Here is my translation, doubtless below par, of a recent interview with Rabiyä Qadir (Rebiya Kadeer, رابىيە قادىر) published on 6 May 2009 in the Italian Communist daily Il Manifesto.  Commentary follows.

Independence is impossible, we will struggle for autonomy

Rebiya Kadeer has lived her sixty years as though on a rollercoaster. The leader-in-exile of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang (a region of northwestern China, with a Muslim majority) has experienced long years of poverty and a brief, enormous wealth as a result of her trade throughout China; the honor of a seat in the National People’s Congress and the suffering of five years in police detention. These and other chapters of Kadeer’s life – three times a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize – are recounted in her biography, The Gentle Warrior [Die Himmelsstürmerin], just published by Corbaccio. A member of the Transnational Radical Party, on Monday and Tuesday, the “Mother of the Uyghurs,” as she likes to call herself, was in Rome, where she yesterday took part in a meeting of the Committee for Human Rights of the Chamber of Deputies. Over the next few days, she will address the assembly of the World Uyghur Congress, where her reconfirmation as President appears decided. We have discussed with Kadeer the strategies of the movement and the situation in Xinjiang, where the Uyghurs (about 8 million) complain of an attempt to assimilate them on the part of Beijing.

In the most recent stage of your life, you lead the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). What mark have you left while at the top of the umbrella of this Uyghur diaspora organization?

At the end of 2006, my objective had been to unite all of the Uyghurs dispersed across the four corners of the world, creating various associations that would be recognized in the World Uyghur Congress. These groups are making the world aware of the problems of our people and are busy promoting our language, history, and culture among the new generation forced to live far from East Turkestan (the name by which the Uyghurs call Xinjiang –ed.). And in the last three years, for the first time, our petitions were brought to the attention of the Parliament of the European Union, United States, and Germany, where I had the opportunity to speak.

Have you managed to maintain contacts with Xinjiang, despite the strict security measures enacted by the authorities in Beijing?

Since we have been branded a “terrorist organization” by China, it has been particularly difficult. Nevertheless, we have our ways. This is despite the fact that anyone who tries to access an internet page that talks about me or our organization will be treated as a “terrorist.”

Do you not believe that China’s economic development – which has brought construction and infrastructure to Xinjiang – is also to the benefit of the Uyghurs?

The only advantage in the development of East Turkestan is Beijing’s. While our natural resources – natural gas, petroleum, uranium, and others – are transferred to the Interior, we Uyghurs are excluded from the labor market and, through the prohibition of instruction in the Uyghur language, our culture will be wiped out. The economic marginalization of the Uyghurs has been achieved through the bingtuan [Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps – trans.], an enormous organization for military production – distributed mainly along the border with Central Asia – is intended to provide homes and work for millions of Han immigrants.

In your book, you recount the spontaneous protests staged during the 80s and 90s by the Uyghur population against the presence of Han colonizers. What about today?

Now, the only expressions of dissent that are allowed are those abroad. Since the opening up of the 80s and 90s, we have returned to a situation similar to that of the Cultural Revolution.

How are their relations with the Han, the ethnic majority in China?

They can have excellent relations with the Han, of understanding and of mutual respect. But the situation changed with the immigration to East Turkestan. Here we have made life impossible: The very fact of discussing politics, the problems of our people, brings the Uyghurs to be labeled as “separatists,” “Islamic fundamentalists,” “terrorists.”

Before the Olympics in August 2008, Beijing had distributed news of attacks in Xinjiang. What information do you have about these events?

They were staged. What we must stress is that[?], before the Games, 15 000 Uyghurs were arrested and locked up under accusations of “terrorism.” Thanks to the platform offered by the more important sports events, the Beijing authorities had manufactured a belief around the world that there were thousands of terrorists in East Turkestan, thus legitimizing further oppressive constraints on our people.

Last February, the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Beijing, said: We will pressure for human rights, but, in these economic times, other things come first. Have you lost your chief ally?

Unfortunately, at this time, the economic crisis is at the top of the agenda for the great powers. But our pressure on the State Department has continued, and I trust that we can continue to receive the support that we need from Washington.

You protested because Islamabad has recently extradited to Beijing nine Uyghurs who trained in Pakistan to attack China. Doesn’t Beijing have the right to defend itself?

In recent years, Pakistan extradited 21 Uyghurs captured in Afghanistan to the United States. These people were then declared innocent by Washington: Some of them found asylum in Albania, and the others still await freedom.

Let us leave the alleged terrorists aside. Are you not afraid that, in the condition of isolation in which Xinjiang has been constrained, there may have prevailed among its people a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam?

