As I’ve observed several times before, it’s always interesting to see how strategic media organizations are when releasing information about Xinjiang simultaneously both in English and in Chinese. Bekri’s words on the stability of Xinjiang were deemed worthy enough to translate into English by the folks over at China Daily, and their coverage can be found here where the writer spun the story as a concerned regional leader warning his constituents and the people of China that the worse is yet to come.

The security situation in China’s northwestern region Xinjiang will be “severer” this year, the regional governor said here Friday.

“The (security) situation will be more severe, the task more arduous, and the struggle more fierce in the region this year,” Nur Bekri, chairman of the Xinjiang regional government, said on the sidelines of the annual parliament session.

This characterization of course is not incorrect – “brace yourselves, people of Xinjiang” is certainly part of the message here, and it doesn’t take a genius to ferret out the political advantages of constantly telling the populace that the menacing enemy is just around the corner and is this close to ruining your lives. Rather, this English version of Bekri’s words is a tad incomplete. The China Daily does insert one quote of Bekri’s thoughts on the origins of these seditious activities.

The “three forces” have foreign backings, he said, adding they could not survive without foreign support.

“They don’t want to see Xinjiang’s prosperity,” he said.

However, missing from this English version of events us Nur Bekri’s unambiguous declaration that Western hostile forces are what everyone should be worrying about here. Over at Tian Shan Net, you can read a more complete account of what Nur Bekri told reporters.

现在的新疆经济发展、民族团结、社会稳定、边防巩固，呈现出令人鼓舞的大好局面。但是，西方敌对势力一刻都没有放松和停止对我进行分裂破坏活动。今年是新中国成立60周年，也是新疆和平解放60周年，“三股势力”决不会善罢甘休，我们面临的反分裂形势更加严峻，任务更加繁重，斗争形势将更为激烈。

Today’s Xinjiang has seen encouraging developments in economic growth, ethnic unity, societal stability, and the strengthening of border defense. Nonetheless, Western hostile forces have not spared a single moment in carrying out splittest, destructive activities against us. This year is the 60th anniversary of the founding of New China, and is also the 60th anniversary of Xinjiang’s peaceful liberation, the “Three Forces” will certainly not stand idly by, and the anti-splittest situation we face will be more severe, the task more arduous, and the struggle more fierce.

Assuming that the English-language publications of the China Daily are meant for Western readers, it appears that the editors did us all the favor of tastefully removing the phrase “Western hostile forces” to spare us from the rather alarming accusation Bekri is making.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but the modern Chinese conception of “the West” does not include international Islamist terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York, the government’s outward strategy in regard to local discontent in Xinjiang was to paint the whole thing as a part of global Islamic extremism, culminating the successful persuasion of the US State Department to designate the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group. Many Xinjiang scholars and academics mark this domestic characterization of discontent in Xinjiang as a sort of paradigm shift, since before 2001, when by objective measures violent activities were far more numerous, the governmental strategy was to simply hide the incidents as much as possible and claim total peace and stability as the norm in Xinjiang.

This, however, marks the second time since his ascension to the chairmanship of Xinjiang that Nur Bekri either sloppily or intentionally peppers his discussion of violent incidents in Xinjiang with the phrase “Western hostile forces” (西方敌对势力). The first time was back in September when Bekri delivered a massive speech to party officials in which he again identified “Western hostile forces” as the origin and financial backers of the “three forces” (of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism) within Xinjiang, which, in turn, are what brought about the violent criminal acts Xinjiang saw before and during the Olympics. In it, “Western forces”, the “Three Forces”, and international Islamic organizations like Al-Qaeda were mentioned with equal fervor and frequency; this time, as Bekri spoke briefly with reporters no mention of Al-Qaeda and the like occurred at all.

It certainly is up in the air how representative Bekri’s speeches and interviews are of general thinking among party leadership in Xinjiang, and certainly two instances do not by any means constitute a trend, but nonetheless I find it interesting how much polemic flak “Western forces” receive in Bekri’s rhetoric as opposed to extremist Islam which since 2001 has been identified by the government as the origin and backer of violence in Xinjiang. At the very least we may be seeing a tendency on the part of one high ranking Xinjiang official to – again, either because of semantic sloppiness or because of a deliberate agenda – blur the boundary between diasporic Uyghur organizations such as the World Uyghur Congress and individuals such as Rebiya Kadeer, which belong to the “Western hostile forces” rubric, and organizations such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement which, according to the government, are Islamic extremists with ties to Al Qaeda. To Bekri it appears that “Western hostile forces” take precedence over Islamic extremist ideology infiltrating from Central and Southern Asia. At the most, we could possibly be seeing another gradual shift in the way governmental officials think about discontent in Xinjiang – though, of course, before I can take my speculation that far we’ll simply  have to wait and see more of what Nur Bekri and other governmental leaders have to say about the issue.

