Two weeks ago, outspoken Uyghur activist and intellectual Ilham Tohti was prevented from going to Turkey to attend an academic conference on Turkic culture. A quick background on the spat can be found here, at Radio Free Asia, but the best place to learn about what happened is from the words of Tohti himself, posted here, in Mandarin, at the controversial online community Uighurbiz. Tohti’s words are soaked with heavy emotion that is simultaneously weary and energetic; clear is his conviction that “enough is enough,” a merited reaction that I hope will lead readers to forgive his frequent use of the third person. Central to Tohti’s approach, and, in my opinion, vital to providing Uyghur discontent with social legitimacy, is a “law centered” critique which questions the latest refusal in light of China’s own laws and international conventions to which China is party.

The following is our translation of Tohti’s impassioned account into English.

These blacklists are always being used as weapons to trample the law for the sake of protecting “social order,” and so the law itself may as well be “illegal,” but of course the law can’t be illegal, therefore what’s illegal is the legitimacy of the government’s authority. Fairness and justice get flouted and eroded, and that’s a significantly harmful thing.

My name is Ilham Tohti, I am a Uyghur, and a legitimate citizen in possession of a valid People’s Republic of China ID who has for a long period of time conducted research on the “Xinjiang Problem.” At the end of March I received an invitation to the 2nd Turkic Culture Academic Conference  to be held in Izmir, Turkey from April 18th to the 24th. I knew from my current situation and past experiences that I had to inform the relevant “harmony” agencies that I was preparing to attend an academic conference. Through unceasing effort and multiple explanations they finally agreed to let me go abroad and attend the 2nd Turkic Culture Academic Conference. They seemed to believe I would not accept any interviews from the media or stay in Turkey… in the remaining time and with the help of a colleague, I sought out the school’s relevant departments, such as the Security Department, the Educational Administration Office, the Human Resources Office, the Organization Department, the Education Office, the college heads and classes at my institution, etc., etc., taking up a whole week’s time. When all was said and done I got them to put 13 red seals on my exit application. I started to worry that perhaps after leaving the country they wouldn’t let me back in. But when I expressed my concerns, they always responded: “How’s that possible? China is a country ruled by law.”

Though at that point all my concerns had not been addressed, I nevertheless went to the Turkish embassy to apply for a visa. At the Turkish embassy’s visa office I met with several other Uyghurs who were also planning to attend the 2nd Turkic Culture Academic Conference. The person in charge of visa applications at the Turkish embassy is Han Chinese, and I unfortunately already had the delight of experiencing his “attitude.” However, this time he appeared to be completely different person from when he completely refused, without reason, to accept my visa application materials back in November of 2009; his attitude was abnormally kind. Perhaps his attitude had something to do with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs understanding my concerns.

Getting the visa turned out to go quite smoothly. The day I received my visa, someone told me that the secretary of the Central Minzu Preparatory College, Arzigul, was informed that due to work requirements I was unable to leave the country. Learning this made me quite worried, as before I had gotten wind that certain relevant authorities were thinking of not letting me leave. That evening I was speaking with an Asia Weekly [亚洲周刊] reporter about the “Xinjiang Problem” when Domestic Security [国保]¹ gave me a call and came over. Could it be that they weren’t letting me leave the country?  Two Domestic Security officers spoke with me the whole evening, exhausting me completely! They said I couldn’t go abroad and attend the academic research conference but didn’t show any sort of paperwork, relying just on spoken orders which is an even more preposterous violation of a legal citizen’s right to go abroad. I asked: which ministry is responsible for this? Which article of the PRC Law on Managing Entry and Exit of Citizens is being implemented here? These Domestic Security officers just offered excuses, saying they were informed by their superiors and were not privy to the exact particulars. One of them told me that his higher-ups decreed that I couldn’t leave the country but didn’t explain the reasons, and further suggested that I accept the “vacation” they had arranged for me,  to “another place” [in China] until the end of the conference in Turkey (and so two days later I took a plane to the South [of China] and there was “vacationed”²). I asked again: “Did you check and see which ministry this information was approved by?” They answered: “This is how the workflow is within the ministry, this is what the boss ordered, and even he’s not clear on what the relevant situation is, there’s no way to tell you.” When I tried to get him to show some documents and asked about compensation for the financial losses due to not being able to leave the country, I was met only with refusals. To all the relevant parties I express befuddlement at this reckless deprival of a citizen’s fundamental right to leave the country as well as deeply felt helplessness and regret. Analyzing the refusal to let me leave the country, perhaps it has something to do with being scared of someone “speaking the truth.” How is it that “Law Unsurpassed by None” can’t even protect one citizens most basic personal legal right?  The last half of last year I received invitations from Norway, Turkey, Sweden and several other countries, and each time I was prevented by the authorities from leaving the country. Perhaps I, Ilham Tohti, have been placed on a no-exit government blacklist? Are the authorities limiting one’s right to exit or enter the country to punish dissenting voices, or isolate them from the outside world?

I’ve thought about all these problems. Ilham Tohti, a citizen with a proper ID, apparently does not meet whatever standards there are in the “Exit and Entry Law” that exists only in the mouths of the authorities; it’s plain that this is an extremely outrageous affront against a citizen’s right to leave the country.

What legal basis is there to prevent me from leaving the country?

1. Section 1, Article 15 of the “Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on the Entry and Exit of Citizens of the People’s Republic of China” states, “Under the following conditions, Frontier Inspection officials at the customs checkpoint have the right to prevent exit or entry from the country: 1) one does not possess a PRC passport or other exit document; 2) one possesses an invalid PRC passport or invalid exit documents; 3) one possesses a forged or altered passport or documents, or is using the passport or documents of another person; 4) one refuses to offer documents for inspection.” This is for verifying the identity of those entering or exiting the country. Ilham Tohti has a valid ID and a valid passport, therefore, this regulation cannot be cited as the legal basis for preventing Ilham Tohti from leaving the country.

Section 1, Article 37 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China states that, “The freedom of person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable,” while Section 3 states, “unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited; and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited.” As a citizen of the People’s Republic of China, leaving and entering the country is one of the legal personal freedoms of the complainant, and no work unit or individual may illegally deprive or limit this right.

Preventing Ilham Tohti, an ID carrying citizen, from leaving the country without any factual or legal basis is clearly illegal.

2. Section 1, Article 8 of the “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Frontier Inspection of Exit from or Entry Into the Country” states that “Under the following conditions, Frontier Inspection officials at the customs checkpoint have the right to prevent an individual from exiting or entering the country: 1) one does not possess exit or entry documents; 2) one possesses invalid exit or entry documents; 3) one possesses another person’s exit or entry documents; 4) one possesses forged or altered exit or entry documents; 5) one refuses to submit documents for inspection; 6) one enters or exits outside designated transit points; 7) the State Council or Ministry of State Security issues a notice prohibiting an one’s entry or exit; 8) Law or administrative rules and regulations prohibits exit or entry.” Because Ilham Tohti has a valid passport, was leaving through a legal transit point, has not been prohibited to leave by the State Council or the Ministry of State Security, and is not prohibited to leave by any law or administrative rule or regulation, this regulation cannot be cited as the legal basis for preventing Ilham Tohti from leaving the country.