Traditionally, the Uyghurs have had nothing to do with fundamentalism. Every day, however, in East Turkestan, some Uyghurs are arrested because they have been accused of being Islamic fundamentalists. For Beijing, a “terrorist” and an “integralist” [one who adheres to an extreme or traditionalist interpretation of Islam, rather pejorative; some prefer "active Islam" or "political Islam" – trans.] are the same thing. These are labels that are applied to hide their policies towards us: prohibition on the distribution of Uyghur literature, the forced transportation of Uyghur girls into the Chinese interior, birth control, limitations on Islamic practice, immigration of millions of Han and the lack of work for us, execution of political prisoners. Xinjiang is the only region of China where they still condone death sentence for political prisoners.

If China grants real autonomy, will you renounce the dream of an independent East Turkestan?

We demand freedom. Today, only a minority of our people hope for independence. We fight for a true autonomy, such as that demanded by the Dalai Lama for Tibet. And this autonomy can only be obtained within a more general process: that of the democratization of China, one that benefits the whole population, not only the Uyghurs. If they give us liberty, we would be prepared to live with the millions of Han settlers who have been sent to our homeland.

Some thoughts:

Rabiyä Qadir is a politician. Just as the Dalai Lama, Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, Tarja Halonen, Abdullah Öcalan or anyone else in a position of leadership must satisfy the demands and play to the sentiments of a diverse community, so must she. Previously, it has been easier to dismiss her as a figurehead, an actor in political theater, prone to yelling and ranting and riling up her base of angry Uyghurs, pan-Turkists, sympathetic Westerners, etc. In this interview, Rabiyä Qadir comes across as a much savvier player. The talking points are broadly the same, but she makes some key concessions.

The most surprising is when she declares that the goal of her movement is not independence, but human rights and autonomy, not only for Uyghurs, but for all of China. This is not just an imitation of the policies of the Dalai Lama, who is an obvious point of comparison; that, I think, is a useful conceit for helping a European audience understand her movement and the situation in her homeland. Rather, this broader humanitarian goal has been a theme of Rabiyä Qadir’s for some time, albeit one not usually shared or emphasized by the broader Uyghur or East Turkestan movement. Early on, she framed herself not only as the “Mother of the Uyghurs,” taking a page from the early modern nationalist playbook digested fully by her cohorts abroad, but also as someone fighting for the rights of everyone in Xinjiang, even Han Chinese. The Uyghur independence movement, as I know it, is a fractious organization staffed by elites whose navel-gazing obsessions with self-definition prevent it from being taken seriously or achieving much internationally. If Rabiyä Qadir can successfully get them to become a much more broadly inclusive organization, then she may prove to be the leader the movement needs to gain real political traction. This pragmatic and less overtly hostile or racist stance gives the Uyghur rights/independence movement a much more mature face.

Rabiyä Qadir also dodges a sensitive question about the PRC’s right to defend itself. What would happen if she conceded that point? It would be of no help to Beijing, which has no interest in presenting her as an authority figure. It would certainly upset a certain section of her base, particularly actual supporters of Islamic fundamentalist and/or terrorist groups operating in or on behalf of East Turkestan. These are people who, I think, are not yet in the company of the broader, more ethno-nationalistic movement, but who could be drawn into it and away from violent action. This may account for her admonishment of the PRC for conflating terrorists and Islamic activists. I think, rather, that she did not want to say “No.” If Rabiyä Qadir claimed that the PRC has no right to defend itself, she would lose credibility as a mature leader and certainly provide fodder for PRC propagandists who, as she frequently reminds us, label her a “terrorist.”

Overall, I think we are seeing Rabiyä Qadir come into her own as a leader. At the very least, she is getting better advice on statesmanship. It is somewhat sad, I think, to see the Uyghur/East Turkestani movement give up on its central hope of a free and independent state, one that has always been imagined with lofty ideals in mind. This new vision, however, demonstrates that the movement is not entirely mired in the pre-1949 past, but that certain influential segments of it are willing to engage with present-day political realities.

According to the Tian Shan article, these individuals were honored under the third article of the “Regulations for the Canonization of Revolutionary Martyrs,” which deems individuals who “valiantly sacrifice their lives to protect or rescue human lives, national property, or collective property” and “meet death at the hands of the enemy while carrying out revolutionary responsibilities, or are captured and meet death at the hands of the enemy for remaining steadfast, or are persecuted unto death” worthy of the title.

With Uyghur rendered into pinyin, the three revolutionary martyrs who died in separate incidents are:

• Ma Jun (马军), for sacrificing himself to prevent arson
• Tuerhong Niyazi (吐尔洪·尼亚孜), for valiantly sacrificing himself to save a youth who had fallen into a body of water
  
• Wang Chunsheng (王春生), for sacrificing himself to save Tuerhong Niyazi

The seven honored victims of the attacks that occurred during the summer, all Uyghurs, are:

• Nueraili Aihemaiti (努尔艾力·艾合买提)
• Kuerban Yakufu(库尔班·牙库甫)
• Maimaitiaili Kuerban (麦麦提艾力·库尔班)
• Tuermaimaiti Abola (图尔麦麦提·阿卜拉)
• Duolikun Abudukelimu (多力昆·阿不都克力木)
• Abudureaji Kadier (阿布都热阿吉·卡迪尔)
• Yimingjiang Kadier(依明江·卡迪尔)

The AP article mentions that the victims of the heavy truck attack in Kashgar were all named revolutionary martyrs shortly afterward, whereas it took a good half-year for these victims to be given the honor. I’m curious as to what explains the discrepency; obviously there are a set of regulations defining who can be elevated to the stats of revolutionary martyr, but while both the Kashgar victims and the victims above died during surprise attacks, the first group was honored swiftly whereas the second group was honored only after what one assumes was a lengthy vetting.

