This would be the second newsworthy case of a Uyghur immigrant from China accused of terrorism on foreign soil. The two suspects in the first case, where they were accused of planning on bombing a statue in front of the Chinese “Dragon Mart” shopping center in Dubai, were just sentenced recently to 10 years in jail followed by deportation.

For years, China has insisted that organized Al-Qaeda-linked Islamic extremism, which at various times has been labeled the “East Turkestan Islamic Movement,” the “East Turkestan Islamic Party,” and the “Turkestan Islamic Party,” is a clear a present danger to both the PRC and nations abroad. Invariably government documents and media reports has attempted to link nearly every incident of violence in Xinjiang, whether premeditated or spontaneous, to the machinations of TIP. Accordingly, given the haphazard and jury-rigged nature of most terror attempts in Xinjiang, alongside the government’s ham-fisted attempts to force mass demonstrations and riots into the “terror” narrative, many scholars and analysts have dismissed or at least questioned China’s claims, particularly in light of the benefits the Party would gain from an Islamic bogeyman and its capacity to manipulate, exaggerate, and fabricate information to serve this end.

These two incidents outside of China may mark a turning point in the discussion. Much is left to be said and discovered: does the presence of one, two, or three disaffected Uyghurs involved in Islamic extremism truly constitute proof for the existence of an organized Uyghur threat? After all, even the United States has its own renegade sons. Will Mikael Davud even be found guilty? Even though, in my opinion, the existence of three alienated Uyghurs with violent plots doesn’t get anywhere near “verifying” an organized “ETIM” threat, the Norway plots in particular are a PR coup for the PRC nonetheless since the intended target country and the identity of the suspect make good press. All it takes is a good news story to instantly put Uyghurs into the Islamic terrorist rubric: see, however, the almost decade-long struggle of the Guantanamo Uyghurs for how much blood, sweat, and tears must go into undoing the terrorist label.

It has been interesting following the chatter on the forums of the Uyghur American Association following the announcement of the arrests. If one thing is plain, it is that diaspora Uyghurs are extremely nervous about the damage a single allegation against a Uyghur terror suspect in a Western country could do to the international reputation of Uyghurs as a whole. For example, on the 10th, a forum visitor excitedly made a post titled, “Good news! It looks like he’s [Mikael Davud] is not a Uyghur!”.

According to the latest information, which I’ve posted below, his name apparently is “Mikael Dawut.” This thug is definitely someone who’s just calling himself a Uyghur, Uyghurs don’t use the name Mikael. Uyghurs in Norway should immediately get in touch with the Norwegian government and make it clear that he’s just someone who’s called himself Uyghur. We must do this to end anxieties among the Uyghurs and clear the name of the Uyghurs!

Of course, having a weird name is pretty poor evidence, and other forum-goers noted this. In a response titled “Don’t be to too quick to claim this is good news,” a replier said:

I’m always happy to hear good news, and if that were the case that would be great, but when you attain Norwegian citizenship it’s possible to adopt a new name, maybe he’s one of those who decided to adopt a foreign name.

Diaspora Uyghurs for the most part live in tight-knit communities, and so it didn’t take long for the channels between and among the American and Norwegian Uyghur communities to take note of Davud’s presence – or in this case, absence – among the local communities and at community events. A most informative post, apparently written by a Norwegian Uyghur, titled “He is Uyghur, his original name was Rashidin Muhemmet,” had this to say:

Today’s issue of VG [Verdens Gangs], one of Norway’s biggest newspapers, revealed everything.

The 39 year old terror suspect is indeed Uyghur, his original name is Rashidin Muhemmet, he’s from Ghulja, and in 1999 he applied for political refugee status at the UN Refugee Commission’s Almaty branch, gained asylum, and with a few other Uyghurs was set up in Bergen city in Norway. In 2003 he disappeared from Bergen and was later discovered that he had moved to Sarpsborg, a city in southeast Norway near the Swedesh border. When he applied for Norwegian citizenship in 2007 he changed his name to “Mikael Davud.”

The author then apparently departs from VG’s exposes and goes on to share some information on Norwegian Uyghurs’ thoughts on Mikael Davud.

A vast majority of Uyghurs living in Norway had no idea that such a Uyghur even existed in Norway. Even people who had originally known of him gradually forgot about him. This was because he would never come to any Uyghur get-togethers – Nowvruz celebrations, demonstrations, wedding celebrations – in any event, he lived ten days’ journey away from any place that had Uyghurs. When he lived in Bergen, other Uyghurs who lived there knew of him, but other than a few other radical Uyghurs living in Bergen he spent most of his time with Arabs. “I won’t study an infidel language,” he would say, and studied Arabic instead of Norwegian. In public, if someone would ask him “What’s your ethnicity, where did you come from?” he’d answer, “I’m a Muslim from Turkestan.”

The terror suspect Rashidin originally was a Uyghur, a descendent of Uyghurs from East Turkestan, however, after he grew up, left his homeland, and “had his eyes opened,” he changed and insisted that calling himself “Uyghur” was wrong, was against Islam, becoming one of those people who says he is of the “Muslim” ethnicity.

And so it’s not wrong if we say that “He’s not a Uyghur” and throw him out from the ranks of Uyghur-ness, however, because he said “I’m a Uyghur” when he was applying for asylum to the UN Refugee Commission and wrote as such on his paperwork, and because a “Muslim ethnicity” wasn’t available as an option, the Norwegian government has outed him as a Uyghur and will continue to treat him as such.

A couple things of note. If we’re to believe this personal account, then Davud explicitly subscribed to a form of Islamic extremism that called for one’s Musilm identity to supersede and replace one’s ethnic identity. This is not an idea that’s foreign to Al-Qaeda rhetoric, or even to Islam in general, where one’s identity as a Muslim is meant to be primary and singular. In other words, it’s not strange to see a terror suspect such as Davud disavow an ethnic identity for the sake of a religious one. Should this be true, it’s important that analysts and scholars to distinguish between a nationalist cause and a religious one among Uyghurs, especially if the two on their own are making efforts to separate themselves, and they are, with Davud saying “I’m a Muslim” when asked about his ethnicity, and, obviously, with forum posters like this trying to make it clear that Davud was separate from the “community” and vocal about the precedence of his religious beliefs.

