar Prefecture Mid-level People’s Court, were pronounced yesterday. Abuduwali Yiming and five other defendants were sentenced either to death or life imprisonment for the crimes of attempting to split the country, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and illegally manufacturing explosives.

In order to achieve their secessionist goals, Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 defendants actively carried out extremist religious activities, declared “jihad,” organized a terrorist training camp, and made preparations to assist in the establishment of an “Islamic Caliphate” from August 2005 to January 2007.

Together the 6 defendants planned, organized, and implemented terrorist training activities, eventually recruiting several dozens of violent splittists to send to the “Black Canyon” terrorist camp, where they conducted training operations in secret for almost two months.

The 6 defendants also created a banner for their organization, drew up guiding principles and regulations, arranged goods and supplies for the terrorist training camp, manufactured explosives, and made preparations to conduct violent terrorist attacks.

The defendants twice conducted and participated in operations designed to seek out explosives-making materials, a campaign which they dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn.” They succeeded in acquiring 16 kilograms of explosives, eventually manufacturing 67 hand grenades and two suicide bombs.

The suspects formally established the “East Turkestan Islamic Party” and carried out two separate military operations while resisting capture by the authorities, during which the defendants destroyed communication lines, blew up buses, and occupied the Kusilafu Village government buildings to declare “independence.”

After the above-mentioned crimes were discovered by the authorities, the 6 defendants gathered a number of terrorists and began an organized military resistance against the armed police force sent to apprehend them, resulting in one injury and one death among the officers.

The court holds that Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants disregarded national law, demonstrated a long-term commitment to the reactionary thought of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and violent terrorism, and vainly tried to split the nation and create an “Islamic Caliphate.” Moreover, they actively communicated with and sought aid from terrorist elements abroad and over a long period of time exploited religion to implant extremist ideology in the minds of other individuals, thus encouraging others to choose, adopt, accept, and seek out “second careers” as terrorist elements who engage in violent terrorist attacks, opposing national unity and socialism’s “dictatorship of the proletariat” system.

The actions of Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants constitute the crime of attempting to split the nation, the crime of organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the crime of illegally manufacturing explosives. The judgments are as follows:

Defendant Abuduwali Yiming, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Muhataer Setiwalidi, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Kuerban Mamuti, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Aihemaiti Reheman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Yimin Miman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Paerhati Yakufu, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is given a mitigated sentence of life imprisonment due to “meritorious actions,” as well as permanent deprivation of all political rights and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, 15 years of imprisonment and 5 years deprivation of political rights. The punishment has been set to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

News Link

On January 5th, 2007, Xinjiang Police Forces destroyed an “East Turkestan Movement” terrorist training camp.

It is now understood that key members of the ETM were dispatched to muster a group of terrorists and enter the PamirMountains to establish a terrorist training base and conduct terrorist training exercises. On January 5th, 2007, as police forces undertook capture operations, the terrorist elements conducted an armed resistance which resulted in the death of one police officer and the injury of another. The police forces managed to recover, killing 18 and capturing 17 terrorists and confiscating 22 homemade grenades and 1500 incomplete explosive devices.

Hasan, why are you running at me with that 50 cm long Uyghur musical instrument?

Originally, the details disclosed by various news agencies described police retaliation against some non-ideological hooliganism that occurred in Xinjiang – earlier, a small band of ruffians invariably described as a “gang” banged up an Urumqi beauty salon, killing an employee in the process, the police, in turn found the gang’s hideout and were forced to kill 5 of the gang members when they violently resisted arrest. Obviously, journalists were all keen on noting that the violent Los Angeles style gang-attacks and police crackdowns just so happened to occur in a region of China where authorities are trying to bottle up Islamic discontent before the Olympics, but none went so far as to assume, yet, that this little police-gang run-in had anything to do with Islamist militants or Uyghurs. Some outlets, such as CNN, went so far as to explicitly note, that at the time there was no cause to believe in a connection:

In an apparently unrelated [to Islamic terrorism and Olympic security] report, Xinhua said police shot and killed five suspected gang members in Xinjiang when one of them stabbed an officer while resisting arrest during a raid. Eight suspects were detained, and two alleged gang members were taken to a hospital with injuries, the report said.

Some of the suspects were accused of storming into a beauty salon with knives and injuring the owner, the report said. It gave no other information on the motivation for the raid or why the other suspects were killed.

Emphasis mine.  Also check out the Interntional Herald Tribune’s initial article on the incident, here. Very little information, and a correspondingly short article, a la: “Violence in Xinjiang, which also happens to be a place where there’s ethnic and religious unrest.”