3. When the authorities so brazenly deprive a citizen of his right to leave or enter the country, they seriously violate the 13th article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including their own, and to return to their country.

Everything I’ve done is what any other reasonable citizen would do, and also is what any citizen with a sense of social responsibility ought to do. I believe that I will spare no effort in advocating my principles, I will continue laboring and appealing for fair, equitable treatment of the Uyghurs.  I call on friends who are Uyghur, Han, and of all other ethnicities to respect rule of law and human rights, to respect one’s own personal dignity and the dignity of others!!! Let us strive to become a people with dignity!

[1]:^国保 is shorthand for 国内安全保卫支队, or the Domestic Security Protection Unit. Activists and intellectuals in China are familiar with Domestic Security as they are the individuals within the Public Security apparatus sent to monitor and police dissidents.

[2]:^ Literally, 被旅游, “to be vacationed.”The particle bei renders a verb into the passive voice, so wherease 旅游 normally is means “to go on vacation” 被旅游 means “to be vacationed” (outside one’s will). The use of “bei” to describe actions of the government against individuals, websites, and organizations has become a common, snarky way to cynically express the helplessness in the face of governmental restrictions or imperatives. Other notable examples include 被和谐, “to be harmonized,” 被自杀 “to be suicided,” and 被自愿 “to be volunteered.” This usage was honored as the 2009 Character of the Year and one of the Top 10 Neologisms in China by Chinese newspapers. See this translation at China Digital Times for more background.

They almost had me convinced, of course, and then today word got out that He Weifang, a renowned legal scholar at Beijing University Law School, has been essentially exiled to Xinjiang in what clearly is a punishment for "dissident activities."

He Weifang is acclaimed (or notorious, depending on your point of view) for being a lead signatory of Charter 08, a forceful manifesto released in December calling for further democratization and liberalization. Charter 08′s unequivocal demands attracted a lot of attention (but not signatures, sadly, for evident reasons) both domestically and abroad, enough to prompt the Chinese authorities to track down and "talk with" the scholars and intellectuals responsible for the charter’s conception, Professor He included. Even before his involvement with Charter 08, He was known for giving speeches and writing papers calling for sweeping legal and judicial reforms. Now, in what many analysts and acquaintances of He are calling a politically motivated punishment, He has been transferred to Xinjiang, far from China’s political heart, where he will teach for two years at Shihezi University. So despite the protestations coming from Xinhua, Xinjiang is not that nice of a place…

Xinjiang actually has a long and decorated history of being the final destination for disgraced officials, intellectuals, and rogues.

Of course, it’s not that Xinjiang really is that bad, but it has much more to do with the fact that Xinjiang was often the most "non-Chinese" part under Chinese dominion – a vast wasteland beyond the Great Wall’s final pass in Gansu, where the creature comforts of the civilized interior would be much harder to come by. This harsh reality bore down so heavily on those exiled to Xinjiang that they would often compose melancholic poems on the utter desolation that came with exile.

Hong Liangji was an official for the Qing Dynasty during the reign of the Jiaqing Emperor who eventually mustered the audacity to criticize the Emperor for his failure to weed out corruption and initiate bureaucratic reforms. Initially he was sentenced to be decapitated but eventually was given the slightly lesser punishment of banishment to Xinjiang. While in Xinjiang, he mused:

For half a lifetime, never one idle stride.
Scaling the Five Peaks left my temples hoary white.
But now, oustide the wall, for ten thousand li,
East, west, north, south — Heaven’s Mountains all I see.

Similarly, Lin Zexu, a civil servant under the next emperor, Daoguang, was exiled to Xinjiang after he orchestrated the destruction of opium brought in by British merchants and was made a scapegoat when Jiangsu and Zhejiang fell to retaliatory British forces (Lin had successfully warded off the attacks on his province of Liangguang; he sent warnings to the governors of Jiangsu and Zhejiang which were duly ignored). On reaching Jiayuguan, the fortress guarding the Western extreme of the Great Wall and the cultural "point of no return," Lin was said to have etched a poem on the wall capturing his sentiment:

Where the fortress scrapes the clouds
With its powerful battlements,
I rein up my horse by the border wall
And gaze back on the road I traversed.

The practice of exiling undesirables to Xinjiang continued even after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, which was essentially the principle behind the founding of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, also known as the XPCC or simply the bingtuan. Faced with the problem of dealing with tens of thousands of former guomindang soldiers, Muslim soldiers who formerly served the ill-fated East Turkestan Republic , and other political personas non grata, the CCP rounded everyone up, dubbed them the XPCC, and sent them off to industrialize and civilize Xinjiang. Like Hong Liangji they were allowed to live but at the cost of having to live out the rest of their lives in *duh dun duuuuh!* the Western borderlands. Anyway, I’m obligated to add that the children and grandchildren of these unfortunate exiles inherited the reins of what is now Xinjiang’s largest and almost completely autonomous political and economic unit, and actually are living pretty comfortably relative to the local population. Among the people swept up and dispatched to Xinjiang was Ai Qing, a revolutionary poet who feel victim to the Anti-Rightist campaign in the 60s.

There’s also Mao Zemin, Mao Zedong’s younger brother who was sent to Xinjiang to do work on behalf of the communists and was eventually executed by the ruling warlord, Sheng Shicai. Though as far as I can tell no records indicate that Mao Zemin’s dispatch to Xinjiang was anything more than a typical assignment for a Communist operative, one can’t help but wonder of Chairman Mao had any feelings of sibling rivalry to vent on his little brother when the decision was made.

While I find it disheartening that such an outspoken dissident like Professor He is being punished by being forcefully sent to a region that I am quite endeared to, I still hope that a lot of good can come out of this. After all, Lin Zexu, while in Xinjiang, did some research on the Muslim population and made improvements to the prevailing conception that the locals were a bunch of savage mystical barbarians. We can hope that He has not been entirely cowed by intimidation and authorities and may spread his legal reform message to Xinjiang where it is sorely, sorely needed. Anyway, to conclude, what was the downcast, evocative poem sighed by He as he prepared to depart to the Western Regions?

It’s okay, is not that bad there. I can go experience the life and culture there in Xinjiang."

Okay, so He’s parting gasps are pretty contrived. Nonetheless, I wish the best for Professor He and hope his time in Xinjiang will be as formative to his worldview as my time there was.