More fascinating for the realm of identity politics is the idea, implied strongly here, that should one publicly disavow his Uyghur identity, as Davud did, and adopt another one, then he or she is no longer a Uyghur. Perhaps my translation is a little clunky, but the last sentence uses the rarely seen (for me anyway) Uyghurluq which I take to mean “Uyghurhess” or “Uyghurhood,” and the verb in the sentence means to completely, entirely throw or eject Davud out from the hallowed halls of “Uyghurhood.” The writer even emphasizes that such a person has disavowed his Uyghur identity even though he is the descendant of “Uyghurs from East Turkestan.” In other words, he has un-Uyghured himself even in spite of his blood heritage.

Much has been written about the “ethnogenesis” of the Uyghur, and much also has been written about the existence of a tangible ethnic identity in the Tarim Basin even before the term Uyghur was revived. Some apologists for the PRC gleefully point to the traceable rise of the term “Uyghur” as indication that there is something inauthentic or fake about their ethnic identity. I think the implications of this one person’s understanding of “Uyghurness” indicate that Uyghurs themselves often realize that “Uyghur” is a flexible ethnic category, and even acknowledging this in no way detracts from the strength or authenticity of the Uyghur ethnic identity. I find such a unique take on what it means to “be Uyghur” a fresh perspective – coming from a Uyghur individual – to the idea of Uyghur identity.

I hope anyone and everyone interested in social justice and ethnic issues in China will take the time to read the letter a Hui individual in Xinjiang has sent to the new Secretary, Zhang Chunxian. It is translated into English below.

I’ll come clean. Reading this letter has made me extremely excited and has thrown a significant amount of optimism into what generally is a personal reservoir of negativity regarding the situation in Xinjiang.

On one hand, this is just a blog post, and, as pretty much most of us blogosphere residents have learned first hand, blog posts can only do so much (if anything at all).

On the other hand, it has always been my conviction that the most probable and fair solution to the “Xinjiang Problem” is a broad, consciousness-raising social movement, a Civil Rights movement, if you will, with both Uyghurs and Han participants, that asserts Uyghur ethnic identity and political rights through creative work, political participation, legal challenges, and civil disobedience.

Such a movement can only work if members of the majority stakeholders, in this case, the Han, participate. Until then, it will only be perceived with hostility as a proto-nationalist separatist movement with harmful designs on the People’s Republic of China. I believe, unfortunately, it is on this point that a resolution to Xinjiang issues is most distant: allies among the PRC majority are few and far between. Besides Wang Lixiong, there are hardly any Han allies to the Uyghur case, and Wang is derided enough as is.

Enter Hui blogger Lüqi Piaopiao (his Chinese pseudonym, 绿旗飘飘), who goes by Green Flag in English. In some ways it is perfectly appropriate that a Hui individual, a Muslim of otherwise “Han” cultural and linguistic background, would be the person who would write the most thorough, fair, and empathetic defense of Uyghur issues I have seen thus far. Green Flag’s exhortations nail, in my opinion, almost every “real issue” that can significantly contribute to solving problems in Xinjiang: respect for the existing legal framework, the concept of genuine autonomy, bringing about tranquility and content through loosening, rather than tightening, religious policy, cultural education for government leaders, and more. But it would be a mistake on my part to put words in Green Flag’s mouth, since he speaks quite wonderfully on his own.

Writing on a blog with a banner that prominently features Mahatma Gandhi, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela, Green Flag conspicuously associates his efforts as a social activist with the style of consciousness-raising social movements that I have come to conclude is the only practical hope for the region. It is with great excitement and optimism, then, that I’ve translated Green Flag’s letter to Zhang Chunxian into English, hoping that in this small way I can contribute to the work of someone, on the ground, in China, who truly has the right ideas. Please read and share!

Dear Secretary Zhang,

After Hunan, a land made legendary by its people, you’ve come to vast and wealthy Xinjiang. The burden you carry truly is not light.

There once was a time when I would blithely sing the song “Our Xinjiang is a Good Place,” ¹ and watch Red Flowers of Tian Shan ² over and over again. To be frank, I miss those times, but that was just me appreciating creative work. Only last year was I able to do away with this imaginary Xinjiang of my dreams.

My first epiphany occurred in February of 2009, when, because of the “February Incident” ³ which happened in Yili some years ago, police vehicles were patrolling the streets of Huocheng County. On February 5th, a little past 5 in the afternoon, I saw a Uyghur youth inexplicably kicking over bicycles parked in front of a supermarket…

In the middle of February of this year, I departed north out of Urumqi with several friends to go to Altai and enjoy the snow up there. We didn’t go west, because we weren’t willing to deal with the inconvenience of having to show our ID papers on the side of the road. After returning home, I posted some pictures from the trip on my blog, and even sent a travelogue I had written in all earnestness and affection to a news periodical in the south; the editor wrote back, asking me to understand how the article I had written was too “sensitive” for the magazine. Ultimately, what was too sensitive was the story of a Uyghur youth from Xinjiang who, after graduating college, was in the end not able to find any employment in Xinjiang and ended up working for the China branch of an American oil company.

The truth is that the situation in Xinjiang has already affected the thinking of all kinds people and has attracted the concern of surrounding regions. However, since I myself am a Muslim, it is easier for me to speak with other Muslim individuals throughout society, including Uyghurs. I believe that several issues in Xinjiang are worth a high level of serious attention, as the potential crises hidden among these issues are clearly detrimental to tranquility in Xinjiang and clearly could influence Xinjiang’s future.

1. Relaxing Religious Policy

In Xinjiang, at least half the population are Muslim adherents of Islam. There is no doubting that terrorist incidents have occurred in Xinjiang due to the influence of “East Turkestan” thinking. This is an unbearable tragedy for all people, including Muslims throughout the country. The events of last July caused unprecedented anguish for everyone.

