Several days ago the continuously superb Xinjiang blog, Autonomous Region, noted from an April 2010 picture that on new signs in the Shanxi Xiang area, Uyghur characters have undergone a transformation and are now written as large as, if not larger than, Chinese characters. This is appropriate, of course, because this region of Urumqi is predominantly Uyghur.

Shanxi Xiang Neighborhood in Urumqi | View Larger Map

The catch–and in my limited experience there’s almost always a catch–is that rather than relaying the names of the stores or the type of wares they are hawking, the new, culturally sensitive signs instead broadcast the typical, trite ethnic unity slogans that, for some reason, the government thinks is somehow effective. Autonomous Region has already translated a few of the signs, though I hope he doesn’t mind of we take a closer look at the new slogans, sharing in particular the Uyghur phrases for any of our readers learning Uyghur, or at least interested in looking how the slogans vary and overlap between the two languages.

ھەر مىللەت خەلقى قول تۇتۇشۇپ تەڭ ئىلگىرىلەيلى!

Her millet xelqi qol tutushup teng ilgirileyli!

各族人民携手共同发展！

Let peoples of every ethnicity join hands and advance!

مىللى بۆلگۈنچىلىككە قارشى تۇرۇپ ۋەتەننىڭ بىرلىكىنى قوغدايلى!

Milli bölgünchilikke qarshi turup wetenning birlikini qoghdayli!

反对民族分裂 维护祖国统一

Let us oppose ethnic separatism and defend the unity of the land!

«ئۈچخىل كۈچ»كە زەربە بىرىپ خەلقنىڭ مەنپەئەتىنى قوغدايلى!

“Üchxil küch”ke zerbe birip xelqning menpe’etini qoghdayli!

打击《三股势力》维护人民利益！

Le

t us attack the “Three Forces” and protect the interests of the people!

ۋەتەنپەرۋەرلىك ۋە مىللەتلەر ئىتتىپاقلىقى ئۇلۇغ بايرىقىنى ئىگىز كۆتۈرەيلى!

Wetenperwerlik we milletler ittipaqliqi ulugh bayriqini igiz kötüreyli!

高举爱国主义和民族团结的伟大旗帜

Let us raise high the flag of patriotism and ethnic unity!

Trite Party slogans are a great way to learn the first person plural imperative mood in Uyghur grammar. Usually, one is introduced to the imperative mood in the form of second-person commands, as in, “[You,] come [here!],” kéling!. When you start applying imperative to first-person plural, it signifies, “Let’s [do something],” as in, “Let’s go!”, mangayli!, or “Let’s eat!”, yeyli!. In Uyghur, the verb always comes at the end, so if you ever hear a Uyghur talk at you in the usual native machine-gun pace and it ends in “-ayli” or “-eyli,” the speaker is suggesting you guys go do something together. In the above case, the speaker is the Municipal Ministry of Propaganda (市宣传部, sheherlik teshwiqat bölümi-seen in the lower-right corner of the first sign) and Miniprop is kindly suggesting that you, the reader, join him (her? it?) in “moving forward” (iligirilimek), “defending” (qoghdimaq), and “raising” (kötürmek).

It’s amazing how quickly you learn propaganda terms, both in Mandarin and in Uyghur, when living in Xinjiang – even before the riots. It’s hard to overemphasize the scale at which these signs and slogans saturate the city; when studying at one of Urumqi’s three major universities, before the riots, I eventually got jaded to the white-on-red “big character” banners that were strung up all over a campus that otherwise would’ve been quite attractive. Even my Uyghur textbook’s lessons telegraphed these political sentiments. I’m probably not entirely lying when I say I learned terms like “milli bölgünchilik,” ethnic separatism, and “üchxil küch,” the “Three Forces,” before I learned the Uyghur word for toilet paper.