For many (read: the Chinese government) this will represent a measure of closure for for a rapid succession of terrorist incidents that occurred in Xinjiang right before the Olympics (and one right after). Granted, the two suspects sentenced yesterday are supposedly responsible for an incident that was merely one of many – still awaiting sentences are the the hijacking incident suspects (who may face a more protracted legal process as they possibly are citizens of Pakistan), suspects for the Kucha attack, and the old lady and 8 year old kid apprehended in Peziwat in an incident that probably occurred during pursuit of people connected to the Kucha attack. Nonetheless the Kashgar attack was the most violent and most clearly defined instance of violence with terrorist intent against agents of the sovereign government.

Or was it? In September a tourist traveling in Kashgar at the time gave the New York Times some pictures he took during the aftermath of terrorist attack and the only eyewitness account of it, which was, frankly, befuddling and vague but nonetheless was enough to cast doubt on the official version of things, should we decide to take the alleged eyewitness’ photos and testimony seriously. As usual, the whole incident is mired in doubt, suspicion, and, most crucially, a lack of clear information, meaning that one can only speculate and make insinuations with word choice. Like, China hands death sentence to Xinjiang attackers (Reuters), two ‘terrorists’ will be executed (AFP – scare quotes in original), and Two Uighurs sentenced to death (NYT) – all hesitating to come out and just say plain terrorist. Well, except for terrorists sentenced to death from the China Daily.  But the China Daily is not a newspaper known for being unsure about anything, is it? I’m sure there’s one thing all the outlets can agree on, and that’s the impending deaths of two Uyghurs named Abdurahman Azat and Kurbanjan Hemit.

See, though, this peculiar quote in a BBC article from John B. Bellinger III, legal advisor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice:

“[The Uighurs] were properly detained, they were in training camps… but they wanted to fight the Chinese. So there’s no question that we had the proper authority to detain them,” he told the BBC in an interview.

“Since we determined who they were, and that they were not intent on fighting us, we’ve been trying to release them. But China is the only country that wants them back,” he added. [...]

Mr Bellinger said American immigration laws were such that it would be extremely difficult to resettle them in the US, so he welcomed the “first breaking of the ice in European resistance in trying to help out”.

Who, exactly, is “we,” here, as in “we’ve been trying to release them?”  Judge Urbina made it pretty clear back in October that he and the judicial system think they should be out.  It’s the Bush administration, where this guy works, that’s been blocking their release by appealing Urbina’s ruling.  Come to think of it, this is the same administration responsible for locking them up seven years ago, the same people who wanted to throw away the key.  Since they’ve been cleared of all charges now for several years, shouldn’t this administration have started making an effort to resettle them even then?

Granted, I am no expert in US immigration law.  I am sure that settling a military detainee is difficult.  However, it’s not true that only “China” wants these men.  Several Uyghur families in the US have agreed to house the detainees as they adjust to life in the land of the free.  Is it possible that the US has been waiting for a European country (besides Albania) to clean up its mess?

This does make me wonder, where was Sweden in all of this?  Where was the Uyghur community in Germany?  Canada?  Honestly, I couldn’t blame them for considering this an American problem.  The US — my country — detained these men, locked them up, processed them, gripped them tight, kept them firmly inside.  Since they were imprisoned in the American realm, their place in America gained a certain naturalness.  When a country tries to hard to hold onto something, why would it want to give it away?

Then we have the question of US-China relations.  First off, I honestly have no way of knowing under which circumstances exactly the remaining Uyghur detainees were captured and delivered to the US.  It is my suspicion that they were not receiving any sort of military or paramilitary training.  In light of Bellinger’s comments, however, I wonder: Did he just say that the United States tolerates armed insurgency against the People’s Republic of China?  “[T]hey wanted to fight the Chinese … they were not intent on fighting us.”  Does that make them any less of a threat to human life?

To my mind, this can mean one of three things.  1. The United States government wants Uyghurs (and others) to be armed and angry and ready to disrupt the PRC presence in Xinjiang.  2. The US, having declared the men enemy combatants, has found a compromise for them, an identity that makes them insurgents but also prevents their return to China.  3. This is an acceptable story for media consumption, one that draws on preestablished ideas of Muslims in China and that obscures a more complex and bureaucratically byzantine truth.

This situation, of course, is not from neglect or lack of trying – journalists and academics come to Xinjiang frequently with the express purpose of ferreting out elusive Uyghur commentary on various subjects – the Olympics, the Uyghur way of life, terrorism, inter-ethnic relations, etc.  Naturally, there is no one Uyghur voice on these topics, and we can hold as axiomatic the fact that across the millions of Uyghurs in Xinjiang there are a wide range of stances, from one extreme to the other and everything in between. However, a robust network of rules,(some written, some not), surveillance, and punishments works quite efficiently in curtailing access to Uyghur opinions on a significant scale. Thus we are left with isolated, anonymous, and often furtive voices that crop up in media reports and academic treatises, to stand alongside the very vocal and hardly unchecked accusations of diasporic Uyghur activist groups. Furthermore, those voices are mediated – delivered to us through a writer who despite even the best efforts to be objective nonetheless has an agenda in writing the report or thesis, one that may differ from the objectives of the Uyghur source referenced.

But the exposé linked in the last post is notable because it includes surprisingly frank, critical, and penetrating commentary by Uyghur members of the Uighur Biz online community. This, of course, is not “unmediated” Uyghur opinion nor can we call it representative. Searching for opinions on the internet unleashes a whole separate type of skepticism – who can own a computer, who navigates online BBS’, who is willing to put forward their ideas, what does anonymity do to peoples’ self-expression. Nonetheless, it is, I believe, an untapped source for ascertaining Uyghur thoughts on these issues and it is far more direct and open than what comes out of an encounter with a journalist in a Kashgar alleyway. And so what is said in the commentary accompanying the notice is a lot more substantial and eye-opening than the usual one-liner delivered in a press release. And this is what I’d like to share with our readers today.

An important disclaimer – my Mandarin has lots of limitations. I welcome corrections.

Son of the West (西域的子) tells us how these policies personally effect people by describing the arrival of two PhD holding Uyghurs from Germany to watch the Olympics.

I had two friends from Germany come over, originally to watch the Olympics, they arrived at Beijing at noon on August the 6th, I went to pick them up, they received extra scrutiny when they passed through security, I had to sit around and wait at the airport for two hours until they came out, furthermore, I received a call from the police, and they made me report their travel arrangements, and they called me every two hours to ask about their every action, I brought them to an office run by Xinjiang folks to arrange lodging, but mysteriously the charge per night was 980RMB (usually it doesn’t approach 200RMB), but they thought that was too expensive, so they started looking for a place to stay, they went to several hotels but were rejected by all of them, and by the time it started getting dark they still hadn’t found a place to stay, originally they were planning on calling 110, but that was too much trouble and they didn’t call, and they had no choice but to buy a ticket for that day to go back home to Urumqi. These two got their doctorates in Germany, they both got scholarships, and have participated in important research projects. They’ve lived in Germany for four years now, and when I met them the first words they said were, “It’s great to be back home, and it’s really exciting to hear again the sounds we were used to hearing.” But they were very disappointed in Beijing, even in their own country they weren’t able to find a place to stay.