The incident in and of itself bore no relation to religion. However, a few issues preceding the incident are worth analyzing earnestly. For example, the doucments of both the media and the government in Xinjiang include wording along the lines of “They (Uyghur Muslims) advocate the doctrine of the Oneness of God” ⁴ and it seems that because of this believe the Uyghurs reject the leadership of the government and the party. However, many other prominent religions believe in “the Oneness of God,” holding it as their guiding principle. In Yili Prefecture, some of the “Places for Religious Activity are Absolutely Not Permitted” policies promulgated by government ministries are incompatible with the historical traditions of mosques and actual capabilities on the ground. For example, in regards to the “Collecting of Fees Not Permitted” policy, mosques have always been places that collect taxes, and furthermore the contribution of these fees are a religious obligation and a public service among Muslims, to be used to aid the poor and as public welfare. The “Worship not Permitted for State Cadres” policy violates Article 36 of the Constitution ⁵. During Ramadan, Uyghur Muslims are not permitted to hold iftar ⁶ meals at mosques and restrictions on Uyghur Muslims desiring to go to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage are quite strict. Originally mosques served an additional role as places of learning, and in this capacity passed on religious knowledge and trained religious leaders. With restrictions limiting students at mosques to about two or three individuals, Muslims are now in a situation where they are hardly able to pass on their traditions. Also, there are various measures which forbid mosques and foreign language schools in China proper from accepting students with Xinjiang residence, especially Uyghurs.

In some regions, government agencies forbid Uyghurs from growing beards, forcing individuals who do not comply to attend “Legal Training Classes,” sometimes for up to three months. People now call these classes “Beard Training Classes” without hardly knowing that among Muslims, growing a beard is sacred behavior following Islam’s Prophet and constitutes a holy religious ritual.

I hope that Xinjiang cadres will, when convenient, take the time to study the fundamental doctrines of religions and gradually transform the above conventions. Religion needs to be able to flow freely and must not be blocked up as if under the “Eliminate Religion” methods from the Cultural Revolution. The minorities of Xinjiang are closely bound to their religion, and if religious policies are relaxed, many people will feel more free and more at ease when it comes to believing and practicing their faith. Doing this would aid in resolving other problems, creating a more contented popular sentiment, and benefit social tranquility.

2. The Employment Gap

As I mentioned above, there was a Uyghur youth who studied in a “Xinjiang Class” in inner China and got into a university, and despite expending his efforts over ten times, was ultimately unable to find employment in his own homeland and was forced to go to distant Tianjin to work for an American company. From any vantage point this is absolutely incomprehensible. In large and mid-sized cities, employment opportunities for minorities, particularly Uyghurs, are few, and in work units with several hundred people there are barely any minority employees. In Yining, all janitors are, without exception, Uyghurs.

Furthermore, many Uyghur girls from Southern Xinjiang are sent to Southern China under “Poverty Alleviation” programs. This, however, is not the desire of many families since Muslim tradition does not support women going far from their homes in search of work and while they’re away it’s hard to avoid interfering with the daily habits and ethnic dress style of these women.

As all people know, Xinjiang is a treasure trove of natural resources and is China’s peerless, bountiful province. The inner provinces make use of natural gas and other resources that come from Xinjiang. As a sort of repayment, the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang should at least be entitled to part of the local employment opportunities so that they may be able to make a living in their own land.

I hope that with some necessary changes in policy, local peoples can be given appropriate employment opportunities, so that the income gap may be gradually lessened and bring about even greater social peace.

3. Improving the Lives of the People

In Urumqi I’ve noticed that districts where Uyghurs have congregated tend to be antiquated and on the decline. Even though the proportion of populations in Urumqi today is not as before, I still hope the government will take into consideration the layout of the city, addressing both development and maintenance of minority areas, and making the citywide disparity less blatant.

“Han Street” in Yining City, which now exists in name only (referring to residential areas where Han originally lived), is quite dirty and messy. The roads have yet to be paved, and if it rains or snows, the surface of the roads turn to mud which makes getting around very inconvenient.

Uyghur peddlers have spread out to every part of the country, selling specialty Xinjiang products but also leaving impressions and influences on the local community. I saw a Uyghur kid selling nan once at the Guangzhou train station, carrying around a stack of nan. Police suddenly appeared, and, with the crowds of bystanders watching, knocked the stack of nan the kid was holding to the ground. Each time the kid stooped over to pick up nan, the police kicked him in the butt until he finally picked up all the nan.

4. Strengthen Autonomy

Xinjiang is China’s largest ethnic autonomous region. Under Secretary Zhang’s new administration, the government should carefully research the ethnic autonomy methods of Xinjiang. Broadening autonomy and allowing, in a planned, measured fashion, local people to manage local affairs, appears to be the best ultimate solution, in Xinjiang and in Tibet.

The unity and strength of China should be the collective responsibility of all Chinese people of good conscience. The burden is heavy and the road is indeed long!

Under the principles of the Constitution and the Ethnic Autonomy Law, the first step must be establishing communication and dialog between social classes, excising the tumor that exists in the hearts of ordinary folks of all ethnicities, including the Han. Please change the old way of doing things, serving both the interests of the state and the peoples in it, bringing about a genuine change of heart, timely healing an open wound, and truly realizing long-lasting peace in ethnic areas.

Best wishes to Secretary Zhang!

Best wishes to Xinjiang!

Best wishes to China!

-A concerned citizen

—

[1]:^ The song “Our Xinjiang is a Good Place” is a kitschy song which of course extols the virtues and tranquility of Xinjiang. Almost everyone in the region knows of this song. From a personal, anecdotal standpoint, I usually only hear this song referred to in a non-derisive tone by native Mandarin speakers (e.g. Han and Hui). View a video of this song here.

[2]:^ Produced in 1964, Red Flowers of Tian Shan is a heavily Xinjiang-flavored propaganda piece which tells the story of a young, female Kazakh commune leader who, through indefatigable socialist spirit, overcomes both the natural challenges from living a pastoral life in the Tian Shan and the shenanigans of the requisite counter-revolutionary villains. Watch Red Flowers of Tian Shan here; this is part 1 of 8 parts, which are all linked on the playlist to the right of the video.

[3]:^ Roused by the execution of Uyghur independence activists and harsh restrictions on the traditional Uyghur activity meshrep, Uyghurs of Ghulja took the streets in February of 1997 and were met with by a violent military crackdown by the authorities. The “February Incident,” known to many Uyghurs as the “Ghulja Massacre,” is very hush-hush in today’s Xinjiang it is rather courageous and surprising that this individual is mentioning it in a letter he has sent to Secretary Zhang. This demonstrates that socially active and Hui individuals are at least aware of the incident, which, under information restrictions in Xinjiang, passes further into obscurity every year.