And so for now, I’d just like to share just a few links to some post-Olympic stories of note.

The biggest thing, of course, is the post-Olympic crackdown that is currently going down. It so far has taken the form of a religious clampdown, going so far as to put pressure on outward signs of religiosity like beards and the veil during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. It goes beyond that, of course, but for analysis and discussion I direct you to Michahel’s Collective Punishment and Anti-Ramadan campaign posts. The Shanghaiist has done the great task of finding some of the original documents with the crackdown guidelines, such as this Huocheng County site and this blogger’s thoughts on the newly minhted regulations.

A story from the Shanghai Daily, less about Xinjiang itself, but nonetheless occured in Xinjiang and is of note: a shocking family tragedy comes to a violent close with the execution of Abduhalik Muzht on the 4th. Muzht went to his daughter’s school in December of 2006 wielding a knife, ultimately killing two students and injuring a teacher and two other students. Worse yet: the alleged motivation for Muzht’s attack was revenge for his daughter’s death – who was strangled by her brother, Muzht’s son, because he was embarassed by her poor grades. Now that is a lot to digest – something so tragic and convoluted it would be more likely in a soap opera than among a Xinjiang family. Again, I emphasize that on this information alone there is nothing particulary “Uyghur” or “Xinjiang” about this tragedy – given the stress one places on success in China, and the stresses the education system places on the children, this could’ve happened in Xinjiang, Guangdong, or anywhere in between. Still, who was this brother and why was he that obsessed over his sister’s grades (note that this was a younger brother still in primary school)? Why did the father kill his daughter’s classmates in revenge, when she was killed by her brother? Where was mom, and what will happen to the original murderer, Muzht’s son?The story is so bizarrely moving I’m compelled to look further into it when I have the time and I’ll post anything of note here.

The next story: the economic relationship between Xinjiang and the rest of China I feel is elegantly illustrated by the natural gas pipelines between the two. The first goes from Xinjiang to Shanghai. The second goes via Shanghai to Guangdong. Now, feasibility studies for the third pipeline have begun, according to the People’s Daily. One notices that poor Fujian, another economic titan of the East Coast, gets bypassed by both of the original routes. The solution, of course is another pipeline, and Fujian is the projected destination of the third pipeline should the plans go through. Railroads in, pipelines out. Does anyone know if the second pipeline passes through Zhejiang? If not, 浙江真可怜!

Finally, a fascinating report from Reuters on Nur Bekri, chairman of XUAR. Since Nur Bekri’s ascension to the Chairmanship back in December, I’ve been wondering who exactly Nur Bekri is and what he’s like – it was hard to find anything other than his official biography which unhelpfully lists all the positions he held. This Friday, however, in a speech to communist party officials, Bekri in no unclear terms stated his firm conviction that Western powers are directly supporting unrest in Xinjiang, likely alluding to the attacks that occurred back before the Olympics. From Reuters:

The region’s governor, Nuer Baikeli, said “Western hostile forces” unhappy with China’s rise were directly supporting groups opposed to Beijing’s rule in the region in the name of democracy and human rights.

“They all along have been direct behind-the-scenes backers and patrons of the ‘three forces’ at home and abroad,” Baikeli said, referring to terrorism, separatism and extremism.

“They are the most important external factor in the continuing rise of ethnic splittist, destructive activities in Xinjiang, and the large threat they pose from abroad to our national security and social stability will exist for a long time,” he added.

“Our struggle against ethnic splittism, in essence, is a struggle against Western hostile forces’ plots to ‘Westernise’ and ‘split’ our country, it is the continuation of the struggle the Chinese people have had for 100 years or more against imperialist plans to split China.”

I feel this is pretty significant, and can’t help but wonder how much of this is official party belief (either among officials in Xinjiang or national level officials) and how much of this is Bekri’s personal opinions, but the Reuters article does note some indirect sanction of Bekri’s words: his speech was hosted on the Central Government’s website on Friday. While unpersuasively accusing Xinjiang unrest to have backing from Muslim extremists in Central Asia and international terrorist networks is quite expected, claiming that the Western governments are directly supporting the same unrest Bin Laden himself is supposedly helping out is a very new development. Confidently accusing a foreign government of backing terrorism on one’s own soil is a profound thing, as anyone in the United States can tell you. The question, thus, is the one I asked before and I bring up again: as Chairman of the XUAR, how much respect should we ascribe to Bekri’s words? What does the Central leadership think about these statements? After all, VP candidate and governor of “America’s Xinjiang” (If I may take liberties to call Alaska that) Sarah Palin has been posturing quite aggressively towards Russia recently, but again, on the other hand, the democratically elected governor of a state in a Federal union is quite different from the de facto appointed mouthpiece in one of China’s “Autonomous Regions.”  Thoughts?