The notice posted on the wall in Beijing required inn owners to report Tibetan and Uyghur lodgers to the police, but we may speculate from the story above, and from other stories on Uyghurs being refused lodging, that hotel owners may have decided to circumvent the inconvenience simply by refusing Uyghur and Tibetan guests or charging unreasonable prices.

Several commentators observed the legal significance of this situation. This is first indicated by the rhetorically challenging title of the article itself, “Netizen Takes Picture of Notice Below, Reminding Us of Former Times in South Africa.” While the reference to apartheid obviously is meant to draw attention to the inherent racism of the police policy, one assumes that it also is a reference to the gradual and peaceful legal evolution which ultimately resulted in a fairer South Africa. Even more vexing to some commentators is the fact that technically the legal framework that renders these kinds of policy illegal already exist, and simply are just being flouted by the police. One solution, according to Gulzar, is making public knowledge of the law more widespread and available.

Even the police are issuing these kinds of emergency notices, so who’s left to protect our legal rights? With this kind of police notice, what kind of inn would be willing to take in Uyghurs or Tibetans? Whatever happened to the essence of the State Council’s document no. 33?

Actually these so-called “national regulations” are simply excuses certain departments have found for their local policies. National lawmakers should make the law publicly available to the masses, ensure that all people are aware of it, and resolve what it stands for and what it doesn’t stand for. So obviously, this statement of “national regulations” is absolutely an excuse, a strategic decision ejected from the ass of some public servant. It simply doesn’t have any legal foundation.

Of particular interest in Gulzar’s words is the insistence that these civil rights incidents are the work of corrupt and evil local officials who are ignoring and flouting a national legal framework and the edicts flowing forth from the centralized government. This is actually a growing theme in China that extends far beyond the Uyghurs – even in cases like the Sanlu Milk scandal and shoddy architecture in Wenchuan, “evil local despots” are decried by the people in contrast to the wiser rules at the center.

Other commentators pointed out that an entire ethnicity should not be punished for the actions of a small, violent minority – a rather poignant point since official documents regarding terrorism in Xinjiang always insist that the discontent is confined to an extreme and isolated group of people (极少数). Should this be the case, two different users named Azamat ask, why should all be punished?

Government measures have a direct influence on society. In any given country, inter-ethnic relations are a very sensitive and complicated issue. Criminal elements and terrorist extremists when all is said and done are an extremely small minority, if you can’t distinguish between these individuals and everyone else, you’re only going to proliferate the negative sentiments among the people. If a terrorist really wants to wreak havoc, he’s not going to check into a hotel and do business as usual. And as for these panicky prevention measures being carried out by the police, I’m afraid the only thing that’s being harmed are the sentiments of minorities. The police can ask hotels to strengthen safety measures in general but shouldn’t draw attention to ethnicity.

It’s the job of the government to combat criminal elements, but this absolutely must not come at the price of violating the rights of the people, and you simply can’t make an entire people the target of one’s suspicions, by doing it this way you’ll just strengthen the mistrust among certain sectors of society, create an even deeper chasm between peoples, to go from combating individual criminals to fomenting the mistrust of an entire people, this actually shows the incompetence of local governments and various departments.

Not only is the policy a type of collective punishment, the two Azamats observe, but it also has a very high chance of backfiring and simply increasing resentment among Uyghurs and Tibetans.

A user named Unique (唯一) points out that these types of policies are completely missing their target and are failing to address the fundamental problems behind the unrest in Xinjiang, interestingly invoking the Yang Jia, a 28-year old who walked into a Shanghai police station and killed 6 police officers. Interestingly, Yang Jia has become somewhat of an internet phenomena, receiving an outpouring of sympathy as a victim of circumstance, and later, of police shenanigans, despite his gruesome crime. Yang Jia expectedly got the death sentence, but Unique asks if the reasons compelling him to the crime in the first place were addressed.

The problem simply is not addressed by these kinds of methods.

It’s just like the Yang Jia incident. You kill someone, you pay with your own life. Otherwise the law is nothing but words. But the key here is why he resorted to murder.

And so the crux of the matter remains unresolved. You can’t keep on covering it up. The tension brought about by suppression will accumulate day by day, society itself will feel its effects, the feeling among the people will become more and more widespread until it spills over. And when the time comes the problem won’t be that of “a tiny cabal” or a few “unenlightened groups.”

Lastly, I’d like to end with the words of Yilihamu (伊力哈木), whose insightful analysis of history, various vested interests in Xinjiang, the “minzu” system, and the rise of a Uyghur ethnic consciousness is rendered even more powerful in that it is an authentic Uyghur voice. Yilihamu’s eloquent language for me evokes the powerful ideas explored by Ralph Waldo Ellison in The Invisible Man, a literary masterpiece on what it means to be a racially and ethnically marginalized stranger.

Both history and the present cycle of unpleasant disputes make it very difficult to resolve the complications that exist among Han Chinese and Uyghurs. During the times of authoritarian rule, the Uyghurs had the highest population and also the status of “autonomous ethnicity,” but because the resources they were able to take advantage of were relatively few, they continued to play the role of the “invisible people,” to retreat behind their own bodies. Further vexed by the so-called “East Turkestan” movement, Uyghurs wouldn’t dare come forward and hold their heads high, and gradually, they became the “unseen masses” and because of this the spirit of the Uyghur people faltered.  With further democratization, pluralization, and a growing feeling that their culture was gradually seeping away, Uyghurs started to acknowledge with ever-increasing awareness the presence of a crisis, and greatly inspired by the rise of the “human rights defense” movement, formed an ethnic Uyghur group consciousness. This, for the Uyghurs, is actually ethnic dignity and this self-awareness is actually a form of self-defense.  Society in modern Xinjiang is a fragmented society, and the antagonism among ethnic groups has caused a widespread crisis of confidence among the people of Xinjiang, on one hand everyone is a “person of Xinjiang” but each ethnic group has various, conflicting interests, each group disdains and quarrels with the other. Let’s think about this – Xinjiang has over 20 million people and it has been divided into several antagonistic ethnic categories, and at the same time within each ethnicity there are different groups, in this kind of situation anyone can be taken advantage of, oppressed, or sold out by someone else, in this kind of situation who else can someone from Xinjiang trust? On top of that in today’s Xinjiang various groups with vested interests are jostling with each other, the different administrative regions, the XPCC, centralized industries, the common people, these groups often clash for the sake of their own interest and often are antagonistic towards one another, in this type of situation both among ethnic groups and among groups with vested interests there is absolutely no trust, and there is a universal lack of confidence among the people.

I express my admiration to these individuals, not only for the insights they have put forward, but also for the courage to publish them on a website based in the PRC when similar sites have been closed before.