So in terms of these news articles, obviously they were basing their scoops on some initial report released by a Chinese state agency, a report I’m still looking for. Why? Because with remarkable speed Xinhua released an updated versoin of the story, going from a bare-bones report on gang-style violence in Xinjiang’s capital to a relatively more in-depth report where the criminals in question get ethnicity (all Uyghurs), motivation (extremist Islam), intent (kill lots of Han), and weapons (only knives, but some up to 50cm in length!). Here’s the report as it stands on the English language Xinhua Net. And the IHP article linked above is even more instructive because it illustrates the rapidity with which the initial information evolved, or altered, depending on how you look at it: IHP’s coverage before, and after, with all the new hot info on angry Uyghurs with knives. To be fair, IHP (being a French newspaper, of course), also sharply notes China’s tendencies to quickly blame Islamic terrorism for unrest of any nature in Xinjiang.

So again, we’re in a situation where there’s little we can do, save for speculate and look at what alleged facts we have, and what facts they are; all we need is the Xinhua report.

When 15 policemen surrounded the apartment where the suspects were hiding, they found themselves face to face with 15 knife-wielding Uygurs, all shouting “sacrifice for Allah,” the spokesman said.

The suspects confessed they had all received training on the launching of a “holy war.” Their aim was to kill Han people, the most populous ethnic group in China whom they took as heretics, and found their own state.

If it weren’t the ever-dependable Xinhua News Agency, I’d say this was a draft for a patriotic B-movie gun battle scene, rife with all the stereotypes one would have gleaned from popular culture about what terrorists are supposed to do or say. But it’s Xinhua News Agency, so really it’s just the facts, pal.

Ask the Internet, of course!

This time, John Pasden of Sinosplice is our kindly intermediary. A few days ago he posted links to two humorous maps making rounds as jokes among Chinese netizens: China as seen by Beijingers and China as seen by Shanghainese. The concept is really quite simple: take a map of China, divide it into regional categories, then write in what a Beijinger or Shanghainese generally thinks of that area – so a Beijinger calls Beijing “Grandpa’s Home,” simple enough, but then we find out that Beijingers think prostitutes come from Manchuria, that Yunnan is a place of drug peddlers, and that the south coast is all about making money – oh, and hilariously, Taiwan – “Bitch at grandpa from not going here back then.” Obviously, it’s meant to be that type of rowdy, in-your-face, non-PC type of humor. Which is exactly why its such a good place to mine for info about mutual perceptions among peoples of China. Xinjiang in the eyes of Beijingers?

小偷的老家 – land of the thieves. No surprise – this is a pretty common stereotype about Xinjiangese throughout China – specifically a particular ethnicity from Xinjiang which isn’t difficult to guess. What about Shanghai?

Much more to the point! 小偷 – thieves.

I know I’m not really divulging any shocking revelation when I illustrate through these jokes that Han Chinese from Beijing and Shanghai think Uyghurs are thieves – anyone who has even casually breached the topic of Xinjiang in either city has already received an earful of sincerely delivered warnings to be wary of Uyghur pickpockets, be they in Xinjiang or in Beijing proper. However, I think that by seeing the stereotypes appear in an online joke as this – a popular one at that, so much so that it has spilled into the English speaking blogosphere – ironically adds a layer of seriousness and concreteness to the idea – people like to laugh at the stereotypes presented here, but I feel that such laughter is merely a “guilt release” for a real prejudice among Han Chinese that Uyghurs are, indeed, “all thieves.”

Anyways – the two maps above were meant to be read as a whole unit – you laugh at Beijingers’ and Shanghainese perceptions of Uyghurs – and laugh at their derogatory perceptions of other places as well. For viewing the whole map, and especially if you don’t read Chinese, I recommend heading over to The China Expat where you can find a really super snazzy Flash-based rig that’ll supply not only instant translations but also audio clips of the Chinese.

However, thanks to the sleuthing of Oiwan Lam at Global Voices, I was able to find at a Chinese blog a treasure trove of these little humor maps that go far beyond Beijing and Shanghai – to other localities like Jiangsu and Hunan, and even from the viewpoints of particular personalities like “middle-aged lady seeking marriage” and “pimp.” Rather than fully scrutinizing each individual map as a whole and discovering more about a particular locality or viewpoint, why don’t we go lateral with this data and see what people all over China think of one particular place? Like Xinjiang? A look at Xinjiang as depicted in these maps under the break.