I’ve said, many times, both here and elsewhere, that one of the goals of this blog is to serve as a counterbalance to the cumulative image of China that’s being sewn together by both other China blogs and by media voices on the PRC. Issues like development, economic advancement, and ideological freedom tend to be spoken of as if they are spread evenly across China. They’re not. And while your average sophisticated Shanghai expat may think that hamfisted, goofy slogans are a thing of the Cultural Revolution and are an unfair portrayal of China’s current intellectual atmosphere, I’d beg to differ. And, even if, by my anecdotal experience, most people roll their eyes when asked about the banners they see every day at work and at school, I still believe that there is a significant an intimidating abstract weight that comes out of the sum influence of these ubiquitous signs. Like CCTV surveillance in London, even if the efficacy of their intent, on paper, is questioned and scrutinized, it’s less about capturing crimes on tape or encouraging people to read and comply with slogans; ultimately it’s about signaling the omnipresence of the authorities and hint at its dominance. The content on the sign, perhaps, is less important than the fact that the signs are being hung in the first place.

Translation:

“On the Pakistani and Chinese media full of nonsense”

Abdullah Mansur

29/4/2009

[Arabic]

In the Name of God the Most Merciful, the Most Kind

Praise be to God, and Prayers and Salutations to the Prophet of God. But now,

[Uyghur]

In order to achieve its own political goals, the Chinese government, a habitual braggart who is always making up ridiculous things, has in recent times changed its methods, and having taught this game to Pakistan and other of its lackeys, has begun to play it together.

To people of sound mind, this is not something secret.

In this unsightly political game, where the second list of terrorism suspects came to nothing, the Chinese government had conducted itself in a way not befitting the government of a state, and had been disgraced before the people of the world.

In Afghanistan, the American government, in need of help in today’s difficult circumstances where they cannot do without a crutch, made China happy by labeling the Turkistan Islamic Party as terrorists and obtained China’s economic, political, and some military assistance.

In this situation, the Chinese government happily stained its lips and once again set about playing with the government of Pakistan internationally. According to what is known of this game, nine Uyghur members of the Turkistan Islamic Party, which has organized attacks on the Pakistani Security Forces, were supposedly arrested and handed over to China.

The Chinese government, which has all the time been imprisoning the people of Eastern Turkistan without reason, making false accusations and deceiving people, had in recent months, through the hands of its concubine Pakistan, arrested several Eastern Turkistanis occupied with their own private studies and business in Lahore and other cities.

In this way, the Chinese government has sought to show that it is a powerful country can challenge the Turkistan Islamic Party and to
break the spirit of pious Muslims living inside and outside the motherland. The Pakistani government has made this empty disclosure aiming to show its collaboration with the Chinese government against the Turkistan Islamic Party through concrete actions, and that it is reducing the pressure on both sides by blocking the flow of Eastern Turkistani Muslims to the jihad region of Pakistan and Afghanistan with the goal of preparing for jihad.

In recent times, the Pakistan government has not captured or handed over to China a single member of the Turkistan Islamic Party.

A state with the slightest sense of honor would of course not take pride in such falsification. Thus it would be best for the Pakistan and Chinese governments to tidy up this foolish propaganda which is now exposed. Likewise, the world’s news agencies would save themselves embarrassment if they more carefully relayed the propaganda of these states who go around making atom bombs out of “hot air.”

We would like to openly warn you: If any country captures a member of the Turkistan Islamic Party and hands them over to China, they will definitely receive a concrete response. This response, of course, will not be something for them to hear, but to see.

It will be most beneficial for the people of the world, among them the people of Eastern Turkistan, to clearly comprehend that, in the view of the Chinese, each
Eastern Turkistani living abroad, no matter who they are, is an enemy and terrorist. Their strongest desire is to seize them one by one, or group by group if possible, not leaving a single one, and imprison them and their land Eastern Turkistan.

For this reason, we honestly recommend that all the oppressed people of Eastern Turkistan living in exile stand alert on full guard against this viciousness of the Chinese government.