The article makes no mention of the fate of the drowning youth that both Tuerhong Niyazi and Wang Chunsheng died to save.

For many (read: the Chinese government) this will represent a measure of closure for for a rapid succession of terrorist incidents that occurred in Xinjiang right before the Olympics (and one right after). Granted, the two suspects sentenced yesterday are supposedly responsible for an incident that was merely one of many – still awaiting sentences are the the hijacking incident suspects (who may face a more protracted legal process as they possibly are citizens of Pakistan), suspects for the Kucha attack, and the old lady and 8 year old kid apprehended in Peziwat in an incident that probably occurred during pursuit of people connected to the Kucha attack. Nonetheless the Kashgar attack was the most violent and most clearly defined instance of violence with terrorist intent against agents of the sovereign government.

Or was it? In September a tourist traveling in Kashgar at the time gave the New York Times some pictures he took during the aftermath of terrorist attack and the only eyewitness account of it, which was, frankly, befuddling and vague but nonetheless was enough to cast doubt on the official version of things, should we decide to take the alleged eyewitness’ photos and testimony seriously. As usual, the whole incident is mired in doubt, suspicion, and, most crucially, a lack of clear information, meaning that one can only speculate and make insinuations with word choice. Like, China hands death sentence to Xinjiang attackers (Reuters), two ‘terrorists’ will be executed (AFP – scare quotes in original), and Two Uighurs sentenced to death (NYT) – all hesitating to come out and just say plain terrorist. Well, except for terrorists sentenced to death from the China Daily.  But the China Daily is not a newspaper known for being unsure about anything, is it? I’m sure there’s one thing all the outlets can agree on, and that’s the impending deaths of two Uyghurs named Abdurahman Azat and Kurbanjan Hemit.

Urgent Notice

To all inns and bathhouses of the administrative district:

In compliance with a request from the local PSB substation, starting today, investigations will be carried out on the lodging circumstances of all individuals of  “Tibetan” and “Uyghur” ethnicity residing at inns and bathhouses of the Haidian District. Reinforce inspection and verification of any lodger matching the description above and report all cases to the local dispatch station.

Furthermore: every inn and bathhouse, when registering travelers, must double-check and accurately fill out the registration form.

All who receive Tibetan or Uyghur individuals for lodging must immediately report to the local dispatch station.

Officer to Contact: Wu Hu Cell Phone: 13801093916

Huayuan Dispatch Station On-Call Phone Numbers: 62014692 62032656

Minority individuals from “sensitive” regions being monitored in hotels is not something new – as far back as July, before the Olympics, there was a news report by Globe and Mail about how the unfortunate parties to a forced, mass Uyghur exodus from Beijing were invariably denied access to an inn or hotel after pulling out their ID cards identifying them as Uyghurs. And while the link above with the photograph of the notice was published on the 3rd of October, it’s unclear whether or not the picture itself was taken recently or long ago. Nonetheless, standing on its own the picture does at least constitute a form of evidence for this type of ethnic discrimination a tad more concrete than word of mouth.

But the notice does remind us that one often overlooked aspect of “being a Uyghur in the PRC” is the civil rights component. I identify this in contrast to aspects that gain greater coverage on media outlets, things like terrorism and separatism, or, the “humanitarian crisis” which I feel overlaps with civil rights issues but are usually more egregious yet more targeted violations of minority rights – for example, religious restrictions during Ramadan, or forced deportation of young Uyghur girls to Eastern industrial areas for labor. While these crises are absolutely worth knowing and analyzing, it’s also worth recalling that sometimes its the smaller troubles with a wider range that trigger greater consequences – the uncalled for nuisances that are capable of affecting all Uyghurs, regardless of whether or not they are man or woman, religious or secular, rich or poor, young or old. Something inexplicably, illogically, and absolutely tied to something as inconsequential as the way you look or a character on your ID card. Like these hotel restrictions.

I can’t help but consider the a similar situation that I became familiar with as a child of the US – namely, the American Civil Rights movement. Just for all you internet critics out there, I underline similar and do not say analagous, because they are not. But I think that on a generalized level there are some comparisons that can be made. For example, while during that time there were frequent and brazen acts of terrorism perpetuated against blacks in the South, most notably and gruesomely vigilante lynching, it was an act of resistance against a far more mundane yet more ubiquitous injustice that today represents the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement – Rosa Parks refusing to sit at the back of the bus.