This picture is awesome.

Mr. Bekri, who ascended to the chairmanship in early January after his predecessor Ismail Tiliwaldi stepped down, is pretty much a blank page. Sometimes in the most literal sense: although Mr. Bekri is listed as the local government leader of Xinjiang in China.org’s Who’s Who, he, unlike most of the other leaders, has yet to have a linked page about his history in the PRC leadership. Even the voluminous China Vitae lacks a page on Bekri. The only way left, then, to get an impression of Bekri is to look not to his past, but instead, to his actions in the now.

One of the responsibilities of a new official, especially one chosen in the manner Bekri was, is to demonstrate the ways in which he agrees with his predecessor, and the ways in which he departs from former policies. Bekri’s position, which seems so far to serve as a bridge-slash-mouthpiece between the Central Government and the Uyghurs of Xinjiang, is naturally predisposed towards preserving the status-quo and reducing uncertainty. One thing has become certain after last week’s meeting of the People’s National Congress, and that is Bekri intends to preserve fully, right down to the word-to-word rhetoric, the policies of Tiliwaldi vis-a-vis terrorism. From a China Daily article released yesterday:

“Although we have achieved some initial success, we will never slacken in our fight against these evil forces,” he told China Daily.

“We should stay on high alert all the time to crush any attempt to damage Xinjiang’s development and stability.”

Bekri, a deputy to the 11th NPC, made the remarks on the sidelines of the ongoing annual session of the top legislature.

He acknowledged that terrorism, separatism and extremism remain the greatest threats to the region’s development.

“But we have the capability and confidence to safeguard our country’s territorial integrity and ethnic unity,” he said.

A stable, peaceful Xinjiang: anti-terrorism drills near Yining

There’s nothing really new here: good vs. evil, development and stability vs. separatism and extremism, overarching themes of “territorial integrity and ethnic unity.” Elsewhere in the same article we are introduced to some other interesting personae; Hou Xiaoqin, the political commisar of the Xinjiang Armed Police Regiment, and Mamat Hasan, deputy political commisar of the Xinjiang Military Command.

Hou identifies ETIM, or the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, as the primary threat within the larger specter of terrorism in Xinjiang. I’ve seen multiple documents, including this one, issued by Chinese sources describing ETIM as responsible “for more than 200 violent incidents, including explosions, assassinations, arson, poisonings and assaults in Xinjiang and other areas between 1990 and 2001, killing 162 people and injuring 440.” Emphasis on the 1990 to 2001 – a period of time that indeed saw an atypically high amount of violent episodes conducted by terrorist elements. However, as time goes by, every time I see this statistic repeated I can help but wonder with growing curiosity, “What about 2001 to now?” Statistics about such incidents remains expectedly hazy, yet one scholastic article I’m aware of makes a convincing case that the numbers of violent incidents has decreased since the late 1990s. I don’t think its difficult to come up with reasons why it is in the government’s best interest to be relatively less vocal about the decrease of religious violence in the Northwest.

Yet another point in the article, established by Hasan, sees ETIM as unambiguously a part of a larger Islamic extremism and, by proxy, sees China as part of the global forces united against terrorism. Specifically, evidence found during an anti-extremist raid in Akto County last January unearthed clear connections between ETIM and international terrorist forces (evidence that is always pointed to, but never shown, as far as I have found it). Again, its obvious that there are benefits to be reaped from plugging ETIM into a global terrorist network, but anything worth saying about this interesting point has been said in the Millward article above and by the ever keen-sighted davesgonechina in this blog post.

I’m going to have to say that, for the life of me, I simply can’t find an article on Bekri’s, Hou’s, or Hasan’s words in the Chinese media. I’m definitely not going to give myself the benefit of the doubt: I just don’t have enough Mandarin search-engine skills to find it, for sure. But one would swear specifically searching Xinhua for 白克力 would certainly turn it up… if any Mandarin-reading readers are up the the challenge, let me know if you can find anything. I’ll withhold saying “Hm, that’s interesting… English version, but not Chinese?” until the future.

Finally, thanks to a little boost by none other than the man Hu Jintao, Xinjiang managed to nab the top headline on the English edition of China Daily.