And so for now, I’d just like to share just a few links to some post-Olympic stories of note.

The biggest thing, of course, is the post-Olympic crackdown that is currently going down. It so far has taken the form of a religious clampdown, going so far as to put pressure on outward signs of religiosity like beards and the veil during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. It goes beyond that, of course, but for analysis and discussion I direct you to Michahel’s Collective Punishment and Anti-Ramadan campaign posts. The Shanghaiist has done the great task of finding some of the original documents with the crackdown guidelines, such as this Huocheng County site and this blogger’s thoughts on the newly minhted regulations.

A story from the Shanghai Daily, less about Xinjiang itself, but nonetheless occured in Xinjiang and is of note: a shocking family tragedy comes to a violent close with the execution of Abduhalik Muzht on the 4th. Muzht went to his daughter’s school in December of 2006 wielding a knife, ultimately killing two students and injuring a teacher and two other students. Worse yet: the alleged motivation for Muzht’s attack was revenge for his daughter’s death – who was strangled by her brother, Muzht’s son, because he was embarassed by her poor grades. Now that is a lot to digest – something so tragic and convoluted it would be more likely in a soap opera than among a Xinjiang family. Again, I emphasize that on this information alone there is nothing particulary “Uyghur” or “Xinjiang” about this tragedy – given the stress one places on success in China, and the stresses the education system places on the children, this could’ve happened in Xinjiang, Guangdong, or anywhere in between. Still, who was this brother and why was he that obsessed over his sister’s grades (note that this was a younger brother still in primary school)? Why did the father kill his daughter’s classmates in revenge, when she was killed by her brother? Where was mom, and what will happen to the original murderer, Muzht’s son?The story is so bizarrely moving I’m compelled to look further into it when I have the time and I’ll post anything of note here.

The next story: the economic relationship between Xinjiang and the rest of China I feel is elegantly illustrated by the natural gas pipelines between the two. The first goes from Xinjiang to Shanghai. The second goes via Shanghai to Guangdong. Now, feasibility studies for the third pipeline have begun, according to the People’s Daily. One notices that poor Fujian, another economic titan of the East Coast, gets bypassed by both of the original routes. The solution, of course is another pipeline, and Fujian is the projected destination of the third pipeline should the plans go through. Railroads in, pipelines out. Does anyone know if the second pipeline passes through Zhejiang? If not, 浙江真可怜!

Finally, a fascinating report from Reuters on Nur Bekri, chairman of XUAR. Since Nur Bekri’s ascension to the Chairmanship back in December, I’ve been wondering who exactly Nur Bekri is and what he’s like – it was hard to find anything other than his official biography which unhelpfully lists all the positions he held. This Friday, however, in a speech to communist party officials, Bekri in no unclear terms stated his firm conviction that Western powers are directly supporting unrest in Xinjiang, likely alluding to the attacks that occurred back before the Olympics. From Reuters:

The region’s governor, Nuer Baikeli, said “Western hostile forces” unhappy with China’s rise were directly supporting groups opposed to Beijing’s rule in the region in the name of democracy and human rights.

“They all along have been direct behind-the-scenes backers and patrons of the ‘three forces’ at home and abroad,” Baikeli said, referring to terrorism, separatism and extremism.

“They are the most important external factor in the continuing rise of ethnic splittist, destructive activities in Xinjiang, and the large threat they pose from abroad to our national security and social stability will exist for a long time,” he added.

“Our struggle against ethnic splittism, in essence, is a struggle against Western hostile forces’ plots to ‘Westernise’ and ‘split’ our country, it is the continuation of the struggle the Chinese people have had for 100 years or more against imperialist plans to split China.”

I feel this is pretty significant, and can’t help but wonder how much of this is official party belief (either among officials in Xinjiang or national level officials) and how much of this is Bekri’s personal opinions, but the Reuters article does note some indirect sanction of Bekri’s words: his speech was hosted on the Central Government’s website on Friday. While unpersuasively accusing Xinjiang unrest to have backing from Muslim extremists in Central Asia and international terrorist networks is quite expected, claiming that the Western governments are directly supporting the same unrest Bin Laden himself is supposedly helping out is a very new development. Confidently accusing a foreign government of backing terrorism on one’s own soil is a profound thing, as anyone in the United States can tell you. The question, thus, is the one I asked before and I bring up again: as Chairman of the XUAR, how much respect should we ascribe to Bekri’s words? What does the Central leadership think about these statements? After all, VP candidate and governor of “America’s Xinjiang” (If I may take liberties to call Alaska that) Sarah Palin has been posturing quite aggressively towards Russia recently, but again, on the other hand, the democratically elected governor of a state in a Federal union is quite different from the de facto appointed mouthpiece in one of China’s “Autonomous Regions.”  Thoughts?

The internet has been positively buzzing the past few days over the sentencing of 15 Uyghurs for terrorist activities in Kashgar a few days ago, particularly because the trial was public and because it resulted in the instant executions of two of the suspects. While most of the major news agencies remain rather conservative with reporting on the details, the RFA article claims that according to a woman who was at the public trial (allegedly, the community members were forced to attend), the sentenced and executed individuals were the scheming terrorists who were apprehended during the Akto daring raid of January 2007. The RFA articles as well as the bigger news companies name the two executed parties as Mukhtar Setiwaldi and Abduweli Imin.

This is where things get slightly confusing for us writers here at The New Dominion.

I’d like to direct your attention to one of our very first posts way back in November, that’s when we were still maintaining the painstakingly time consuming “News Roundups” which involved taking Chinese language news stories and providing English language summaries. One of the more notable stories we found buried in Xinjiang’s massive and unorganized pile of Mandarin-language reports was a lengthy summary of a recently concluded terrorism case, where six individuals were sentenced for terrorism activities that had gone on for a year and a half until they were apprehended almost a year before, in January of 2007. I quote what we wrote then:

Six defendants in what has been dubbed the Kashgar “12-25″ Threat to National Security Case have been sentenced for attempting to split the country. Under the charges of splittist activities, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the illegal production of explosives, 4 death sentences and 2 life imprisonment sentences were passed down. The Xinhua article announcing this sentence also includes a detailed list of the alleged suspects’ activities, including running a terrorist training camp for two months with the Hollywood name of “Black Canyon,” conducting an explosives collecting operation dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn,” resisting PLA counterinsurgency efforts by sabatoging communications facilities, blowing up public buses, and occupying the Kusilafu village’s government building and declaring independence. Kusilafu is a village in Akto County (Location in Google Earth), a hotbed of resistance to Chinese rule.

Here’s the clincher: the two individuals who were singled out as ringleaders for the terrorism operation and summarily executed in November of 2007 were named Abduwali Yiming (阿不都外力·依明) and Muhataer Setiwalidi (穆合塔尔·色提瓦力迪) – or, the Chinese transliterations of Abduweli Imin and Mukhtar Setiwaldi.