Rosa Parks also reminds us that offenses against an individual’s civil rights does not a  Civil Rights Movement make. It takes two other things: one, an understanding by the minority community of what these violations are, how they operate, and where they come from, and, two, a willingness to speak and act out against those violations.

And so I was a little surprised and intrigued that in the link posted above, the one publishing the photograph of the police notice, there also were some reactions and commentary written in Mandarin by other Uyghur members of the Uighur Biz online community. I say surprised because Uighur Biz is a site based in China, written in Mandarin, and, like all sites in China, has registered an ICP license with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. Despite this, community members have voiced some insightful, penetrating, and surprisingly frank comments on the discriminatory hotel policy, its implications, and its origins, to which I turn to in an article that will be posted shortly.

And so for now, I’d just like to share just a few links to some post-Olympic stories of note.

The biggest thing, of course, is the post-Olympic crackdown that is currently going down. It so far has taken the form of a religious clampdown, going so far as to put pressure on outward signs of religiosity like beards and the veil during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. It goes beyond that, of course, but for analysis and discussion I direct you to Michahel’s Collective Punishment and Anti-Ramadan campaign posts. The Shanghaiist has done the great task of finding some of the original documents with the crackdown guidelines, such as this Huocheng County site and this blogger’s thoughts on the newly minhted regulations.

A story from the Shanghai Daily, less about Xinjiang itself, but nonetheless occured in Xinjiang and is of note: a shocking family tragedy comes to a violent close with the execution of Abduhalik Muzht on the 4th. Muzht went to his daughter’s school in December of 2006 wielding a knife, ultimately killing two students and injuring a teacher and two other students. Worse yet: the alleged motivation for Muzht’s attack was revenge for his daughter’s death – who was strangled by her brother, Muzht’s son, because he was embarassed by her poor grades. Now that is a lot to digest – something so tragic and convoluted it would be more likely in a soap opera than among a Xinjiang family. Again, I emphasize that on this information alone there is nothing particulary “Uyghur” or “Xinjiang” about this tragedy – given the stress one places on success in China, and the stresses the education system places on the children, this could’ve happened in Xinjiang, Guangdong, or anywhere in between. Still, who was this brother and why was he that obsessed over his sister’s grades (note that this was a younger brother still in primary school)? Why did the father kill his daughter’s classmates in revenge, when she was killed by her brother? Where was mom, and what will happen to the original murderer, Muzht’s son?The story is so bizarrely moving I’m compelled to look further into it when I have the time and I’ll post anything of note here.

The next story: the economic relationship between Xinjiang and the rest of China I feel is elegantly illustrated by the natural gas pipelines between the two. The first goes from Xinjiang to Shanghai. The second goes via Shanghai to Guangdong. Now, feasibility studies for the third pipeline have begun, according to the People’s Daily. One notices that poor Fujian, another economic titan of the East Coast, gets bypassed by both of the original routes. The solution, of course is another pipeline, and Fujian is the projected destination of the third pipeline should the plans go through. Railroads in, pipelines out. Does anyone know if the second pipeline passes through Zhejiang? If not, 浙江真可怜!

Finally, a fascinating report from Reuters on Nur Bekri, chairman of XUAR. Since Nur Bekri’s ascension to the Chairmanship back in December, I’ve been wondering who exactly Nur Bekri is and what he’s like – it was hard to find anything other than his official biography which unhelpfully lists all the positions he held. This Friday, however, in a speech to communist party officials, Bekri in no unclear terms stated his firm conviction that Western powers are directly supporting unrest in Xinjiang, likely alluding to the attacks that occurred back before the Olympics. From Reuters:

The region’s governor, Nuer Baikeli, said “Western hostile forces” unhappy with China’s rise were directly supporting groups opposed to Beijing’s rule in the region in the name of democracy and human rights.

“They all along have been direct behind-the-scenes backers and patrons of the ‘three forces’ at home and abroad,” Baikeli said, referring to terrorism, separatism and extremism.

“They are the most important external factor in the continuing rise of ethnic splittist, destructive activities in Xinjiang, and the large threat they pose from abroad to our national security and social stability will exist for a long time,” he added.

“Our struggle against ethnic splittism, in essence, is a struggle against Western hostile forces’ plots to ‘Westernise’ and ‘split’ our country, it is the continuation of the struggle the Chinese people have had for 100 years or more against imperialist plans to split China.”