I’m not sure why it got that far though, or how long it will last (hence the “print screen” for preservation’s sake), because the actual linked article is just a picture with two paragraphs. Much like the Bekri article, in terms of content and what was said, there’s really nothing new. I’m more amused, actually, by yet another testimony to the rotten state of web design in China. Correct me if I’m wrong, but in terms of structure, shouldn’t the links after the summarizing blurb be semantically connected to the article itself? Hu calls for development, harmony in Xinjiang…FOOD CHALLENGE! It’s my humble opinion that Chinese web designers have a long way to go before overcoming the “vomit links absolutely everywhere with no logic or rhyme or reason whatsoever” phase.

Xinhua Network News Xinjiang Channel 新华网新疆频道

• 30 December 2007: Authors celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Xinjiang Writers’ Association on the 27th of December. The Association started in 1957 with only 50 members; today, 2000 authors are members.
• 31 December 2007: Three climatologists wrote a treatise on global warming’s effects on China’s Northwest for the Economic Consultation Newspaper. The summary is as follows: “As a result of global warming, our country’s Northwestern region is currently undergoing a transformation from a warm, dry climate to a warm, wet climate, and so in the future this arid area may become relatively moist. Experts believe climatic transformation will have a major practical and strategic impact on the local ecology, on regional economic development, and on other relevant factors. The Northwestern region ought to actively carry out responsive measures to exploit changing ecological resources, simultaneously taking advantage of the situation yet preventing and avoiding harmful side effects, thus bringing about better and faster economic and social development.” Seems to me that they’re saying “if global warming makes the Taklamakan Desert into a thriving oasis… more power to it!” Though I admit I haven’t read the full text, which is available through the above link.
• 31 December 2007:Regional Social Sciences Union held its annual meeting in Urumqi on the morning of the 29th. 200 scientists attended, revealing research results from 2007 and exchanging academic information.
• 31 December 2007: The Regional People’s Inspection Agency’s Anti-Corruption Bureau announced that this year special investigation operations lead to the conviction of 13 individuals working in the field of health care, including the Regional Health Department Financial Regulations Bureau Chief Chen Jianguo (sentenced to 10 years imprisonment) and the former president of Kashgar Prefecture People’s Hospital Zhu Zhong (sentenced to 14 years).
• 31 December 2007: The Party Secretary of Aletai Prefecture divulged on the 29th that the regional government has already approve the upgrade of Beitun (Beitun in Google Earth) to full city status and will also invest 400 million yuan to help bring about this status change. Beitun, which is the headquarters of the 10th Division of the XPCC, previously only held township status. Intensive urban planning projects aimed at remodeling Beitun began on April of 2007 and was carried out by both Chinese and British engineers.
• 31 December 2007: Qadir Qurban, a Uyghur computer specialist at the Changji police department, has become a candidate for Olympic torchbearer. Qurban was recommended by the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture for his efforts in bringing about stability via the implementation of the latest crime fighting theories and technologies. As the torchbearer selection process continues to unfold, Qurban works out daily and continues to pour efforts into his work, knowing that at the very least he can contribute by helping quash any preemptive efforts to hamper the Olympics through his technological work.
• 1 January 2008: This New Years a number of shopping centers passed out discount cards which triggered an upsurge of “panic buying,” leading a Xinhua writer to conclude that holiday frenzy shopping at extremely crowded shopping centers has turned to a new consumerist tradition in Urumqi.
• 1 January 2008: Surveys conducted and funded by the China Petroleum Tarim Oilfields Company and China Petroleum Northwest Oilfields Company have confirmed 974.1 billion cubic meters of proven natural gas deposits in Aksu Prefecture, enough to fill energy quotas for 200 million residents.
• 2 January 2008: On the morning of the 2nd, Urumqi International Airport had to close for the second time within a month due to heavy fog. Several hundred passengers were affected by the delays.
• 3 January 2008: The Central Propaganda Ministry, the National Broadcasting Headquarters, the Regional Party Committee and the Regional Government in cooperation with local industries are carrying out the “TVs for Ten Thousand Homes” project, which will provide 273 thousand 53 cm color TVs to low-income, rural households across Xinjiang. Akto County (a place known for being a hotbed of resistance) resident and program beneficiary Maimaiti Wushou’er gushed, “I didn’t expect that during Qurban festival I’d be sitting on my kang watching television, I must thank the party and the government for their care and consideration. Now I’ll definitely study with enthusiasm party policies, science, and cultural knowledge, and soon I’ll be able to cast off this poverty.” Imagine that! Maybe America can learn a thing or too from China: televisions, not bombs.
• 3 January 2008: Full-scale construction work on the Kashgar-Khotan railroad will begin this year. Surveying investigations and planning for this new railroad was conducted in 2007; now, the projects 6.5 billion yuan worth of construction investments will be directed towards the actual implementation of a new 775 kilometer railroad connecting Kashgar city with Minfeng in Khotan prefecture. The railroad is expected to begin operation in 2010.
• 4 January 2008: The city of Urumqi recently began the first “National Causes of Pollution Survey which will attempt to clarify the data available on pollutant producers in Urumqi by investigating the amount of pollutants, their sources, the directions by which they spread, their regional distribution, the current condition of pollution prevention systems, and expenses being put into pollution management. The data produced by the survey will form the foundation for upcoming pollution management reform.
• 4 January 2008: In 2007 Xinjiang companies extracted 26.4 million tons of crude oil and 21.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas, making Xinjiang the number 1 gas and oil producer in the country. According to current estimates, 20.8 billion tons of crude oil and 10.8 trillion cubic meters of gas are yet to be exploited.
• 5 January 2008: Nur Bekri, acting chairman of the XUAR, made an appearance at the regional Minority Elementary and Middle School Bilingual Training Evaluation and Feedback Meeting. Bekri, who as a high-ranking Uyghur member of both the regional government and the regional party probably underwent bilingual education himself, emphasized the importance of the continuing growth of bilingual education and ensured continuing support on behalf of the government for the program.
• 5 January 2008: The 36th meeting of the 10th Regional People’s Congress Standing Committee occurred on the morning of the 3rd. The primary topic of hand was preparations for transition to the 11th Regional People’s Congress, whose first meeting is rapidly approaching.
• 5 January 2008:As part of the “Fewer Children, Quicker Prosperity” project of the regional Population and Family Planning Committee, over 50 thousand households were each awarded 3000 yuan for voluntary renouncing their right to have a 3rd child. Left unstated in the article is the fact that minorities in rural jurisdictions are permitted to have 3 children per household, so the beneficiaries of this program are probably all non-Han.
• 5 January 2008: Starting from the 6th, the China Southern Airlines route between Urumqi and Dushanbe, Tajikistan will be transformed from a chartered flight to a regularly scheduled and operating flight. The route opened in 2004 but was chartered and therefore prices were often high and flights operated on an erratic schedule. After the 6th, both prices and times for the route are expected to stabilize.
• 5 January 2008: Thanks to rapidly increasing trade between China and Central Asian nations, the export volume of Alashankou, (Alashankou in Google Earth) a trade center located on the border with Kazakhstan on Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture, surpassed 50 million tons before the close of 2007, officially making it the busiest land-based railroad “port” in the nation.