Commentary:

I feel very strongly that the speaker has Yarkand accent. The “r”s are a giveaway, as they are sometimes American and sometimes palatal glides. Note also his raised vowels and some odd moments where he seems to palatalize what would be a stop consonant in standard Uyghur, i.e. äjiship instead of ägiship. This may be immaterial. The last time we saw a video like this was when TIP spokesman Sayfullah threatened the Olympic Games. It was difficult to make much out, but he certainly rolled his “r”s.

On another linguistic note, this video uses, for the first time in my experience, the term hijrät to refer to the Uyghur diaspora. Hijrät, from Arabic, means “flight,” as in the hijra, when Muhammed fled from Mecca to Medina. This is an interesting cue, doubtless employed self-consciously, to emphasize Islamic, rather than ethnic or national, kinship. A brief, unscientific survey of secular Uyghurs shows me that this usage is highly marked, creative, and clearly charged with Islamic symbolism.

Similarly, the speaker only uses the word “Uyghur” once, preferring “East Turkestani.” As I noted in a recent post on an interview with Rabiyä Qadir, this is language that makes the problems in Xinjiang more than Uyghur issues. While Rabiyä Qadir reaches beyond Uyghurs to anyone living in the region, emphasizing cooperation with non-Muslims for the sake of national self-determination, the TIP plays up the Muslim angle. This is more likely to inspire violence within Xinjiang, but Islam could be a much better catalyst for action in Xinjiang, especially among rural Turkic Muslims who have not completely internalized the idea of an ethnonational identity.

Finally, catch the last line of the speech. “…stand alert on full guard…” If you’re a terrorist, scaring the people for whom you claim to struggle, putting them on “alert,” is a great way to get them to do your job for you.

One of the things that has remained frustratingly vague is the CCP understanding of ETIM. Of course, one thing is clear, the ETIM almost always gets blamed or at least obliquely accused for unrest, discontent, and violence in Xinjiang. In that respect, the government is unequivocal. But where does the government think ETIM comes from? What does the government think about the ideology driving these shadowy bandits? What does the government want the people of Xinjiang to think about ETIM? These deeper questions cannot be answered by the infrequent reports that state agencies and Western organizations produce on the topic.

So imagine my surprise and intrigue when at a local bookstore I spied a series of small booklets, written in Chinese, collectively titled “Readers on the History and Current Situation of Xinjiang, China.” One of these booklets is titled The Origins and Development of East Turkestan Splittism. This, of course, is a fascinating opportunity to take a detailed glimpse into how the CCP conceives and understands the ideology behind discontent in Xinjiang, and how it wants the citizens of Xinjiang to accordingly perceive the situation.

And so for the interest of all readers and scholars out there, I’ve begun translating it. It’s a slow, painstaking process given my curse of inadequate Chinese ability, but even the little section I’ve managed to cram into English wording  reveals a lot about how the CCP views the history of the region, and what kind of ideological manuveuring the government places on history as far back as the 6th century in order to legitimize its standpoints.

In a few days I’ll begin the first of what will hopefully become a serial translation of this booklet. Part One is titled “‘Pan-Islamic’ and ‘Pan-Turkic’ Thought”, and section one of Part One, which I’m almost done with, is called “The Origins of the Terms ‘Turk’ and ‘Turkestan.’” For now, here’s the introductory blurb, a single sentence that apparently is so important it is placed on an entire page all by itself between the table of contents and the beginning of Part One.

“泛伊斯兰主义”与“泛突厥注意”是19世纪下半叶形成的一种社会思潮，20世纪初传入新疆后，在特定的历史条件下，成为早期“东突厥斯坦”分裂主义的思潮基础。

“Pan-Islamism” and “Pan-Turkism” are social ideologies that took form in the second half of the 19th century and, under specific historical conditions, became the foundation for early “East Turkestan” splittist thought after entering Xinjiang at the beginning of the 20th century.