So Beijing – Home of Thieves, Shanghai – Thieves. How about Jiangsu?

Raisins, kebabs, getting drunk on mare’s milk, and elite theives

And Hunan:

Chaos and Raisins

Hubei:

Thieves + Kebabs

Henan:

Thieves + Raisins

Fujian:

“A yellow place.” I think this is mostly a reference to much of Xinjiang being a desert, though the word for “yellow” in Mandarin also means “pornographic” or “sexual.” Unfortunately my command of Mandarin isn’t anywhere near good enough to detect whether or not that’s the implication in this particular map. Maybe someone can look at the original map and help out.

Chengdu:

Where thieves come from

A kid from Manchuria:

Kebabs, beautiful women, a place to travel to one day

Guangzhou Nympho:

A place for wild outdoor sex – first of all, does anyone know what a 豆瓣唐小唐 is? I have no clue, to be frank, but based on everything that’s on the original map (including Xinjiang), I took a wild stab and wrote “nympho.” Also, 野合 means adultery and/or illicit sex, but it also can mean sex outdoors, which I guessed made more sense in this context. I invite anyone with a better understanding to correct me.

Older lady looking for marriage:

“There’s no way I’d marry someone from here (Xinjiang)”

Pimp:

“Got a girl with a big Russian ass here”

Angry Nationalist Youth:

“Has ties with Bin Laden”

And there you have it! Thieves, kebabs, raisins, beautiful women, dangerous men to avoid, tourism, some sort of repressed undercurrent of sexual tension, terrorism: Xinjiang to the Chinese in a nutshell. Naturally, this is nothing definitive and can hardly be called representative, but it merits notice as consistent themes do emerge across jokes claiming to portray different regional ideas, and the jokes seem to be getting a pretty good reception among audiences.

Of course, of equal significance is what we’re not seeing, that is: China in the eyes of Xinjiangren. Where is it? Now that would be priceless, and this blog would definitely look the whole thing over. Any local readers out there up to the challenge? Bonus points if its in Uyghur!

]]> http://www.thenewdominion.net/170/online-humor-affirms-xinjiang-stereotypes/feed/ 5 http://www.thenewdominion.net/168/hong-kong-tabloid-wildly-speculates-on-xinjiang-involvement-in-shanghai-bus-fire/ http://www.thenewdominion.net/168/hong-kong-tabloid-wildly-speculates-on-xinjiang-involvement-in-shanghai-bus-fire/#comments Wed, 07 May 2008 17:10:25 +0000 Porfiriy http://www.thenewdominion.net/?p=168 I’m going to state right off the bat, unequivocally, that since portraying a truthful picture of affairs in Xinjiang is one of the top goals of The New Dominion, we’re automatically cautious when dealing with what we believe to be false or even outright fabricated reports about Xinjiang-related events. However, another important part of our goals is the desire to be more than a journalistic-type blog and to explore Xinjiang from all sorts of perspectives – historical, cultural, linguistic, in addition to journalistic – and so we naturally have decided in the past to report on false and fabricated “stories” with a Xinjiang bent circulating on the grapevine: a comical example being HIV-laced kebabs, a more sinister example being a hostage-film created and Pakistan and customized for a Uyghur speaking audience, erroneously attributed by a third party site as depicting the actions of a East Turkestan group. Regardless of the falsity of the events, we at the The New Dominion still believe there is significance that Uyghurs are being depicted in such a way in the first place, and so feel it is a requirement to report on them, with the proper amount of skepticism and caution, in order to remain faithful to our objectives.

So, having said that, without further ado, I present the next blip on the Uyghur radar as we draw closer and closer to the Olympics, courtesy a Hong Kong tabloid via the Shanghaiist. As they say, a picture is worth a thousand words…

At around 9:00 AM on Monday, during peak traffic hours, a Shanghai bus filled with passengers caught on fire, resulting in 3 deaths and 12 injuries. The first official reports released about the event used the words “explosion incident” (爆炸案) but now that two days have passed and eyewitness accounts have proliferated, specifically about whether or not people in the neighborhood actually heard an explosion (most witnesses did not), most news stories are now using the phrase “combustion accident” (爆燃事故). There are a few certain things floating around – first of all, the police are being unusually ambiguous about the cause of the incident, deciding only to divulge that someone had brought “flammable materials” on board, thus ruling out an equipment failure of sorts – no word yet on whether or not it was deliberate, and whether or not there are suspects. The second certainty: with such ambiguity floating around such a sensational story, there’s no way in hell that nobody’s going to capitalize on it, and who else to do the job but a newspaper based in Hong Kong, China’s capitalism capital? While more official outlets are cautiously using words like “incident” and “combustion,” Hong Kong’s Apple Daily unabashedly proclaims in huge font on its front page: “SUICIDE STYLE BUS BOMBING IN SHANGHAI” (上海自杀式炸巴士). The usual sensationalist speculation one would expect from such an introduction (What, precisely, is suicide style? Something I can buy at Hot Topic? I thought a suicide bombing was pretty much all or nothing…) has already been translated by the impeccable Roland Soong at ESWN, but here at The New Dominion we’re more interested in another part of the article.