[4]:^ In Chinese, “认主独一”. This is a reference to the Muslim concept of tawhid, a belief in the oneness of God, or, less obscurely, monotheism in Islam. The author is astutely criticizing the government’s tendency to accuse tawhid in Islam as redirecting Muslims’ loyalty away from the nation and the government, since several other approved religions in the PRC are also monotheistic.

[5]:^ Article 36. Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.

[6]:^ Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset during the holy month of Ramadan. The iftar meal is the highly anticipated community event where Muslims break their fast together and eat their first meal after going without food the whole day. These meals are often hosted at mosques and are significant social events for local communities.

Several days ago the continuously superb Xinjiang blog, Autonomous Region, noted from an April 2010 picture that on new signs in the Shanxi Xiang area, Uyghur characters have undergone a transformation and are now written as large as, if not larger than, Chinese characters. This is appropriate, of course, because this region of Urumqi is predominantly Uyghur.

Shanxi Xiang Neighborhood in Urumqi | View Larger Map

The catch–and in my limited experience there’s almost always a catch–is that rather than relaying the names of the stores or the type of wares they are hawking, the new, culturally sensitive signs instead broadcast the typical, trite ethnic unity slogans that, for some reason, the government thinks is somehow effective. Autonomous Region has already translated a few of the signs, though I hope he doesn’t mind of we take a closer look at the new slogans, sharing in particular the Uyghur phrases for any of our readers learning Uyghur, or at least interested in looking how the slogans vary and overlap between the two languages.

ھەر مىللەت خەلقى قول تۇتۇشۇپ تەڭ ئىلگىرىلەيلى!

Her millet xelqi qol tutushup teng ilgirileyli!

各族人民携手共同发展！

Let peoples of every ethnicity join hands and advance!

مىللى بۆلگۈنچىلىككە قارشى تۇرۇپ ۋەتەننىڭ بىرلىكىنى قوغدايلى!

Milli bölgünchilikke qarshi turup wetenning birlikini qoghdayli!

反对民族分裂 维护祖国统一

Let us oppose ethnic separatism and defend the unity of the land!

«ئۈچخىل كۈچ»كە زەربە بىرىپ خەلقنىڭ مەنپەئەتىنى قوغدايلى!

“Üchxil küch”ke zerbe birip xelqning menpe’etini qoghdayli!

打击《三股势力》维护人民利益！

Le

t us attack the “Three Forces” and protect the interests of the people!

ۋەتەنپەرۋەرلىك ۋە مىللەتلەر ئىتتىپاقلىقى ئۇلۇغ بايرىقىنى ئىگىز كۆتۈرەيلى!

Wetenperwerlik we milletler ittipaqliqi ulugh bayriqini igiz kötüreyli!

高举爱国主义和民族团结的伟大旗帜

Let us raise high the flag of patriotism and ethnic unity!

Trite Party slogans are a great way to learn the first person plural imperative mood in Uyghur grammar. Usually, one is introduced to the imperative mood in the form of second-person commands, as in, “[You,] come [here!],” kéling!. When you start applying imperative to first-person plural, it signifies, “Let’s [do something],” as in, “Let’s go!”, mangayli!, or “Let’s eat!”, yeyli!. In Uyghur, the verb always comes at the end, so if you ever hear a Uyghur talk at you in the usual native machine-gun pace and it ends in “-ayli” or “-eyli,” the speaker is suggesting you guys go do something together. In the above case, the speaker is the Municipal Ministry of Propaganda (市宣传部, sheherlik teshwiqat bölümi-seen in the lower-right corner of the first sign) and Miniprop is kindly suggesting that you, the reader, join him (her? it?) in “moving forward” (iligirilimek), “defending” (qoghdimaq), and “raising” (kötürmek).

It’s amazing how quickly you learn propaganda terms, both in Mandarin and in Uyghur, when living in Xinjiang – even before the riots. It’s hard to overemphasize the scale at which these signs and slogans saturate the city; when studying at one of Urumqi’s three major universities, before the riots, I eventually got jaded to the white-on-red “big character” banners that were strung up all over a campus that otherwise would’ve been quite attractive. Even my Uyghur textbook’s lessons telegraphed these political sentiments. I’m probably not entirely lying when I say I learned terms like “milli bölgünchilik,” ethnic separatism, and “üchxil küch,” the “Three Forces,” before I learned the Uyghur word for toilet paper.

I’ve said, many times, both here and elsewhere, that one of the goals of this blog is to serve as a counterbalance to the cumulative image of China that’s being sewn together by both other China blogs and by media voices on the PRC. Issues like development, economic advancement, and ideological freedom tend to be spoken of as if they are spread evenly across China. They’re not. And while your average sophisticated Shanghai expat may think that hamfisted, goofy slogans are a thing of the Cultural Revolution and are an unfair portrayal of China’s current intellectual atmosphere, I’d beg to differ. And, even if, by my anecdotal experience, most people roll their eyes when asked about the banners they see every day at work and at school, I still believe that there is a significant an intimidating abstract weight that comes out of the sum influence of these ubiquitous signs. Like CCTV surveillance in London, even if the efficacy of their intent, on paper, is questioned and scrutinized, it’s less about capturing crimes on tape or encouraging people to read and comply with slogans; ultimately it’s about signaling the omnipresence of the authorities and hint at its dominance. The content on the sign, perhaps, is less important than the fact that the signs are being hung in the first place.

Starting May 14th, Internet service has been fully restored: you can chat on QQ, you can search on Baidu, and you can post on bulletin boards.

This is long-awaited news for the 700 thousand Internet users in our region; for the over 20 million people in Xinjiang this is a good thing.

Recently, following the confirmation of a new round of aid to help Xinjiang surge forward, a group 19 city and province representatives finished a high-level inspection tour of Xinjiang; with the Central Committee’s Xinjiang Work Conference about to begin, Xinjiang has a historical opportunity for considerable growth, opening, and development. It is in this context that Internet service has been restored to Xinjiang, which is timing of extraordinary significance.

This news brings warmth to the popular sentiment of the people. It means our lives are finally back to normal and shows that the Party and the government, by ensuring stability, has care, empathy, and respect for the people.

This is a forceful and effective signal. It means that peace has returned to this region of our lives and shows that the Party has the confidence and ability to protect social stability in an open Internet environment.

This is a rallying call that excites the heart. It means that just before a historical opportunity for great development, that we shall, to the largest extent possible, use all our information resources, gather all our strength, and realize developmental breakthroughs and lasting peace in Xinjiang.