Now there’s a succint summary if I ever saw one. Stay tuned.

There are a lot of interesting tidbits in Beijing’s latest weapon in its information war with the specter of Uyghur terrorism, which lead me to believe that Beijing’s information warriors are trying to hone the way they speak about the East Turkestani terrorist threat, so as to produce a narrative that is simultaneously more convincing and more threatening. Thoughts under the break.

As newsmakers in Beijing engage in a constantly escalating duel of words and facts with cynics outside of China (mostly at this point with Tibet activists), they are faced with the task of balancing persuasiveness with the need to portray a threat that grows more dangerous and more lethal by the day. Frankly speaking, a few weeks ago the Tibetans accomplished the latter requirement quite well on their own, but things in Xinjiang have remained relatively quiet sort of creating a need in Beijing to “compensate” by divulging information, real or otherwise, on terror plots that would’ve happened were it not for the impeccable abilities of the Public Security Bureaus throughout Xinjiang. The latest news conference on Xinjiang terrorism also upped the ante in terms of what Uyghur plotters are capable of: now Olympian athletes are facing suicide bombers (sound familiar?), poisoned meat (sound familiar?), and kidnapping (sound familiar?).

What I’m seeing here are “threat details” flowing in between different news threads sort of like the way ink spreads slowly but inevitably when dropped in a test tube of water. Fanatics willing to commit suicide – that’s lethal and dangerous, and we see the possibility coming from both the Tibetans and the Uyghurs now. The Reuters article adds that the captives were ordered to commit suicide in the case they were captured. Food concerns – peoples of China are paranoid about the quality and the edibility of their food, and rightly so, but we’ve also seen those fears merge with not-to-subtle racism against Uyghurs in the “AIDS via kebabs” hoax that was publicly put down by the Xinjiang Health Department a few weeks ago. The fears still linger though, and its likely that Uyghurs poisoning meat for the Olympics will resonate with the residue left over by the AIDS rumors. Olympic hostages are also a lingering wound on the Olympic spirit that will get some people, particularly Germans, pretty worried.

To be fair, let me put a sentence out there to give both sides a look: either the propagandists in Beijing are putting their feelers out, sensing what the people are concerned about, and conveniently crafting a terrorist movement that fits right into that mold, or East Turkestan plotters of the Uyghur persuasion are doing the same thing and trying to hit the nerves of the Chinese populace that are most exposed. Or maybe both.

One interesting deviation from the usual news conference course of events is the lack of a spectacular, one day People’s Armed Police extravaganza where grenades are exchanged between police forces and militants, where x militants are killed and y militants are arrested right next door, where martyrs for socialism are made. It seems that amid a wave of skepticism over the thought of military-grade explosions in the Happiness Garden apartment complex in Urumqi, Beijing to be more subtle about the arrest details and more pressing about the potential results were the arrests not made, thus, we simply see “35 militants arrested over the past few weeks” instead “crash, bang, boom, kapow, and a victory for the people in your local apartment complex.”

Of course, just because the tone of justice is changing doesn’t mean ministry spokesperson Wu Heping is going to skip over some juicy new details about the last crackdown we saw in January. At the same press conference, we got the name of the first plots’ ringleader, Aji Muhammat, scary details about how close these guys were getting to do something (13 test explosions… were they at the Happiness Gardens, I wonder?), and, of course, more emphasis on the international nature of the plotting. Wu alleges that group was ordered to enter the country at the end of last year (begging the quite important question: from where? Pakistan? Uzbekistan, maybe?), and that they were ordered (from somewhere else) to have their attacks ready by April, i.e. now. We can all breath a sigh of relief knowing that we won’t be offed on an Urumqi bus during a terrorist test run.

So basically, tone down the terrorist-police confrontation to decrease the burden of evidence, play up the thwarted outcomes to get the right amount of quaking-in-yer-boots, and finally, plug it into an international network to tap into existing ideas about international terrorism and add a little more legitimacy to what you have to say.