So, therein lies the mystery: what exactly is going on here? RFA claims that on the 9th, these two individuals were executed summarily after a public trial, during which they were accused of plotting terrorist activities and managing a hidden terrorist base of operations starting from August 2005. The plot was broken up when the police raided their hideout in January of 2007. However, we found a Chinese language article describing an uncannily similar trial being conducted in November of last year, with the same charges against the same individuals, with the same result (two summary executions, two delayed executions, and a number of other non-capital sentences). I vividly remember recalling when we looked at the article at the time being quite surprised that no international news agencies were picking up on the execution of alleged East Turkestan terrorists – only to be quite surprised to find out they finally picked up the scent, only 8 months later. We are thus facing a time-traveling trial and execution: did this happen just a few days ago, or did it happen last November?

I think the most obvious evidence for the trial occuring in November is the fact that the Chinese-language article describing the trial and dated in November is still up and viewable. While it’s possible that the two immediate executions were stayed for 8 months, particularly in light of new laws in the PRC mandating that executions be reviewed by higher courts, even if that should be the case the fact remains that the trial was done a while ago, and not recently, unless this second, public trial was intended to be a show trial to intimidate the local Uyghurs. After all, if we do a little sleuthing, we find that the original source of this new information is indeed the RFA article (all the other articles out for now are just repeating what the RFA said), and thus the RFA could be mistaken, or, it possibly doesn’t have the complete picture. RFA is known for basing most of its stories on reports by disgruntled locals, Han, Uyghur, or otherwise, making clandestine calls to their international hotlines. Via this manner RFA may have learned from local Uyghurs that a show trial and execution occured, but may be unware of the official sentences passed in November.

The second possibility, more sinister, sheds light on the fact that the CCP regime, with its struggle between increasingly uncontrolled and rabidly nationalistic domestic “flash media” and completely uncontrolled foreign media, has adopted a strategy of sometimes providing different versions of events in Mandarin and in English – one for home consumers, one for abroad consumers. Again, I bring up how surprised I was that there was such a detailed report on the trial and sentencing of alleged Uyghur terrorists that hardly made a blip on the international media – we’re talking juicy, sensational stuff like snap executions and crazy Muslims storming town halls. But perhaps the Mandarin language report was deliberately shoved into the rather mundane procession of daily news rather than plasted all over front pages for a reason – so that the “International Edition” could be unleashed at a more strategic time, say, when China publishes reports on Uyghur terrorist activities over the past half year to justify its current anti-terrorism agenda.

Under the break, I have a full English-language translation of the Chinese language article from November. For some great “Law and Order” style drama and some crazy allegations of what these folks allegedly did during their reign of terror, read on:

Sentences have been pronounced in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case; 6 individuals will be punished for attempting to split the nation. (2007-11-09)

The sentences in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case, which was tried in a Kasghar Prefecture Mid-level People’s Court, were pronounced yesterday. Abuduwali Yiming and five other defendants were sentenced either to death or life imprisonment for the crimes of attempting to split the country, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and illegally manufacturing explosives.

In order to achieve their secessionist goals, Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 defendants actively carried out extremist religious activities, declared “jihad,” organized a terrorist training camp, and made preparations to assist in the establishment of an “Islamic Caliphate” from August 2005 to January 2007.

Together the 6 defendants planned, organized, and implemented terrorist training activities, eventually recruiting several dozens of violent splittists to send to the “Black Canyon” terrorist camp, where they conducted training operations in secret for almost two months.

The 6 defendants also created a banner for their organization, drew up guiding principles and regulations, arranged goods and supplies for the terrorist training camp, manufactured explosives, and made preparations to conduct violent terrorist attacks.

The defendants twice conducted and participated in operations designed to seek out explosives-making materials, a campaign which they dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn.” They succeeded in acquiring 16 kilograms of explosives, eventually manufacturing 67 hand grenades and two suicide bombs.

The suspects formally established the “East Turkestan Islamic Party” and carried out two separate military operations while resisting capture by the authorities, during which the defendants destroyed communication lines, blew up buses, and occupied the Kusilafu Village government buildings to declare “independence.”

After the above-mentioned crimes were discovered by the authorities, the 6 defendants gathered a number of terrorists and began an organized military resistance against the armed police force sent to apprehend them, resulting in one injury and one death among the officers.

The court holds that Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants disregarded national law, demonstrated a long-term commitment to the reactionary thought of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and violent terrorism, and vainly tried to split the nation and create an “Islamic Caliphate.” Moreover, they actively communicated with and sought aid from terrorist elements abroad and over a long period of time exploited religion to implant extremist ideology in the minds of other individuals, thus encouraging others to choose, adopt, accept, and seek out “second careers” as terrorist elements who engage in violent terrorist attacks, opposing national unity and socialism’s “dictatorship of the proletariat” system.

The actions of Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants constitute the crime of attempting to split the nation, the crime of organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the crime of illegally manufacturing explosives. The judgments are as follows:

Defendant Abuduwali Yiming, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Muhataer Setiwalidi, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Kuerban Mamuti, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Aihemaiti Reheman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Yimin Miman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Paerhati Yakufu, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is given a mitigated sentence of life imprisonment due to “meritorious actions,” as well as permanent deprivation of all political rights and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, 15 years of imprisonment and 5 years deprivation of political rights. The punishment has been set to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

News Link

On January 5th, 2007, Xinjiang Police Forces destroyed an “East Turkestan Movement” terrorist training camp.

It is now understood that key members of the ETM were dispatched to muster a group of terrorists and enter the PamirMountains to establish a terrorist training base and conduct terrorist training exercises. On January 5th, 2007, as police forces undertook capture operations, the terrorist elements conducted an armed resistance which resulted in the death of one police officer and the injury of another. The police forces managed to recover, killing 18 and capturing 17 terrorists and confiscating 22 homemade grenades and 1500 incomplete explosive devices.

(All GoogleDitu maps now automatically focus at the all-China level. Please scroll west.)

According to sparse reports from the international press, a police station was assaulted last week in Sangong Hui Village by a group of Uyghurs. The Uyghurs are said to have used rocks and gasoline bombs in their attack. Several dozen people may have been arrested in connection with the attack. The attackers may have been protesting crackdowns on civil liberties in the run-up to the Olympic Games to be held in Beijing in August. No more details are known at this time. Although the incident has not been reported upon in the Chinese press, the Epoch Times, which I cannot for the life of me access from China, appears to have picked up the story. Michael Manning’s The Opposite End of China has some commentary.

Sangong Hui Village (三公回族乡) is a small village, encompassing nearby Upper and Lower Sangong Villages in Huocheng (霍城) County, 53 kilometers from Ghulja (Yining) and near the border with Kazakhstan. It is situated between the 218 and 312 highways, the latter of which leads west to Qorghos and Kazakhstan.