After the July 5th Incident, due to the need to protect social stability and in accordance with the decisions of the Central Committee and Autonomous Regional Party Committee, the regional government implemented management measures over the network going into and leaving Xinjiang, over text messaging, and over international and long distance phone calls, cutting off, in a timely manner, the ability of law breakers to join together to instigate and plot. These facts prove that this instance of communication management measures was timely, correct, and effective, serving an important role in the Party and government’s efforts to rapidly take care of the July 5th Incident and guarding against further instances of violent criminal activity. After the July 5th Incident, the overall situation throughout the region became more stable and benefited from the active effects produced by communication management.

There are two sides to every issue. To separate the truth from the facts, it must be said that communication management is an important measure to undertake for the protection social stability in times of urgency. However, it also affected normal economic life throughout Xinjiang and inconvenienced the communication needs of the daily work and life of the masses.

In spite of these effects and inconveniences, cadres and peoples of every ethnicity within our region stood as one for protecting the motherland, united together to protect all peoples,  and strove to protect overall social stability, overcoming the difficulties that occurred at work and in everyday life over this period of time, giving full understanding and support to communication management.

It is precisely this precious ability to consider the situation without regard to one’s personal comforts, to take into account the larger issues, that forms the unyielding foundation for the protection of stability in Xinjiang and protecting ethnic unity. It is precisely this precious ability to distinguish right from wrong, to understand things well, that created the conditions for the prompt, complete reinstatement of the Internet.

We must not ignore the fact that, due to the influence of complicated issues both within and outside our borders, our responsibility for protecting stability in our region remains as arduous as before. The exploitation of the Internet by the “Three Forces” to coordinate and plan destructive activities has not ceased. And so we must value and cherish the need to maintain vigilance even more, and through one’s actual activities and actions contribute to construction of a safe and healthy Internet environment and work hard to protect social stability and strengthen ethnic unity.

If the nobleman¹ loves the Internet, he will use it with moral discretion. The revered sage once said, “Look not at what is contrary to propriety; listen not to what is contrary to propriety; speak not what is contrary to propriety; make no movement which is contrary to propriety.”² Even in the world of the Internet, which some people consider to be a “personal space,” the bottom line of civil behavior exists all the same. Every netizen must remember: say no words harmful to unity, do nothing harmful to stability, do not pass on political videos that do not serve the interests of the state.

If the nobleman loves the Internet, he will use it with restraint. “Any freedom that does not have standards to measure by is mere indulgence.” The Internet surely provides a broad, unmatched platform, but it is a space that belongs to real rule of law, any activity that violates the rights of others, harms public interest, or damages the interests of the nation must be punished according to the law.

We can’t live without an open Internet environment, but we definitely cannot live without stability and social order, because without the latter, we would have nothing.

And so, when we are speaking freely on QQ, when were are publishing our opinions on forums, when we are speaking our mind on microblogs, never forget the moral demands of a civilized person, never forget the rule of law under every citizen.

A healthy, open Internet environment needs the vigilant protection of each and every one of us.

[1]:^ The author here is referring specifically to the Confucian concept of a “gentleman” or a “nobleman,” 君子.

[2]:^ Analects XII, 1

To all netizen friends throughout Xinjiang:

Greetings!

With direct concern from the Party Central Committee and after careful research by the Autonomous Regional Party Committee, it was decided to fully restore Internet service in our region on May 14th.

Since July, as our region began control over Internet communications and implementation of a gradual re-opening, Internet users far and wide have given their complete understanding and immense support, actively contributing to the protection of our region’s social stability and creating favorable conditions for implementing the reinstatement of the Internet throughout the region. For this, we express our heartfelt gratitude to all our netizen friends.

The Internet has become a vital component of the life of modern society. It is the gateway through which the Party committee and the government communicate to the vast multitudes as well as a channel for hearing public opinion and the collective wisdom of the people. Through their active comments and suggestions, netizens have expressed their love of Xinjiang and their boundless enthusiasm for building a better Xinjiang. They have shown to the world that people of every ethnicity in Xinjiang are simple, forgiving, sincere, and optimistic at heart.

The construction of a healthy, wholesome Internet community not only touches open economic and social development, but also concerns the personal interests of Internet users. We must value today’s hard-earned stability, value the completely open environment of the Internet, and use the Internet for the expression of good and in service of what is good.

It is the intense desire of peoples throughout all of Xinjiang to quicken the pace of economic and social development in Xinjiang. Soon, the Central Committee will open the Xinjiang Work Conference, which aims to formulate a strategy for advancing developmental breakthroughs and long-lasting peace in Xinjiang, and so Xinjiang has a historical and an important opportunity for considerable growth, opening, and development. In order to tightly grasp this opportunity, bring maximum benefit to the lives of peoples of all ethnicities, and continue the promotion of social harmony stability, the cooperation of netizens throughout the region, including cadres and peoples of all ethnicities, is necessary.

Xinjiang will appear before the world with an attitude of even greater confidence and openness. There can be no open Xinjiang without an open Internet, which is something we must create, hand in hand, for an even brighter future for the region. We hope that netizens will continue, as before, to be vigilant, to support the development and growth of Xinjiang, and, using the Internet as a platform, continue to offer poignant criticisms and excellent policy ideas for development and stability in Xinjiang; together building and even more prosperous and thriving Xinjiang. Xinjiang looks forward to a brighter tomorrow.

Wishing netizens blessings, happiness, and health,

Autonomous Regional Party Committee Ministry of Propaganda

14 May 2010

Two weeks ago, outspoken Uyghur activist and intellectual Ilham Tohti was prevented from going to Turkey to attend an academic conference on Turkic culture. A quick background on the spat can be found here, at Radio Free Asia, but the best place to learn about what happened is from the words of Tohti himself, posted here, in Mandarin, at the controversial online community Uighurbiz. Tohti’s words are soaked with heavy emotion that is simultaneously weary and energetic; clear is his conviction that “enough is enough,” a merited reaction that I hope will lead readers to forgive his frequent use of the third person. Central to Tohti’s approach, and, in my opinion, vital to providing Uyghur discontent with social legitimacy, is a “law centered” critique which questions the latest refusal in light of China’s own laws and international conventions to which China is party.