As to what really happened? I’m surprised to see in an article on at The State that names have been released for the newest bust – Abdulrahman Tuersun and Kuerban Mutalifu – something that usually doesn’t happen until a few months later, as was the case with the previous bust. A year later, the sentencing of these fellas usually is quietly published on Chinese newswires with some additional details on “what happened” and “who was involved.” By then, the main media outlets usually don’t care anymore and the government is actually more willing to say more about what happened (though as usual, whether or not those statements are true will never be known…). I’ll actually talk about that in a future post, but we’ll keep our eyes open. Also, check out The State’s article for some commentary by Nicholas Bequelin, a Xinjiang scholr who was consulted for the writing of the article (something we’d like to see more of).

For Mandarin readers out there, here is news about the press conference in Mandarin. We’ll also look it over and publish any details left hidden by the AP translators here.

The city government of Urumqi has officially inaugurated a program through which city residents can submit suggestions to local officials drawing up legislation plans for the period of 2008 to 2012. Previously, when city officials were planning legislation, laws would be drawn up according to perceived societal “hot spots” noticed by people’s representatives and according to suggestions from department-level governmental structures. In the interest of including ordinary citizens into the law-making process, Urumqi legislators are now encouraging people to step forward with suggestions regarding the city government, economic and societal development, dispute-settlement laws, the need to add to or update the existing legal structure, etc. All suggestions will undergo a preliminary evaluation, and those deemed valuable will move on to a special committee, a panel of legal experts, and a special subsection of the municipal people’s congress. After the approval of these three bodies suggestions will be officially incorporated into the five-year legal plan.

“You look at your watch yet again… the meeting started almost three hours ago and we’ve already seen several officials read through manuscripts of over 20 pages… and there’s still one more speaker left to go!” Never again, proclaims this article on new time saving regulations for governmental institutions, will you have to slog your way through such situations. The recently published “Suggestions on further improving office work methods” includes a formidable slew of suggestions for minimizing waste of time in governmental offices, including “no more than two leaders should give speeches per meeting, “large meetings should not include over two hours of continuous speech,” “governmental plenary meetings should not involve over 5 people,” “departmental announcements should not exceed 10 minutes, ” “reports submitted to standing committees or special committees should not exceed 15 minutes,” and more. Now is a good time to be a cog in the bureaucracy, I suppose, and one can imagine that such new regulations will give our pals Wang Lequan and Nur Bekri more time to do…well…whatever they do.

On the morning of the 25th, Ismail Tiliwaldi, the previous Chairman of XUAR, payed a visit to the members of the regional People’s Congress standing committee. Tiliwaldi exhorted members of the standing committee to earnestly implement the new guidelines and overall spirit of the “two meetings” which recently concluded in Beijing, a reference to the meetings of the National People’s Congress and the CPPCC. Tiliwaldi himself was elected at those very meetings to be the vice chairman of the 11th National People’s Congress’ standing committee, a few months after voluntarily stepping down as the chairman of Xinjiang. Having as chairman always enjoyed the support of all peoples and nationalities of Xinjiang, Tiliwaldi assured the members that he would continue to work for his homeland in Beijing and urged the members to carry out similar efforts here in Xinjiang.

The Regional Propaganda Philosophy Meeting started on the 26th and lasted for a day and a half. The manifesto for the meeting pointed out that “As we stand on the brink of a new kind of history, looking at what it means to do propaganda work, we see that our duty is significant and that are responsibility still grows larger. We must raise our banner high, thoroughly understand our surroundings, emphasize that which needs to be emphasized, and to work hard to completely implement and accomplish the obligations that comes with this year’s regional propaganda philosophy work and to continuously uncover new ways to do what is required of us.” As things usual go with these types of gatherings, the emphasis was to carry out the spirit of the most recently convened NPC and CPPCC.

