According to the Tian Shan article, these individuals were honored under the third article of the “Regulations for the Canonization of Revolutionary Martyrs,” which deems individuals who “valiantly sacrifice their lives to protect or rescue human lives, national property, or collective property” and “meet death at the hands of the enemy while carrying out revolutionary responsibilities, or are captured and meet death at the hands of the enemy for remaining steadfast, or are persecuted unto death” worthy of the title.

With Uyghur rendered into pinyin, the three revolutionary martyrs who died in separate incidents are:

• Ma Jun (马军), for sacrificing himself to prevent arson
• Tuerhong Niyazi (吐尔洪·尼亚孜), for valiantly sacrificing himself to save a youth who had fallen into a body of water
  
• Wang Chunsheng (王春生), for sacrificing himself to save Tuerhong Niyazi

The seven honored victims of the attacks that occurred during the summer, all Uyghurs, are:

• Nueraili Aihemaiti (努尔艾力·艾合买提)
• Kuerban Yakufu(库尔班·牙库甫)
• Maimaitiaili Kuerban (麦麦提艾力·库尔班)
• Tuermaimaiti Abola (图尔麦麦提·阿卜拉)
• Duolikun Abudukelimu (多力昆·阿不都克力木)
• Abudureaji Kadier (阿布都热阿吉·卡迪尔)
• Yimingjiang Kadier(依明江·卡迪尔)

The AP article mentions that the victims of the heavy truck attack in Kashgar were all named revolutionary martyrs shortly afterward, whereas it took a good half-year for these victims to be given the honor. I’m curious as to what explains the discrepency; obviously there are a set of regulations defining who can be elevated to the stats of revolutionary martyr, but while both the Kashgar victims and the victims above died during surprise attacks, the first group was honored swiftly whereas the second group was honored only after what one assumes was a lengthy vetting.

The article makes no mention of the fate of the drowning youth that both Tuerhong Niyazi and Wang Chunsheng died to save.

From the Xinhua article, it seems that Kucha is under lockdown, with businesses shut and security checks everywhere. This sounds a great deal similar to what was said to have happened in Qitai, north of Urumchi, on 25 June: according to rumor, ten soldiers had been killed in a raid on a munitions depot at the headquarters of the 102 Regiment of the People’s Liberation Army, 6 km from Qitai proper. Following this incident, the city’s businesses and institutions were closed or open on a limited basis for several days after, while armed police patrolled the streets at regular intervals, frequently performing identification checks. Although the veracity of this rumor cannot be verified, the circumstances and reaction seem very similar.

The IHT’s report also quotes IntelCenter, which conducted some analysis of the first video released by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), as saying that that organization is, in fact, the same as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the terrorist group blamed by the PRC for most dissident activity in Xinjiang, the existence of which has not been independently verified. The evidence from IntelCenter as put forth in the article, based primarily on the organizations’ names, seems sketchy. We had a look at the relationship between Xinjiang separatism and radical Islam in Xinjiang at the TIP back in April, when a video of an execution of Chinese workers in Peshawar, Pakistan, distributed in the name of the TIP, was released.

Update 7:01AM Beijing Time: Caijing Network writes in this Mandarin language report that a reporter in Kuche has confirmed with the local military garrison that the explosions indeed did happen and are not mere rumors as was the case with the phantom Urumqi bus bombings back in March. According to this report, the incidents occured from around 3 AM to 4 AM on Sunday. Witnesses say the explosions occured in the city center, and the blasts were followed by bright flashes and intermittent sounds of gunfire.

Timothy B. Weston at The China Beat has conducted a fascinating interview that sheds some light on an all-too neglected aspect of modern-day Xinjiang: the self-reported perspective of the Han Chinese that were born and grew up in Xinjiang and consider it their home. Weston’s interviewee, Leong, is now a student at the University of Colorado (adding “overseas Chinese” to his already colorful set of identities) but grew up in an ethnically diverse part of Urumqi. Equally worth viewing and pondering are the comments, which have elicited responses from all sorts of quarters.

After reading up on a localized Han Xinjiang-ren’s thoughts on Xinjiang, head on over to being/becoming, a personal blog whose latest post offers some concise reflections on why certain aspects of American pop-culture – specifically Arnold Schwarzenegger – appeal to Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Once you start peeling off the layers (and read this article) you’ll start to see how there’s more to this apparently arbitrary movie-star preference than meets the eye.

After browsing through being/becoming’s other intriguing posts on Uyghurs and Xinjiang you’ll inevitably stumble upon the web page for The Organization for the Advancement of Studies of Inner Eurasian Societies, or “OASIES” (clever, clever, clever!), a brand new Central Asia academic community based at Columbia University. I’m happy to see more concrete evidence of a growing interest in Central Asia and Xinjiang.

The Christian Science Monitor reporter Peter Ford has published an article of the usual journalistic tint called Uyghurs Struggle in a World Reshaped by Chinese Influx. Of particular interest is the journalist’s encounter with the last living monarch on Chinese territory, King Daoud Mehsut of Kucha, whose palace is now a triple-A tourist attraction. Of his from riches-to-photo-opps story, King Daoud merely says, “I get a cut”… of the 200RMB per ticket admission fee.

And finally, Michael from The Opposite End of China discovered a government published “backgrounder” praising the past year’s progress on the implementation of local autonomy in China – another statistics-fest courtesy of the CCP. Michael uses his trusty newspaper archive spelunking skills to bring to light some interesting Los Angeles Times articles on Chinese language policy in the 1950s and 60s, creating a context that questions the accuracy of the backgrounder.

Now go to Urumqi and eat some Xibo food!