I feel this is pretty significant, and can’t help but wonder how much of this is official party belief (either among officials in Xinjiang or national level officials) and how much of this is Bekri’s personal opinions, but the Reuters article does note some indirect sanction of Bekri’s words: his speech was hosted on the Central Government’s website on Friday. While unpersuasively accusing Xinjiang unrest to have backing from Muslim extremists in Central Asia and international terrorist networks is quite expected, claiming that the Western governments are directly supporting the same unrest Bin Laden himself is supposedly helping out is a very new development. Confidently accusing a foreign government of backing terrorism on one’s own soil is a profound thing, as anyone in the United States can tell you. The question, thus, is the one I asked before and I bring up again: as Chairman of the XUAR, how much respect should we ascribe to Bekri’s words? What does the Central leadership think about these statements? After all, VP candidate and governor of “America’s Xinjiang” (If I may take liberties to call Alaska that) Sarah Palin has been posturing quite aggressively towards Russia recently, but again, on the other hand, the democratically elected governor of a state in a Federal union is quite different from the de facto appointed mouthpiece in one of China’s “Autonomous Regions.”  Thoughts?

The Karshi police said that one of the attackers drove a tip lorry to hit a team of more than 70 policemen who were jogging to pass the Yiquan Hotel in a regular morning exercise at about 8:00 a.m. In the meantime, the other suspect threw an explosive toward the gate of the station.

The driver then abandoned the lorry to throw explosive at the policemen, after the vehicle veered to knock on a roadside wire pole, said the Kashi police.

The police confirmed that the driver blew up one of his arms after igniting the home-made explosive.

Police found 10 home-made explosives, a home-made hand gun and four knives from the vehicle.

Changing at least earlier reports that one of the suspects had injured his leg – apparently, instead, he’s lost his arm. Joy. Anyways, while checking the Chinese language coverage for updates, I find one page that after repeating the same one-sentence summary was at least nice enough to say “Stay tuned for updates”. Also on this page is a still that was marked 8/4, and depicts a guy in a prison suit who may possibly be one of the suspects (likely not the de-armed one). We see CCTV in one corner but the word for China in Russian in the other corner (???). On top of that, Chinese news websites are notorious for jumbling a bunch of totally unrelated crap into one article and without any alt text or captioning we have no idea what it is, but I’ll throw it out there for you guys anyways.

与人民为敌的，最终结果是自取灭亡！！！

For those against the people, the end result is to bring annihilation upon oneself!

向烈士致敬，一路走好

I salute the martyrs, and bid them farewell!

向死难的官兵表示最沉痛的哀悼,
恐怖行为，必须采取非常手段严厉镇压.

To those officers who died during the incident, I express my deepest sorrow.

As for the terrorist activities, we must implement extreme measures to thoroughly suppress them.

唉~~~缠头干的事。

Yeah… the towelheads did this.

恐怖行为越来越猖狂了，必须采取非常手段严厉镇压

Terrorist activities are getting even more savage, we must implement extreme measures to thoroughly suppress them.

哎~~~瞅瞅,咱中国办个奥运容易嘛…

Ah… can’t we Chinese host the Olympics in peace?

维吾尔族 的朋友们，我们都是同胞，我们都是中华民族，新疆自古以来就是中国的一部分，大部分的维族朋友们，是非常好客的，也是非常欢迎我们其他民族的，不过有极少 部分维族朋友，不满于现在的生活，不满于现在的政策。有时你们该想想，就算继续这样继续下去“继续100年200年还是这样“或者自取灭亡“`那又 是何必呢“知足常乐`！

My Uyghur friends, we are all fellow countrymen, we are all nationalities of China, Xinjiang has from ancient times remained a part of China, most Uyghurs are really friendly, and they genuinely welcome other nationalities, however, an extremely small amount of our Uyghur friends are unsatisfied with life today, are unsatisfied with current policies, sometimes they should think a bit, if things continue like this they’ll go on and on for 100 years or 200 years just like this, eventually bringing destruction upon themselves, or they can think “There’s no need for that!” and that’s enough to bring about real satisfaction.

早晚收拾他们

We should take care of them sooner or later.

我是新疆人“`
但我看到这些很伤心“`
这种极端的败类应该彻底消失“`
不然新疆永远都是一颗定时炸弹

I’m from Xinjiang

But when I see this it really gets to me

These kinds of extremist scum should really disappear

Otherwise Xinjiang will always be a time bomb

发生了那么大的事啊~快顶上首页给大家看~一定会是头条~奥运近了~危险近了~那些垃圾在作乱~

Something really big has happened… hurry and rate this video so it will reach the front page and everyone will see it… it really is a lead story… the Olympics are approaching… danger is near… those trash are blowing things up…

我是新疆人,当我早上看到这条新闻.我很震惊!
我是汉族,我有很多朋友是 维族 哈族. 他们跟我们一样都热爱伟大的祖国!
那只是少数的极端分子 蓄意破坏边疆的安宁与稳定.
我坚信少数极端分裂主义分子的阴谋不会得逞!
伟大的祖国只会越来越强大!
中国万岁!
中华民族万岁!

I’m from Xinjiang, when I saw the news this morning I was really shocked!