The following is our translation of Tohti’s impassioned account into English.

These blacklists are always being used as weapons to trample the law for the sake of protecting “social order,” and so the law itself may as well be “illegal,” but of course the law can’t be illegal, therefore what’s illegal is the legitimacy of the government’s authority. Fairness and justice get flouted and eroded, and that’s a significantly harmful thing.

My name is Ilham Tohti, I am a Uyghur, and a legitimate citizen in possession of a valid People’s Republic of China ID who has for a long period of time conducted research on the “Xinjiang Problem.” At the end of March I received an invitation to the 2nd Turkic Culture Academic Conference  to be held in Izmir, Turkey from April 18th to the 24th. I knew from my current situation and past experiences that I had to inform the relevant “harmony” agencies that I was preparing to attend an academic conference. Through unceasing effort and multiple explanations they finally agreed to let me go abroad and attend the 2nd Turkic Culture Academic Conference. They seemed to believe I would not accept any interviews from the media or stay in Turkey… in the remaining time and with the help of a colleague, I sought out the school’s relevant departments, such as the Security Department, the Educational Administration Office, the Human Resources Office, the Organization Department, the Education Office, the college heads and classes at my institution, etc., etc., taking up a whole week’s time. When all was said and done I got them to put 13 red seals on my exit application. I started to worry that perhaps after leaving the country they wouldn’t let me back in. But when I expressed my concerns, they always responded: “How’s that possible? China is a country ruled by law.”

Though at that point all my concerns had not been addressed, I nevertheless went to the Turkish embassy to apply for a visa. At the Turkish embassy’s visa office I met with several other Uyghurs who were also planning to attend the 2nd Turkic Culture Academic Conference. The person in charge of visa applications at the Turkish embassy is Han Chinese, and I unfortunately already had the delight of experiencing his “attitude.” However, this time he appeared to be completely different person from when he completely refused, without reason, to accept my visa application materials back in November of 2009; his attitude was abnormally kind. Perhaps his attitude had something to do with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs understanding my concerns.

Getting the visa turned out to go quite smoothly. The day I received my visa, someone told me that the secretary of the Central Minzu Preparatory College, Arzigul, was informed that due to work requirements I was unable to leave the country. Learning this made me quite worried, as before I had gotten wind that certain relevant authorities were thinking of not letting me leave. That evening I was speaking with an Asia Weekly [亚洲周刊] reporter about the “Xinjiang Problem” when Domestic Security [国保]¹ gave me a call and came over. Could it be that they weren’t letting me leave the country?  Two Domestic Security officers spoke with me the whole evening, exhausting me completely! They said I couldn’t go abroad and attend the academic research conference but didn’t show any sort of paperwork, relying just on spoken orders which is an even more preposterous violation of a legal citizen’s right to go abroad. I asked: which ministry is responsible for this? Which article of the PRC Law on Managing Entry and Exit of Citizens is being implemented here? These Domestic Security officers just offered excuses, saying they were informed by their superiors and were not privy to the exact particulars. One of them told me that his higher-ups decreed that I couldn’t leave the country but didn’t explain the reasons, and further suggested that I accept the “vacation” they had arranged for me,  to “another place” [in China] until the end of the conference in Turkey (and so two days later I took a plane to the South [of China] and there was “vacationed”²). I asked again: “Did you check and see which ministry this information was approved by?” They answered: “This is how the workflow is within the ministry, this is what the boss ordered, and even he’s not clear on what the relevant situation is, there’s no way to tell you.” When I tried to get him to show some documents and asked about compensation for the financial losses due to not being able to leave the country, I was met only with refusals. To all the relevant parties I express befuddlement at this reckless deprival of a citizen’s fundamental right to leave the country as well as deeply felt helplessness and regret. Analyzing the refusal to let me leave the country, perhaps it has something to do with being scared of someone “speaking the truth.” How is it that “Law Unsurpassed by None” can’t even protect one citizens most basic personal legal right?  The last half of last year I received invitations from Norway, Turkey, Sweden and several other countries, and each time I was prevented by the authorities from leaving the country. Perhaps I, Ilham Tohti, have been placed on a no-exit government blacklist? Are the authorities limiting one’s right to exit or enter the country to punish dissenting voices, or isolate them from the outside world?

I’ve thought about all these problems. Ilham Tohti, a citizen with a proper ID, apparently does not meet whatever standards there are in the “Exit and Entry Law” that exists only in the mouths of the authorities; it’s plain that this is an extremely outrageous affront against a citizen’s right to leave the country.

What legal basis is there to prevent me from leaving the country?

1. Section 1, Article 15 of the “Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on the Entry and Exit of Citizens of the People’s Republic of China” states, “Under the following conditions, Frontier Inspection officials at the customs checkpoint have the right to prevent exit or entry from the country: 1) one does not possess a PRC passport or other exit document; 2) one possesses an invalid PRC passport or invalid exit documents; 3) one possesses a forged or altered passport or documents, or is using the passport or documents of another person; 4) one refuses to offer documents for inspection.” This is for verifying the identity of those entering or exiting the country. Ilham Tohti has a valid ID and a valid passport, therefore, this regulation cannot be cited as the legal basis for preventing Ilham Tohti from leaving the country.

Section 1, Article 37 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that, “The freedom of person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable,” while Section 3 states, “unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited; and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.” As a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, leaving and entering the country is one of the legal personal freedoms of the complainant, and no work unit or individual may illegally deprive or limit this right.

Preventing Ilham Tohti, an ID carrying citizen, from leaving the country without any factual or legal basis is clearly illegal.

2. Section 1, Article 8 of the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Frontier Inspection of Exit from or Entry Into the Country” states that “Under the following conditions, Frontier Inspection officials at the customs checkpoint have the right to prevent an individual from exiting or entering the country: 1) one does not possess exit or entry documents; 2) one possesses invalid exit or entry documents; 3) one possesses another person’s exit or entry documents; 4) one possesses forged or altered exit or entry documents; 5) one refuses to submit documents for inspection; 6) one enters or exits outside designated transit points; 7) the State Council or Ministry of State Security issues a notice prohibiting an one’s entry or exit; 8) Law or administrative rules and regulations prohibits exit or entry.” Because Ilham Tohti has a valid passport, was leaving through a legal transit point, has not been prohibited to leave by the State Council or the Ministry of State Security, and is not prohibited to leave by any law or administrative rule or regulation, this regulation cannot be cited as the legal basis for preventing Ilham Tohti from leaving the country.