Other

• 2 January 2007: David Challenger with CNN travel writes a standard-fare travelogue of his trip to Turpan. Though most of the writing is typical first impression descriptions many Xinjiang enthusiasts and scholars have long moved past – “The people were intriguing; Chinese were evident, and of course Uighurs, who looked like a cross between Mongols and Afghanis” – it is nonetheless interesting to see Xinjiang make a blip on a top-level American news network.
• 3 January 2007: Fresh produce industry website Fresh Plaza writes on the growing jujube industry in Gansu in Xinjiang. The jujube industry is expected to expand to over 3 million acres, which will make it the largest jujube base in China.
• 4 January 2007: China View runs aEnglish translation of the Xinhua article above regarding Xinjiang becoming the nation’s top oil/gas producer.
• 4 January 2007: Rocky Mountain News reporter David O. Williams makes some observations about the ski industry’s gradual shift of focus from the United States to Asia. With the skiing and snowboarding industry on the decline in the US, many American ski moguls are turning Asia’s vast untapped markets and prime skiing mountains. Ping Tian resorts near Urumqi are examined as a case study in this move; currently Ping Tian has many Americans on their team to help develop the resort into a top notch resort, including ski trainers who are passing on their skills to (former) Kazakh herdsmen.

Members of the 10th Regional People’s Standing Committee accepted the resignation of Ismail Tiliwaldi from the post of Chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. At the same meeting, Nur Bekri was given both the position of Vice-Chairman and Acting Chairman. In an acceptance speech, Bekri accepted the position with gratitude and assured all that he will work diligently to continue the Sinification of the region, to further implement Marxist-Socalist thought, and to strengthen the recent economic growth. For more information on Tiliwaldi, visit his page at China Vitae. More information on Nur Bekri’s political history is available only in Mandarin at this page at Xinhua.