I’m Han, but I have many Uyghur and Kazakh friends. They’re just like us and really love the great motherland.

It’s only a small amount of extremists who plan on disrupting the peace and stability of the borderlands.

I firmly believe that the separatist ideology of this tiny minority will not succeed.

The mighty motherland will become more and more great!

Long live China!

Long live the people of China!

作为一个普通的维吾尔人，绝大多数维吾尔人是热爱祖国大家庭的，所以极少数分裂分子的阴谋是不会得逞的，我们反对分裂，维护统一；我为和平祈祷，为奥运的圆满举行祈祷。

As an ordinary Uyghur I can say, a large number of Uyghurs love the great family of the motherland, so the conspiracies of these few separatists will not succeed, we are against splittism, we are for unity, we pray for peace, and we pray for the success of the olympics.

奥运后，国家必须要采取强硬方法解决此类事件了，严惩不贷，彻底解决，还老百姓一安家和睦中国，中国加油！

After the Olympics, we must implement tough measures to resolve these types of incidents, we have to punish without excuses, completely resolve the problem, and give the ordinary people a calm and friendly China, go China!

And those are some of the interesting ones for now. Some themes: rapid unity over the death of the young officers, similar unity around fury towards the perpetrators. Note that although as of right now no news agency has made an explicit connection between Uyghurs and the attack, this is already a given in the discussion among the public. Several people have come forward urging calm among their (implied Han) countrymen, to not direct their anger in Uyghurs in general and repeating the mantra distributed by the state that the discontent is isolated among an extremely small majority, also, people coming forward and claiming themselves to be Uyghur while saying that the attackers do not represent the will of the majoriy (they invariably use the phrase 大家庭, or “great family” of which all the minorities are metaphorically a part of).

Also interesting are comments that state tough measures should be carried out after the Olympics. I find this fascinating. It seems to indicate to me that the ordinary citizens of China perceive all the tidying up that occurred before the games – including, one would imagine, the relaxation of censorship and the lip service to human rights – to only be temporary measures whereas analysts in the West have been praying (albeit with little hope) that the Olympics would be a catalyst for permanent changes. Instead, we can see here that even the 老百姓 ordinary Chinese are clearly aware that the stuff the government has been doing lately has been only for the Olympics and that the “normal Chinese way of doing things,” for example, harsh crackdowns, can return to the forefront when all the bleeding heart Westerners leave after the Olympics. Intriguing…

Of course, we can always count on some folks to throw in some comic relief…

杀死韩国猪

Kill the Korean pigs

喀什的事件 跟韩国猪什么关系？莫非你认为喀什和韩国相邻？你真的该学学地理了

What does the incident in Kashgar have to do with “Korean Pigs”? Could you possibly think that Kashgar is near Korea? You really should brush up on your geography

Not much can be said until we have an opportunity to view the video. The last time there was a buzz about an East Turkestan Islamic movement produced video, the resultant surprise and concern were quickly quashed by the content of the actual video itself which, as we covered here at The New Dominion, contained a number of inconsistencies and puzzling questions, all but ruling out the authenticity of the video’s claims.

Yet even with what little information we have, there are a number of eyebrow-raising points to consider…

First, why the delay? Why would such an organization carry out these attacks only wait until now to claim ownership of the violence?

Why would China remain silent on such issues even if they had the slightest inkling that East Turkestan terrorists were responsible for the acts? There’s a trend among the government to exploit every opportunity to justify increased Olympics security and crackdowns in restive minority areas, as evidenced by the glowing report released recently on “busting up terrorist cells”, as well as the intense domestic press coverage of incidents with really spurious, if not entirely fabricated links to religious terrorism. One would assume that these bus bombing incidents would also be revealed to the public as the machinations of Muslim terrorists, and thus further justify both iron security at the Olympics and massive crackdowns in Xinjiang – though I also acknowledge the possibility of a face issue, where the CCP is willing to acknowledge the threat itself but not actual instances where terrorists slipped through cracks in the Great Security Wall. It remains a fact, however, that the official government word on both the Kunming and Shanghai bus incidents is that while they definitely weren’t accidents, they aren’t linked to terrorism or the Olympics. Obviously the CCP and Seyfullah can’t both be correct.

Who is Seyfullah? What is the Turkestan Islamic Party? Much scholastic criticism concerning Chinese and American policy towards the East Turkestan Islamic Party (which apparently also goes by Turkestan Islamic Party, which also happens to be another possible name for the successor of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which may or may not have been eradicated) centers around the question of whether or not such an organization even exists on a structurally significant level. I’m willing to wager that if we were actually see this video we could ascertain just from the content whether or not there are genuine links to Uyghur-related unrest or if it is a deliberate but sloppy attempt to agitate, as the last video appeared to be. I would be interested to see what kind of background Seyfullah delivers his statement in front of, what language he speaks in, what kind of attire he wears.