3. When the authorities so brazenly deprive a citizen of his right to leave or enter the country, they seriously violate the 13th article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including their own, and to return to their country.

Everything I’ve done is what any other reasonable citizen would do, and also is what any citizen with a sense of social responsibility ought to do. I believe that I will spare no effort in advocating my principles, I will continue laboring and appealing for fair, equitable treatment of the Uyghurs.  I call on friends who are Uyghur, Han, and of all other ethnicities to respect rule of law and human rights, to respect one’s own personal dignity and the dignity of others!!! Let us strive to become a people with dignity!

[1]:^国保 is shorthand for 国内安全保卫支队, or the Domestic Security Protection Unit. Activists and intellectuals in China are familiar with Domestic Security as they are the individuals within the Public Security apparatus sent to monitor and police dissidents.

[2]:^ Literally, 被旅游, “to be vacationed.”The particle bei renders a verb into the passive voice, so wherease 旅游 normally is means “to go on vacation” 被旅游 means “to be vacationed” (outside one’s will). The use of “bei” to describe actions of the government against individuals, websites, and organizations has become a common, snarky way to cynically express the helplessness in the face of governmental restrictions or imperatives. Other notable examples include 被和谐, “to be harmonized,” 被自杀 “to be suicided,” and 被自愿 “to be volunteered.” This usage was honored as the 2009 Character of the Year and one of the Top 10 Neologisms in China by Chinese newspapers. See this translation at China Digital Times for more background.

Here are two of his poems. The translations are unrhyming but otherwise accurate. Where I have felt the need to make stylistic choices, I have done so.

From Alip Tékin, Ibrahim. Memtili Ependi Shéirliri [The Poems of Memtili Ependi]. Ürümchi: Shinjang Xelq Neshriyati, 1998, p. 1:

[2]^ Tewpiq (تەۋپىق) comes from the Arabic tawfīq, a Muslim theological term referring to God’s grace or guidance. In Uyghur, it is often rendered as the “correct road” toghra yol. Memtili took this as his pseudonym, apparently from an early age.

Memtili composed this poem at the age of about 19, around the time of the departure of his teacher and mentor, the Ottoman educator and Pan-Turkist Ahmed Kemal.

From the same source, pp. 13-14:

[4]^ Thus, the speaker, to his Senem/senem, is just an improvised meshrep dance, but also represents, perhaps, the social power of the meshrep gathering.

[5]^ Ghérib is the tragic lover of Senem.

Memtili most likely wrote this poem in Istanbul, where he had arrived some years before. During his work and education there, he joined a group of young Turkestani exiles, some of whom returned with him to Kashgar in 1934 in hopes of building a new Turkic state. The poem suggests that he, as the speaker, has just learned about the uprising that led to the formation of the Turkic Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (1933-1934).

Oghlaq Tartishish, a traditional Central Asian sport which could roughly be rendered into English as “Goat Tussle,” or “Contending over a Goat” and better known by its Persian name, buzkashi, is something you’ll inevitably hear or read about in any foray into the peculiarities of Uyghur culture. During my time in Xinjiang I heard about Oghlaq Tartishish frequently though I never had the chance to see an actual game in action. Recently I realized that the idea of riding around on a horse and fighting with other mounted warriors over a raggedy sheep carcass was cool enough by itself and I had neglected to look into the how the actual game works. Reading the following short article, taken from a May 2007 Uyghur newspaper, proved to be very enlightening. As usual, the original Uyghur text will pop up when the text is moused over.

A Look at the Past and Present of the Goat Tussle and Horse Racing

The goat tussle and horse racing are two of the popular traditional sports among the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tajiks, and other peoples of our autonomous region and over a long and continuous historical development have grown into a major player in the two cultural structures of the people.¹

Goat tussle matches and horse racing are usually reserved for winter, spring, Nowruz, weddings, festivals, special or auspicious occasions, and happy get-togethers. In earlier times, local elders of a particular area would gather together famous goat tussle experts and to raise the stakes of the horse games would use a calf in the place of a young goat.

Goat tussle matches are usually conducted as follows:

Before the match begins, the young goat or calf set aside for the game is slaughtered. Its head and hooves are removed and then it is disemboweled. After the goat or calf is readied, it is thrown onto the field of play that has been especially prepared for the match, and then mounted riders, divided into two groups, A and B, descend onto the field with their horses and begin to vie for the goat’s corpse lying on the ground. Whoever arrives first claims the goat as his spoils, taking it from the ground, darting off after securing the goat under his leg with the members of the opposing team hot in pursuit. Members of the goat-possessor’s team also follow suit, and without breaking ranks spend all their efforts on preventing the goat from being taken from the carrier as the members of the opposing team struggle hard to wrest it from them. The scene then takes on the appearance of a frenetic battlefield. Viewers of the match infuse the playing field with energy through their lively shouts and cheers. Among the goat tussling athletes, some are responsible for blocking the path of the player with the goat, while the stronger members of a team are responsible for defending the goat-carrying player as they all race towards the goal, and when the carrier arrives, he throws the goat into a designated container or structure. The goat’s corpse becomes the trophy for the team that attains victory.

Either large-scale or small-scale goat tussle matches and horse races can be held depending on the circumstances of a particular locale. Public organizations or wealthy individuals interested in promoting public sporting take on the task of supplying funds themselves and gather together goat tussle players and horse racers within their own neighborhoods or in nearby ones, hosting these unique games in the spirit of friendship and unity. A dedicated referee is hired to manage the regulations, scheduling, and hosting of the games. At the end of the events, the winning players are presented gifts. The winning horse of the races is adorned with a red cloth, and praise is given to the abilities of the horsemen and their steeds.

In 1949, a massive goat tussle game that used a calf instead of a goat was held in Yopurgha County [Mandarin: 岳普湖县, Yuepuhu Xian] between players from Yéngisheher [疏勒县, Shule Xian], Peyziwat [伽师县, Jiashi Xian], Maralbéshi [巴楚县, Bachu Xian] and other locals. During the game, a famous goat tussler named Nur Sidiq wowed the audience by flawlessly tossing the calf’s body right into a wooden hoop serving as the goal.