The Regional Civil Affairs Bureau along with the Xinjiang Funerary Association advises all citizens to be “civilized” when carrying out Tomb-Sweeping Festival rituals this upcoming Friday, particularly by “lessening” the volume of people going out for sacrifices, avoiding traffic congestions, and controlling the propagation of unmerited superstitions. Other advice published by the Bureau includes avoiding the use of firecrackers, avoiding the burning of sacrifices (and instead buying flowers or planting trees as memorials), and scheduling transportation away from peak travel times.

It should be no surprise, then, that, in 2007, this station, a member of Xinjiang People’s Broadcasting Station, held a contest to find and promote “The Song of the Taxi Gentleman” (的士之歌). The winner, by a teacher named Liu Jun (刘君), was “Camel of the City” (城市骆驼), a song now recorded by new Ürümchi-based pop singer Camel Hadron (骆驼强子 – yes, that’s how he translates it), known otherwise as Wang Aqiang (王阿强).

A play on Camel Xiangzi? Nah. “Camel of the City” is the title track of his first CD, the release party for which, held on 15 March at City Island Coffee (西提岛咖啡), I had the opportunity to attend in my private capacity. (You can find a rather embellished press review here at Tianshan.net.)

Camel Hadron’s apparently popular on the Web, and you can find several of his songs on this page (only works in Internet Explorer). I’ll stick with his release party, though, and you can make your mind up about the rest. Between endless speeches, some lasting up to twenty minutes, and an entertaining comedy act, Camel Hadron performed three songs from his CD: “Love’s Eyes” 爱之眼, “Camel of the City” 城市骆驼, and “Olympic Beijing” 奥林匹克北京 First off, Camel Hadron, himself, has a very good voice, which sometimes dips into classical intonation. He is clearly well-trained, able to bounce around on stage while maintaining his vocal quality. The emotion with which he sings drifts frequently into melodrama, but it is a precise, recognizable melodrama. In these respects, Camel Hadron makes a nice, plain, normal singer, entirely inoffensive, yet mildly impressive. The remarkable thing about Camel Hadron, as he showed later on during the event, is his ability to sing entirely convincingly in both a high male and a high female voice. He sang a duet with himself. Bravo!

Now the songs. I honestly couldn’t tell “Love’s Eyes” apart from anything else I’d ever heard in China. Everyone I was with, foreign and native included, had the distinct feeling they’d heard the song before, but they weren’t sure where. “Love’s Eyes”, like Hadron’s other songs, is marked apart from run-of-the-mill Han Chinese song you’ll hear a million times by its conservative and cautious use of the piece of sound symbolism that makes a piece of music most recognizably minzu: a sudden jump up to a long, sustained note with just a hint of shahaltai, the tightening of the throat found in certain varieties of throat singing. It’s supposed to symbolize the wide open spaces of the steppe. I think Tengger did it first, but I could be wrong. (Hadron adapts something similar, but cooler, for another of his songs, “Return East” 东归.) “Camel of the City”, despite being billed as a gritty song, close to life, was really more of the same. For all his praise of cab drivers male and female, I felt none of the bustle of the city, nor did my fellow audience members seem especially moved. The song simply isn’t Ürümchi. It’s too big, too plodding. If anything, it’s the feeling of being stuck in a Beijing traffic jam in the late afternoon. This was the buzz of 2007? The last song, by the same author, was “Olympic Beijing”. I’m still humming “Olympic Beijing”. Lyrically, it’s a cookie-cutter piece of trite Olympic propaganda, but the simple chorus and the backbeat (which Hadron doesn’t seem aware of as he sings on the CD) make it rather infectious.

The CD is 城市骆驼 by 骆驼强子.