What are the abilities of this shadowy movement? Violence attributed to Uyghurs has been on the decline for the past decade, yet suddenly there’s a Uyghur movement that is capable of striking in places as distant as Wenzhou, Kunming, Shanghai, and Guangzhou? Just as I believe the Chinese government is not beyond attributing Islamic, terroristic motives to secular hooligan gang violence in Urumqi, I wouldn’t put it past international agitators to attempt to weave a pattern between various violent occurrences, a pattern with no real basis in reality.

So basically, as is the case for most information coming out of China concerning Xinjiang or the Uyghurs – it’s time to suspend judgement. There are reasons this could be legit, and there are (probably far more) reasons this could be just troublemakers throwing fuel onto the pre-Olympic fire. But until we can see some primary sources on our own – rather than receiving information filtered through layer after layer of various news organizations – it’s hard to say what’s what. Trying to report on the facts about Xinjiang reminds me of what terrorism and “the war on terrorism” is all about – in the end, much of it is information warfare – it’s out-mis-informing the misinformation of the other side, until nobody knows what the hell is going on. That’s basically the situation we’re looking at when we try to analyze East Turkestani terrorism.

For now, we’ll just try to point out what we can and encourage a critical analysis and discussion beyond what reliable is simplly verbatim repitition of either Xinhua or “the terrorists” on the parts of the major news agencies. And in that spirit, if anyone has any comments, observations, or better yet, links to the alleged video, please do share in the comments below or in the contact form above.

Updates: Reuters has an informative article on the broken promise of press freedom in the Xinjiang and Tibet torch relays, part of a series on the Olympic flame. The New York Times also has an interview with noted Tibet scholar Dr. Robert Barnett on the relays in western China.  Here’s a quote: “[W]hat you tend to see is sullen resentment of these major government-organized activities. They’re just huge inconveniences and nuisances for everyone who isn’t a Chinese patriot.”

The Olympic torch has passed through Urumchi and gone. The flame was carried from a quiet, orderly official ceremony — described by XJTV news as renao (lively!) — at 9/7:35 AM yesterday morning. It passed from torch to torch between 209 runners, including members of 47 minzu, famous athletes, a famous dancer (Rena Abdukerim, who did not “sway her hips“), and several pudgy middle-aged men.

A couple of days ago, I wrote of my sincere hope that someone in Urumchi would actually be able to see the Olympic torch relay. Rumors abounded that the whole city would be on lock-down for the day. My hopes were not fulfilled. (See a piece by the BBC’s James Reynolds, which I think is right on the money.)

The vast majority of spectators were danwei-organized official cheering teams, no more than two rows deep, wearing matching outfits and sporting the official cheer and its accompanying arm movements. They arrived at their designated areas by 7/5:30 AM or so and dispersed in an orderly fashion following the torch’s passing. They were not allowed to leave their spots until that time. The crowds were monitored by rows of police, soldiers, and volunteer community deputies, who also watched the roads the previous nights. Many people reported seeing snipers at major intersections. All windows along the route were kept closed — open windows were shut by police.

I will grant that, for reasons certainly unknown to me, such security measures may have been entirely necessary. However, they gave Urumchiliks a pretty negative impression, especially to the few unofficial spectators. These people had to stand further away from the relay route, beyond specially-erected barricades.

The majority of people were, indeed, completely unable to see the torch relay in person, even as it passed by their homes. Even individuals who lived along the torch route were told to sit inside and watch it on television — and, indeed, they mostly did, though some, it seems, peeked out from their locked gates. Many people tried to stay in hotels along the route, which, by police decree, were not allowed to rent out rooms facing the route itself. Luckily, due to bureaucratic oversight, rooms slightly to the side were available. Hotels on the route were locked from around 8/6:00-11/9:00 AM or later, depending on their location. Shops and apartment complexes were likewise kept closed. Of course, the flame steered clear of the Uyghur part of town, where its reception would have been, perhaps, less warm.

We can compare the Urumchi relay, perhaps, to other Olympic relay events in China so far. From what I am told, many cities have seen what appear to be campaigns of misinformation — much as in Urumchi, people receive many conflicting reports of where the torch might be and at what times. Specific groups, mainly consisting of students and members of favored danwei, have been invited and organized, as in Urumchi. However, I am not aware of any previous official warnings to stay inside and actually avoid the event, as in Urumchi. The result is, in any case, more or less the same. History passes on by, and many people are left with a distinct feeling of anticlimactic disappointment and resignation.

The flame has proceeded today to Kashgar (referred to on this map as “Kashen”, an incorrect reading of 喀什), and it will be in Shihezi and Changji (“pearl of the northern foothills of the Tianshan Mountains”) tomorrow.