One day, I’m going to watch one of these games, hopefully one of those giant scale ones that last days and range over vast grasslands. Still, even though this article cleared a few things up for me, I’m not entirely sure how a beheaded, disemboweled goat carcass rendered raggedy and dirty by men and horses yanking and clawing at it can be presented with the same pride and glory of an Olympic medal or a giant, golden trophy – but hey! That’s just me.

I’ve translated a short article published today on Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur service. Bilingual education is one of the most controversial policies of the Xinjiang regional government, and is frequently accused of being disproportionately conducted in Mandarin, of co-opting a freer system where Uyghurs had the individual choice to send their children to exclusively Uyghur or Mandarin schools, of creating new educator standards that drive Uyghur teachers with poor Mandarin skills into unemployment, and of putting the education of Uyghur kids into the hands of Han educators unsympathetic to Uyghur culture. While many of these criticisms are valid and documented, I also think that the bilingual education policy is also extremely difficult to criticize, particularly since the concern with providing Uyghurs with the linguistic skills to be competitive on the job market is indeed a valid one and can be seen all over the world, as in, for example, the United States where providing immigrant children with English-speaking skills is paramount. Education in Xinjiang is a rich topic that spotlights issues of indigenous rights, cultural involvement in education, the relationship between language and nationalism, and “domestic” globalization. Here’s a short article where RFA reporter Irade, a Uyghur, weighs in on the topic.

Chinese authorities in the Uyghur region are presently undertaking firm measures to expand “bilingual” education starting with children in kindergarten. According to information from today’s Xinjiang newspaper, Shule County [Hanzi: 疏勒县; Uyghur: Qeshqer Yéngisheher Nahiyisi] has set the target for children’s enrollment in “bilingual kindergartens” to 100%.

According to the article, Shule County has managed to build 105 bilingual kindergartens, which together have a total of 14,166 children. The first “bilingual kindergarten” in Shule County was built in March of 2006, and under a policy mandating the construction of a standard bilingual kindergarten, in just 4 years “bilingual kindergartens” have spread to every single village in the county, including the most remote and distant ones.

The central Chinese government has allocated dedicated funding for the expansion of bilingual education in the Uyghur region up until the year 2012 as part of the 11th 5 year plan. The policy was originally aimed at educational training at the kindergarten, elementary, and middle school level, and emphasized working to broaden the areas designated for construction projects.

The so-called “bilingual” education policy, based on forcing Uyghur children to speak Chinese, has aroused intense discontent among Uyghur intellectuals both within and outside the Uyghur homeland. Critics draw attention to the potential of “bilingual” education to threaten the normal development and healthy thinking of immature children and accuse bilingual education of being a planned and deliberate assimilation policy.

As usual, the original Uyghur will pop up on hovering over the text, written in ULY. While I think the article I’ve translated is definitely worth sharing, it doesn’t necessarily reflect accurately my own opinions on the subject.

This is a translation of a Mandarin article posted on Tian Shan Net on March 23rd about the expansion of the pilot program in the Kashgar Old City Reconstruction Project.

In 2010, the Comprehensive Management Project for the Reconstruction of Dangerous and Old Residences in Kashgar’s Old City (喀什老城区危旧房改造综合治理工程), with a total investment of over 700 million RMB, is to enter into a period of expansion. Use of “Coordinated Demolition and Coordinated Building,” “Voluntary Demolition and Coordinated Building,” and other themed methods initially implemented as part of a 2009 pilot project in five neighborhoods will be significantly broadened.

On 22 March, reporters learned from the Kashgar Municipal Government that among the various issues and difficulties of the Kashgar Reconstruction Project in the heart of Kashgar’s Old City, the biggest difficulty encountered so far is determining the best way to simultaneously ensure the earthquake safety of the good people of Kashgar and the preservation of their historical and culturally renowned city, while also striving to improve the livelihood and environment of the residents.

“Through the pilot project we’ve discovered that the ‘Voluntary Demolition and Coordinated Building’ method of reconstruction solves the problem of both rebuilding dangerous residences while protecting the historically and culturally renowned city, and so we can effectively guarantee the quality of the project and the construction timeline” said Shi Shixiong, head of the Headquarters Office of the Kashgar Reconstruction Project. Shi also added, “The residents can use the material from their old houses to raise enough funds to meet their primary needs, investment from the project is also available  in reasonable amounts. It is more important that the project receives the universal endorsement of the residents, as well as a high evaluation by UNESCO, while also providing the ‘Kashgar Experience’ to the world.” On the basis of the will of the residents, Shi plans to broaden these kinds of methods this year.

After the Kashgar Reconstruction Project began in February of last year, the project has used “Coordinated Demolition and Coordinated Building of Multi-level Buildings” (demolish and then rebuild), “Voluntary Demolition and Coordinated Building,” Protect, Preserve and other pilot designations for old or dangerous buildings.

In Kashgar’s Old City, by the end of last year, a total 4817 households totaling 399.7 thousand square meters were demolished, 8623 households totaling 600.6 thousand square meters were rebuilt, 3434 families were relocated to new houses or returned to rebuilt houses, and 522 families were given compensation money for their own relocation. Altogether 73.7 million RMB were invested that year.

According to Shi Shixiong, this year the project has already relocated 323 households and has exchanged 438 apartments. This year’s reconstruction itinerary has not yet begun, and currently planning is underway for the construction of homes for residences. The project anticipates completing the renovation of 1.27 million square meters, finding homes for 10799 households, and building 920 apartments totaling 41.5 thousand square meters to meet the needs of relocating residences, at the same time completing the accompanying infrastructure for all the related neighborhoods. For this year’s reconstruction and relocation an anticipated total of 150.87 million RMB is to be invested in the project.

Hat tip to Amy Reger and Henryk Szadziewski of the Uyghur Human Rights Project who not only called attention to this article through their Twitter accounts but also later wrote insightful analysis and criticism of the Kashgar’s Reconstruction Project at the Asia Sentinel (Who Decides Kashgar’s Future?) and openDemocracy (Kashgar’s Old City: A Landscape of Loss), respectively. Both these articles are required reading for anyone seeking a context to the flurry of construction that has taken over the fabled city and a counterbalance to the conspicuously and exceptionally adulatory content produced by domestic publications.

As usual, I’m open to any comments or criticisms Mandarin speakers may have for my probably shoddy translation.