Xinhua Network News Xinjiang Channel 新华网新疆频道

• 30 December 2007: Authors celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Xinjiang Writers’ Association on the 27th of December. The Association started in 1957 with only 50 members; today, 2000 authors are members.
• 31 December 2007: Three climatologists wrote a treatise on global warming’s effects on China’s Northwest for the Economic Consultation Newspaper. The summary is as follows: “As a result of global warming, our country’s Northwestern region is currently undergoing a transformation from a warm, dry climate to a warm, wet climate, and so in the future this arid area may become relatively moist. Experts believe climatic transformation will have a major practical and strategic impact on the local ecology, on regional economic development, and on other relevant factors. The Northwestern region ought to actively carry out responsive measures to exploit changing ecological resources, simultaneously taking advantage of the situation yet preventing and avoiding harmful side effects, thus bringing about better and faster economic and social development.” Seems to me that they’re saying “if global warming makes the Taklamakan Desert into a thriving oasis… more power to it!” Though I admit I haven’t read the full text, which is available through the above link.
• 31 December 2007:Regional Social Sciences Union held its annual meeting in Urumqi on the morning of the 29th. 200 scientists attended, revealing research results from 2007 and exchanging academic information.
• 31 December 2007: The Regional People’s Inspection Agency’s Anti-Corruption Bureau announced that this year special investigation operations lead to the conviction of 13 individuals working in the field of health care, including the Regional Health Department Financial Regulations Bureau Chief Chen Jianguo (sentenced to 10 years imprisonment) and the former president of Kashgar Prefecture People’s Hospital Zhu Zhong (sentenced to 14 years).
• 31 December 2007: The Party Secretary of Aletai Prefecture divulged on the 29th that the regional government has already approve the upgrade of Beitun (Beitun in Google Earth) to full city status and will also invest 400 million yuan to help bring about this status change. Beitun, which is the headquarters of the 10th Division of the XPCC, previously only held township status. Intensive urban planning projects aimed at remodeling Beitun began on April of 2007 and was carried out by both Chinese and British engineers.
• 31 December 2007: Qadir Qurban, a Uyghur computer specialist at the Changji police department, has become a candidate for Olympic torchbearer. Qurban was recommended by the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture for his efforts in bringing about stability via the implementation of the latest crime fighting theories and technologies. As the torchbearer selection process continues to unfold, Qurban works out daily and continues to pour efforts into his work, knowing that at the very least he can contribute by helping quash any preemptive efforts to hamper the Olympics through his technological work.
• 1 January 2008: This New Years a number of shopping centers passed out discount cards which triggered an upsurge of “panic buying,” leading a Xinhua writer to conclude that holiday frenzy shopping at extremely crowded shopping centers has turned to a new consumerist tradition in Urumqi.
• 1 January 2008: Surveys conducted and funded by the China Petroleum Tarim Oilfields Company and China Petroleum Northwest Oilfields Company have confirmed 974.1 billion cubic meters of proven natural gas deposits in Aksu Prefecture, enough to fill energy quotas for 200 million residents.
• 2 January 2008: On the morning of the 2nd, Urumqi International Airport had to close for the second time within a month due to heavy fog. Several hundred passengers were affected by the delays.
• 3 January 2008: The Central Propaganda Ministry, the National Broadcasting Headquarters, the Regional Party Committee and the Regional Government in cooperation with local industries are carrying out the “TVs for Ten Thousand Homes” project, which will provide 273 thousand 53 cm color TVs to low-income, rural households across Xinjiang. Akto County (a place known for being a hotbed of resistance) resident and program beneficiary Maimaiti Wushou’er gushed, “I didn’t expect that during Qurban festival I’d be sitting on my kang watching television, I must thank the party and the government for their care and consideration. Now I’ll definitely study with enthusiasm party policies, science, and cultural knowledge, and soon I’ll be able to cast off this poverty.” Imagine that! Maybe America can learn a thing or too from China: televisions, not bombs.