Thus far, the only source of this information has been Dilxat Raxit, spokesman for the World Uyghur Congress. If the story receives further press, we will comment on it here.

The idea that Uyghurs lashed out in protest over an increasingly harsh pre-Olympic crackdown makes some sense. Indeed, the restrictions imposed on life in Xinjiang, especially since the Khotan (Xotän) protests in March, have been sudden and without a satisfactory explanation: curfews of 11/9:00 PM have been imposed in many towns, especially in the South. It is now illegal to remove a knife from Khotan (and only Khotan) by post, bus, or plane, a law in effect since March but only under active enforcement in the last few weeks. Identification checkpoints and roadblocks are ubiquitous. For the last three weeks, the passports of non-Han citizens in Xinjiang (with, of course, certain exceptions for well-placed individuals) have been collected by government officials, to be returned after the Olympics are over. Supposedly, these are being held so that their possessors “will not lose them”. In some areas of Urumchi, including very “safe” neighborhoods, I have myself witnessed groups of “community volunteer police” (社区义务治安联防): ten to thirteen middle-aged, mostly Han, men walking in a bored single file, waving nightsticks. Besides their volunteer arm bands, they wear a uniform of a red Olympic hat and a t-shirt emblazoned with the Beijing Olympics logo on the front and the words “Welcome the Olympics, protect safety” (迎奥运，保平安) on the back. Given that Xinjiang hasn’t seen an ethnic riot on the scale of those seen in most of the rest of the world for many years – except, perhaps, for the skirmish between Han and Uyghur police academy students some time back – the sudden switch to a bunker mentality has left many law-abiding private citizens more than a little upset, and the explanation “It’s because of the Olympics” does not seem satisfactory. The implication, it seems, is that this is just what you do when there’s a hint of political jitters on the air: make things feel a little tenser in Xinjiang.

If I may editorialize further, it seems to me that, first of all, there is no large and active threat to public security and safety in Xinjiang. Ethnic and religious tensions are rampant and tangible in the everyday, but they are not, for the majority of people, violent, organized hatreds equipped with hair triggers. To lump, to take a hypothetical example, a law-abiding, China-loving ethnic Kazakh businessperson planning a business trip to Almaty in with a suspected sympathizer of the Islamic Party of Turkestan and revoke both their passports (how did the latter individual get a passport to begin with?) is to undo some of the work that economic development in Xinjiang has done to create a class of wealthy non-Han loyal to China. In the case of my Kazakh example, the better life to be had on the Chinese side of the border is what keeps such a person from asking for – and certainly receiving – a Kazakhstani passport. The sullen men with their big, black sticks just put the people around them on edge. The net result of all of this is an increasingly cynical attitude, as I see it, towards the Olympics out in Xinjiang, largely among non-Han who previously either did not care about the event or who held some hope that its light might shine out West. Suddenly, “One World, One Dream” sounds less inspiring when accompanied by jeeploads of angry young men in forest camouflage, a peculiar and jarring sight in the quieter corners of a grey city. It seems that China is having a dinner party, and non-Han are to be made to sit in their rooms upstairs and listen, the unwanted and twisted children. It is unwise to nurture resentment. Does the Chinese government want to make its own people angry?

If you live in Ürümchi, you’ll have noticed that North Youhao Lu (友好北路) is being torn to pieces. The street, lined with two to three rows of trees (inconveniently placed both to the sides of and in the middle of the bus lanes), is being deforested, the trees ripped apart and uprooted. Chaos rules in the bus lanes, which are now great gashes in the ground. Cyclopean concrete pipes await internment. This road work, which actually began ahead of schedule, is meant to continue until 20 May, according to Xinhua. It is in preparation for an unnamed event of great magnitude to be held at the international exhibition center in June. The pipes will also provide better drainage, preventing North Youhao Lu from becoming a “waterway” when it rains. Admittedly, traffic on Youhao Lu is pretty rough during Ürümchi’s seven hours of rush hour (7-10 AM, 3-7 PM Xinjiang Time), but I am myself very fond of the trees, and would wish to see them preserved. This is one of the charms of Ürümchi: its persistently wooded sidewalks. Now, it seems, Youhao Lu will look just like its parallel neighbor, Xibei Lu (西北路).

I am in no way joking, by the way, when I report that Ürümchi’s rush “hour” lasts from 7-10 AM and 3-7 PM Xinjiang Time. I have been told as much by several locals. Luckily, the Ürümchi bus system is remarkably accessible.

A recent famine among wild animals in Tashkurgan has been eased by an influx of donations. Early snowfall, which normally only occurs in March and April, has put wildlife populations there in danger. Over 40 000 RMB of donations from Xinjiang and elsewhere have provided 20 metric tons of food for the animals, who seem to be taking to it.

In contrast, we can see how swiftly the government acts on environmental protection. The Agricultural and Rural Working Committee of the XUAR Standing Committee will request that the Standing Committee discuss a law on the protection of natural woodlands. Various local laws on agricultural practices are already in place, though they are mostly concerned with “development” and consumer protection more than environmental protection for its own sake.

Finally, for the first time, Ürümchiliks have engaged in the worship of the Daoist god Wenchang, protectors of women and students. On 10 March (Lunar 二月初三), Wenchang’s “birthday”, worshipers gathered at his infrequently-visited shrine in Beimen, which was erected last year. The celebration is being touted as a celebration of “Zhonghua” culture.

Xinhua Network News Xinjiang Channel 新华网新疆频道

• 11 November 2007: Jimusaer County (see in Google Earth) adds to the recent national park frenzy (see Sayram Lake National Wetlands Park and Kanas Geological Park) by carrying out an extensive refurbishment and improvement of the Sandbank Ecological Park, Xinjiang’s largest desert park. In the first stage of construction, 15.8 million yuan will go into a shelterbelt, an Ethnic Garden (民族特色风情园), and sand-faring and amphibious tour vehicles. In the second stage, 600 million yuan will go into making desert pastures, a botanical research center, and a wildlife viewing area.
• 12 November 2007: In order to the continue the development of bilingual education throughout Xinjiang, the regional Financial Department has allocated 70.39 million yuan to be used primarily in Kashgar, Khotan, and 7 “pastoral regions.” The money will mostly serve as subsidies to offset costs for tuition and school items and to assist in paying the incomes of participating teachers.
• 12 November 2007: As a part of this year’s effort to prevent severe air pollution over the winter, the city of Urumqi has created a “Redlist-Blacklist” system of incentives to encourage heating companies to abide by environmental regulations. Companies that violate these regulations (for example, by improperly disposing of sulfur-contaminated water, or due to a boiler accident that damages the factory’s environmental protection equipment) are placed on the publicly viewable black list, while companies that consistently uphold environmental protection are honored on the red list. Other than losing or gaining face, the article does not mention any other repercussions or rewards for being on either list.
• 12 November 2007: After a November 7 loss (104-87) to the Jiangsu Dragons in Nanjing and a home victory (115-104) against the Shanghai Sharks on November 9, the Flying Tigers rallied at home on November 11 and toppled the number 1 ranked juggernaut, the Ba Yi Rockets (116-106).
• 13 November 2007: The former director of the Regional Health Department’s Office of Financial Planning, Chen Jianguo, was sentences to 10 years imprisonment and stripped of his political rights for one year for corruption. On 16 separate occasions from 2002 to 2005, Chen accepted bribes totaling over 330 thousand yuan.
• 13 November 2007: Kanas Geological Park has closed for the winter season and the park management has completed its statistical snapshot of the this year’s tourist season. This year the park saw 929 thousand tourists, 50 million yuan from ticket sales, and 730 million yuan from general tourist revenue.
• 13 November 2007: Mother nature reminds us that Xinjiang is a geological hotspot by sending a magnitude 4.6 earthquake to Luopu County (earthquake epicenter in Google Earth) on the southern rim of the Tarim Basin. There were no casualties.
• 14 November 2007: A new international passenger route between Xinjiang and Mongolia was officially opened on October 28. The route is between Qinghe County in Xinijang and Burgan, which is located in Mongolia’s Khovd Province (see route in Google Earth). The international route between these two locations was original established in 1992, but was closed due to insufficient passenger numbers and unacceptable road conditions. A renewed interest in the route and road repairs have helped bring about this year’s reopening. (Hat tip to Michael at The Opposite End of China for alerting me of this exciting new find).
  