After the end of the Urumchi torch relay, the torch will proceed to Kashgar, Shihezi, and Changji. The cities on the torch’s route have been chosen as “the center of Asia” (Urumchi), “an important town on the ancient Silk Road” (Kashgar), “the Republic’s first military land reclamation city” (Shihezi), and “the pearl of the northern foothills of the Tianshan Mountains”, which is an awfully nice way to refer to Changji. The first of the 209 athletes to carry the torch, including ten foreign nationals, will be Uyghur boxer Abdushukur Mijit.

Here is the rough schedule for the torch relay in Urumchi: the opening ceremony will be at People’s Square (Renmin Guangchang) at 9/7:30 AM. The closing ceremony is to be at the Xinjiang Athletics Center West Square (Xinjiang Tiyu Zhongxin Xi Guangchang) at 11/9:55 AM. (The site also has times for the relay in other cities.)

For those who want to try to see the torch, it is meant to run down Youhao Lu, I believe from south to north, between these times. The road has been under renovation since April in preparation for the event, and it has now been decorated from end to end with Olympic-theme topiary.

To get a better idea of where the torch might actually be, it is useful to look at what roads will be closed off and when. There have been many rumors circulating in Urumchi today about a total freeze on traffic all day throughout the entire city. The actual regulations, as released by the City Transportation Department on Sunday evening and reported in the Urumchi Evening News today, are as follows:

From 7/5:00 AM to 2/12:00 PM, the following roads, mostly located in the southern-central part of the city (around Bingtuan Headquarters and Nanmen), will be experiencing rolling closures: Guangming Lu, Dongfeng Lu, Jiefang Bei Lu, Heping Bei Lu, Renmin Lu and Xinhua Bei Lu.

From 8/6:00 AM to 2/12:00 PM, the following roads, mostly located in the northern-central part of the city (around Xinjiang Normal University, the Sheraton, and the Xinjiang Library), will be experiencing rolling closures: Youhao Lu, Xinyi Lu, Beijing Lu, and Hebei Lu.

From 7/5:00 AM to 10/8:00 PM, all roads within the Waihuan “ring road” will be inaccessible to medium and large automobiles, though it is not clear if this includes buses. (I am told that most, if not all, buses will not be running.) Starting tonight (Monday 16 June) at 10/8:00 PM, police have been conducting screenings of cars within this area.

Good luck, however, actually getting a glimpse of the torch or its journey down Friendship Street. In Urumchi, unlike in other Chinese cities, residents have been told to stay inside and watch the torch relay on television, rather than watch from the barricades erected along the road. (Indeed, who is meant, then, to fill these barricades? Will government-organized cheering throngs fill the sidewalks? Will there be one token group of “ethnics”, smiling and sweating in nylon costumes? But I digress into cynicism.) Many foreigners staying in hotels, so it seems, have been told to stay inside all day “for their own safety”. Those staying in hotels along the route are meant to keep their windows shuttered, as well. This has not been reported, it seems, in any Chinese news sources, but the rumor seems highly pervasive and is backed up by (annoyed) personal testimony from locals and foreigners alike.

And so it seems that tomorrow will witness a Potemkin torch relay. Now, we should not kid ourselves by imagining that the Olympic torch, nor the Games themselves, have always been some symbol for global harmony, democracy, human rights, or any such thing. They are predicated, after all, upon the idea of the primordial nation-state, and they have often been used to advance some political purpose. However, the Olympics in Xinjiang, which I, for one, previously found merely chintzy and tacky with a cast of nationalism, have become downright Orwellianly creepy, and it is bothering a great many people, not just spoiled expatriates with internet access. Again, a random, last-minute bit of inconvenience has been unleashed on this city “because of the Olympics”, and it is getting somewhat farcical. I wonder how the workers who sweat day and night to build the shining new Youhao Lu ahead of schedule will feel when they cannot witness that event for which they labored so long.

Of course, they may not care at all either way. Urumchiliks seem to be of two minds about the Olympics. For the past few days, uniformed schoolchildren everywhere, it seems, have been running around carrying a little Chinese flag in one hand and a little Beijing Olympics flag in the other. They are excited, even if they do not fully understand what they celebrate. Adults seem rather less ready to cheer, though teenagers and students have been wearing Olympic gear with greater frequency. Most non-Han seem especially underwhelmed by the Olympics, which, despite their tremendous geographical and psychological distance, have been constantly invading everyday life here for the past several months. As noted in a previous post, the Games seem to be, at least partly, an excuse to make life more difficult out here.

I hope that the dear reader will forgive my anxiousness when it comes to the Olympics’ presence in Xinjiang. It seems that something meant to be fun for everyone — “One World, One Dream” and all — is being constantly politicized in one way or another, handled with the black leather kid gloves of an underconfident regime. I hope that the rumors are wrong, and that everyone who wants to and who can get off work will have the chance to go out and cheer for the torch. Since no one knows for sure when it will arrive, however, (despite the news) and since the route will be under lock-down, a fine opportunity to show off the genuine pride and enthusiasm that people all around the world feel for the Olympics, no matter where it is held, will be lost in favor of the world’s largest photo-op.