• 3 January 2008: Full-scale construction work on the Kashgar-Khotan railroad will begin this year. Surveying investigations and planning for this new railroad was conducted in 2007; now, the projects 6.5 billion yuan worth of construction investments will be directed towards the actual implementation of a new 775 kilometer railroad connecting Kashgar city with Minfeng in Khotan prefecture. The railroad is expected to begin operation in 2010.
• 4 January 2008: The city of Urumqi recently began the first “National Causes of Pollution Survey which will attempt to clarify the data available on pollutant producers in Urumqi by investigating the amount of pollutants, their sources, the directions by which they spread, their regional distribution, the current condition of pollution prevention systems, and expenses being put into pollution management. The data produced by the survey will form the foundation for upcoming pollution management reform.
• 4 January 2008: In 2007 Xinjiang companies extracted 26.4 million tons of crude oil and 21.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas, making Xinjiang the number 1 gas and oil producer in the country. According to current estimates, 20.8 billion tons of crude oil and 10.8 trillion cubic meters of gas are yet to be exploited.
• 5 January 2008: Nur Bekri, acting chairman of the XUAR, made an appearance at the regional Minority Elementary and Middle School Bilingual Training Evaluation and Feedback Meeting. Bekri, who as a high-ranking Uyghur member of both the regional government and the regional party probably underwent bilingual education himself, emphasized the importance of the continuing growth of bilingual education and ensured continuing support on behalf of the government for the program.
• 5 January 2008: The 36th meeting of the 10th Regional People’s Congress Standing Committee occurred on the morning of the 3rd. The primary topic of hand was preparations for transition to the 11th Regional People’s Congress, whose first meeting is rapidly approaching.
• 5 January 2008:As part of the “Fewer Children, Quicker Prosperity” project of the regional Population and Family Planning Committee, over 50 thousand households were each awarded 3000 yuan for voluntary renouncing their right to have a 3rd child. Left unstated in the article is the fact that minorities in rural jurisdictions are permitted to have 3 children per household, so the beneficiaries of this program are probably all non-Han.
• 5 January 2008: Starting from the 6th, the China Southern Airlines route between Urumqi and Dushanbe, Tajikistan will be transformed from a chartered flight to a regularly scheduled and operating flight. The route opened in 2004 but was chartered and therefore prices were often high and flights operated on an erratic schedule. After the 6th, both prices and times for the route are expected to stabilize.
• 5 January 2008: Thanks to rapidly increasing trade between China and Central Asian nations, the export volume of Alashankou, (Alashankou in Google Earth) a trade center located on the border with Kazakhstan on Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture, surpassed 50 million tons before the close of 2007, officially making it the busiest land-based railroad “port” in the nation.

Other

• 2 January 2007: David Challenger with CNN travel writes a standard-fare travelogue of his trip to Turpan. Though most of the writing is typical first impression descriptions many Xinjiang enthusiasts and scholars have long moved past – “The people were intriguing; Chinese were evident, and of course Uighurs, who looked like a cross between Mongols and Afghanis” – it is nonetheless interesting to see Xinjiang make a blip on a top-level American news network.
• 3 January 2007: Fresh produce industry website Fresh Plaza writes on the growing jujube industry in Gansu in Xinjiang. The jujube industry is expected to expand to over 3 million acres, which will make it the largest jujube base in China.
• 4 January 2007: China View runs aEnglish translation of the Xinhua article above regarding Xinjiang becoming the nation’s top oil/gas producer.
• 4 January 2007: Rocky Mountain News reporter David O. Williams makes some observations about the ski industry’s gradual shift of focus from the United States to Asia. With the skiing and snowboarding industry on the decline in the US, many American ski moguls are turning Asia’s vast untapped markets and prime skiing mountains. Ping Tian resorts near Urumqi are examined as a case study in this move; currently Ping Tian has many Americans on their team to help develop the resort into a top notch resort, including ski trainers who are passing on their skills to (former) Kazakh herdsmen.