对于巴士起火的原因，上海市公安局在其官方网站上发布的公告称： 「经初步勘查，火灾是乘客携带易燃物品上车所致，有关情况警方在进一步调查中。 」不过，消息人士透露，有人用皮囊带汽油上车再点燃，结果引起车厢大火和爆炸，疑犯一度传出已被烧死，但后来证实已被拘捕，身份尚不得而知。
公 安部早前公布在新疆破获东伊运恐怖团伙时曾指，该团伙预谋于5月份开始在北京、上海等地进行投毒、爆炸等恐怖破坏活动，图谋干扰破坏北京奥运会，而北京奥 运圣火将于5月20日至21日在上海传递，上海巴士在早上返工高时间发生爆炸，令上海市民和内地网民议论纷纷，对公安的公告更冷嘲热讽，讥笑以后搭巴士要 像搭飞机一样执行安检。

As to the cause of the bus fire, the Shanghai Municipal PSB has published this official announcement on its website: “According to the initial investigation, the fire was caused by a passenger bringing flammable materials aboard the bus, the police are continuing the investigation of all relevant matters.” However, a informant has divulged to us that someone brought gasoline on board using a leather bag to ignite a fire, thus causing the resulting inferno and explosion inside the bus carriage. At first it was said that the suspect perished in the fire, but later it was confirmed that the suspect was arrested; the suspect’s identity remains unknown.

The Ministry of Public Security previously has made public that investigations following the breakup of a East Turkestan Islamic Movement terrorist cell in Xinjiang uncovered the cell’s intent to begin terrorist activities involving poisoning and explosions in Beijing and Shanghai starting from May, with the intent to disrupt the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai leg of the Olympic Torch Relay on May 20th and 21st as well as carry out attacks on buses during morning rush hour, causing Shanghai residents and mainlander Chinese netizens to discuss the matter and sarcastically suggest that boarding buses should have the same security preventive measures as airports.

Thus, our Hong Kong rag never bothers to explicitly create a connection between the “combustion incident” and East Turkestan terrorism, but, the obvious implication is there in that the Ministry of Public Security allegedly uncovered Shanghai bus attack plots in the previous crackdown. Also amusing, but a side note, is a sort of Hong Kong scorn for mainlanders getting their just desserts – the newspaper conspicuously uses the word for mainlander Chinese netizens as those who laughed and scorned the potential of an attack originating from the dark depths of the New Frontier.

I don’t even want to acknowledge the material by analyzing how suspect the article is – a single newspaper, an already sensationalist reputation, blaring loudly out of the one place where censorship is sort of in check, with a single, shady anonymous source – but as sensationalist as it may be, we must acknowledge the fact that the Shanghai PSB was sort of asking for it by being unusually scarce with the details. In fact, I’d say that the paucity of details divulged by government apparatuses leads one to conclude that it wasn’t a Xinjiang-based terrorist attack given the government’s eagerness to lay the blame at least four times after attempted plots and preemptive strikes in and around Xinjiang. There are differences though – a successful terrorist attack in the throbbing heart of one of China’s model metropolises is quite a different matter than a botched hijacking over Gansu province – but, unfortunately, there’s no use speculating unless the government decides to come forward with a little more information. We can rest assured that the bigwigs of the Shanghai PSB are discussing just that as they scan over what they know so far about the incident.

What we can wonder about, however, is the swiftness and enthusiasm with which an independent Hong Kong newspaper strongly suggests that “Uyghurs done it.” Why? It has already become quite apparent that the concept of the “dangerous Muslim terrorist Uyghur” is gaining currency in the Han social imagination, especially as the Olympics approach, through viral rumors about rogue, AIDS infected Uyghurs turning their kebabs into biological weapons to officially propagated accounts of minority shenanigans in apartment blocks leading the buildings’ Han Chinese residents to rethink whether or not they heard grenade explosions. Does the Shanghai bus bombing, I mean, bus burning resonate within existing ideas about dangerous Uyghurs? It most certainly does – as it was only a few months ago when another rambunctious Uyghur allegedly entered a mass transportation vehicle with some flammable material in an suicidal attempt to set the whole thing ablaze.