• 14 November 2007: The Management of Safety Production Goals Meeting convened on the morning of the 13th and commissioned 6 Inspection Teams that will travel throughout Xinjiang investigating safety standards in spheres ranging from coal mining to traffic to fire prevention.
• 14 November 2007: The dates of the 34th meeting of the XUAR 10th Standing Committee has been set from the 20th to the 23rd of November.
• 14 November 2007: The success of the “Deliver Warmth and Compassion with One Day’s Wages” program has prompted Xinjiang’s party organs to declare November “Donation Month,” with the hope that donation efforts in subsequent Novembers will continue to aid low-income residents of Xinjiang battle the imminent cold weather.
• 14 November 2007: Surgeons of the Aksu’s Number 1 People’s Hospital’s Gynecological Department have successfully removed a 30 kg (66 lbs) ovarian tumor from a 55 year old woman. The patient, who hails from Wushi County, discovered that she had a 6.7 inch diameter tumor two years ago, but was unable to treat it for economic reasons. This year, within a period of two months, the tumor experienced abnormally rapid growth, giving the patient a waist circumference of 149 cm (58.6 inches). The new growth affected her daily living so much that she decided to visit Aksu, and on arrival doctors sent her immediately to the operating table, which implies that the patient had the ironic fortune of having an ailment so bad the doctors would treat it for its own sake, in spite of the costs involved.
• 14 November 2007: A six member international team for the Xinjiang Przewalski’s Horses Propagation Research Center has hired 3 Kazakhs to track wild horses in the Qaramay Mountains Ungulate Natural Reserve during the winter season on the Center’s behalf. Kazakh nomadic herders migrate with their flocks to the mountain pastures of the reserve during the winter, making them the most likely candidates for monitoring wild horses. The three choices chosen from 128 candidates, and all are around 30 years old and have enough education as to be able to submit written progress reports to the Center.
• 15 November 2007: The preliminary stages of a project to build a protective structure over the ruins of an ancient Buddhist temple in Jimusaer county have been completed. Beiting’s “West Temple” was constructed sometime between the 11th and 13th century and at that time served as a prominent center for Buddhist art. Preserved at the ruins are a number of Buddhist figures and frescoes.
• 15 November 2007: A punitive element has been added to efforts to help protect and conserve Przewalski’s horses in Northern Xinjiang. Drivers involved in collisions with wild horses face up to 810 thousand yuan in fines. Przewalski’s horses are classified as level one protected wildlife, and according to wildlife protection laws, their “value” is to be calculated as 12.5 times whatever administrative costs are spent to protect them – which under current calculations is 65 thousand renminbi. There have been 5 collisions in the past 8 months, and in response the Forestry Police posted a 20 thousand yuan reward for any information leading to the arrest of the hit-and-run drivers. After the reward was posted, three drivers have been arrested.
• 15 November 2007: The Flying Tigers defeated the Fujian SBS team in Urumqi on the 15th, 110 – 91.
• 16 November 2007: According to statistical data from the Regional Foreign Trade Department, the total value of foreign trade for the past 10 months has surpassed 1 billion American dollars in 5 regions: Urumqi ($2.96 billion, an increase of 61.2% compared with last year), Yili Prefecture ($1.92 billion, 3.3% increase), Changji Prefecture ($1.74 billion, 100.4% increase), Bortala Prefecture ($1.52 billion, 13.4% increase), and, for the first time, Kashgar Prefecture ($1.05 billion, 300% increase).
• 16 November 2007: Xinhua Xinjiang issues a “special report” on XUAR’s Chairman, Ismail Tiliwaldi, which includes some biographical details and information on Tiliwaldi’s philosophy when it comes to governing Xinjiang. The main points of the report can be summarized in its title: Development, stability, and harmony have all along been the primary pursuits of Xinjiang.
• 16 November 2007: This year, the total value of foreign trade imports and exports surpassed 10 billion US dollars, a milestone which Xinhua attributes to Xinjiang’s superior geographic location and abundant natural resources. Xinjiang by far is a net exporter: exports amounted to $8.57 billion, whereas imports totaled almost $2 billion.
• 17 November 2007: As a part of its National “Building the Future: CCB’s Maturation Plan for Providing Financial Aid to Low-Income High School Students” project, the China Construction Bank has 4 high schools in Urumqi 360 thousand yuan each. The program will continue on for 6 years, eventually providing 3300 low-income students at 15 Xinjiang High Schools and 840 low-income students at 4 Bingtuan High Schools financial aid totaling 6.21 million yuan.

Other News

• 9 November 2007: The UCLA Asia Institute’s AsiaMedia site runs a fascinating piece by Tim Hathaway describing his year and a half stint as a journalist and writer for the state-run Xinjiang Economic Daily in Urumqi. Hathaway’s unique position as a foreigner hired by a state run publication in China’s most sensitive region gave him a unique vantage point through which to explore Xinjiang’s social issues and current events.
• 12 November 2007: The English Edition of Xinhua Net runs an English language version of the article linked above discussing the selection of 3 Kazakh herdsmen to track Przewalski’s horses in northern Xinjiang.

Blogs

• 15 November 2007: Davesgonechina at Mutant Palm writes about the 13th century legendary Sufi mystic Nasreddin Appendi and the different ways he has been reinvented in China. He also shares a vintage claymation “Afanti” episode posted at Tudou and the news that producers in Chongqing are working on a newer cartoon incarnation of the ancient master.