As much as we like to see Hong Kong as the ideal implementation of “One Country, Two Systems” policy, a bastion of capitalist-driven democracy and free thinking, I think that the freedom of press in Hong Kong can work both ways, and that we’re seeing through this tabloid a rare instance where mainlander nationalistic sentiment has only Hong Kong as a valve to express itself while state-run media outlets on the mainland obediently await the verdict on “what happened” as it is being decided right now by a very cautious Shanghai PSB – despite, of course, the can’t-be-helped swipe at mainlander sarcasm. Just as an unchecked, unedited, and unsupervised Internet has played an increasing role in the West as a barometer for “what everyone is thinking” regardless of journalistic integrity or credibility, Hong Kong’s freedom of press may in this instance have provided a voice to the type of mainlanders who refused to eat kebabs after receiving harrowing text messages. And with so many Chinese still simmering over the various catastrophes that occurred during international legs of the torch relay (a sentiment likely shared by Hong Kongers given the turnout at the Hong Kong portion of the relay), theres no wondering that the Chinese are ultra sensitive to threats to the integrity of the Olympics, and by proxy, national pride. With the torch abroad, the “Tibet splittests” insane enough to attack a woman in a wheelchair were the bad guys… now that the torch is in China, Chinese audiences are perhaps turning inward to find their enemies – and unfortunately, the rather rash conclusions the Hong Kong paper has jumped to indicate that Uyghurs may be the prime scapegoat. Should this be the case then it’s no mystery at all that the model bridge between China and the West would be the first place to gleefully express a gathering suspicion directed at the indigenous peoples of exotic Xinjiang.

]]> http://www.thenewdominion.net/168/hong-kong-tabloid-wildly-speculates-on-xinjiang-involvement-in-shanghai-bus-fire/feed/ 8 http://www.thenewdominion.net/165/may-brings-more-links/ http://www.thenewdominion.net/165/may-brings-more-links/#comments Sat, 03 May 2008 03:42:35 +0000 Porfiriy http://www.thenewdominion.net/?p=165 Again, the cool-posts-about-Xinjiang rate has reached critical mass and it’s time to share some links. On to the good stuff.

Timothy B. Weston at The China Beat has conducted a fascinating interview that sheds some light on an all-too neglected aspect of modern-day Xinjiang: the self-reported perspective of the Han Chinese that were born and grew up in Xinjiang and consider it their home. Weston’s interviewee, Leong, is now a student at the University of Colorado (adding “overseas Chinese” to his already colorful set of identities) but grew up in an ethnically diverse part of Urumqi. Equally worth viewing and pondering are the comments, which have elicited responses from all sorts of quarters.

After reading up on a localized Han Xinjiang-ren’s thoughts on Xinjiang, head on over to being/becoming, a personal blog whose latest post offers some concise reflections on why certain aspects of American pop-culture – specifically Arnold Schwarzenegger – appeal to Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Once you start peeling off the layers (and read this article) you’ll start to see how there’s more to this apparently arbitrary movie-star preference than meets the eye.

After browsing through being/becoming’s other intriguing posts on Uyghurs and Xinjiang you’ll inevitably stumble upon the web page for The Organization for the Advancement of Studies of Inner Eurasian Societies, or “OASIES” (clever, clever, clever!), a brand new Central Asia academic community based at Columbia University. I’m happy to see more concrete evidence of a growing interest in Central Asia and Xinjiang.

The Christian Science Monitor reporter Peter Ford has published an article of the usual journalistic tint called Uyghurs Struggle in a World Reshaped by Chinese Influx. Of particular interest is the journalist’s encounter with the last living monarch on Chinese territory, King Daoud Mehsut of Kucha, whose palace is now a triple-A tourist attraction. Of his from riches-to-photo-opps story, King Daoud merely says, “I get a cut”… of the 200RMB per ticket admission fee.

And finally, Michael from The Opposite End of China discovered a government published “backgrounder” praising the past year’s progress on the implementation of local autonomy in China – another statistics-fest courtesy of the CCP. Michael uses his trusty newspaper archive spelunking skills to bring to light some interesting Los Angeles Times articles on Chinese language policy in the 1950s and 60s, creating a context that questions the accuracy of the backgrounder.

Now go to Urumqi and eat some Xibo food!