Based on the demands and name of the attacker, I’d say pretty conclusively that this attack has no links with terrorism or ethnic issues.

Here’s a summary of the article:

Kurban Hemit and Abdurahman Azat were found guilty of illegally manufacturing firearms,  ammunition, and explosive devices, and of intentional homicide. For these crimes the two defendents were sentenced to death and permanent deprivation of legal rights.

According to case proceedings, Hemit and Azat were incited by extremist religious propaganda to carry out the attacks. In February and March of 2008 the two bought the materials necessary to manufacture guns, ammunition, and explosive devices. They also at this time began searching for targets and eventually settled on the officers of the Kashgar Frontier Defense Support Unit of the People’s Armed Police.

On August 4th, the two suspects used a stolen self-loading truck to transport all the materials they had created to a site near the police station. Then, at 8, when the police began their morning jog, Azat drove the truck into the soldiers, killing 15 and injuring 13. The vehicle lost control and crashed into the side of the road before flipping – as can be seen in this picture taken from the New York Times witness.

The official court account countinues: Azat then exited the truck, attempting to use the firearm he had created but to no effect – he then used oned of the explosives which successfully detonated and killed another individual. Hemit was not in the vehicle. Apparently, after the truck crashed, Hemit emerged from somewhere else wearing a summer uniform of the People’s Armed Police and began by throwing an explosive at the sentinel guarding the gate of the police station. Then he took out two knives and used them to hack at the soldiers injured from the truck collision, causing yet another death and two injuries. At this time, the surviving soldiers managed to apprehend both the perpetrators and a total of 17 people were killed and 12 injured.

Reading the Xinhua account immediately prompted me to go back and reread the only other existing account of events, the eyewitness testimony and pictures provided to the New York Times by a tourist who was across the street at the moment of the incident. The admittedly hot scoop hit the New York Times with a lot of fanfare, as indicated by the deliberately worded title “Doubt Arises in Account of Attack in China.” The point of the story, other than providing some amazing visuals and a surprising eyewitness account, was to sharply question the official version of events at the time, which then was still quite vague.

Among other discrepancies, the witnesses said that they heard no loud explosions and that the men wielding the machetes appeared to be paramilitary officers who were attacking other uniformed men.

That raises several questions: Why were the police wielding machetes? Were they retaliating against assailants who had managed to obtain official uniforms? Had the attackers infiltrated the police unit, or was this a conflict between police officers?

Quite interestingly I found that the terse yet nonetheless descriptive version of events put forward by Xinhua just yesterday meshes quite well with eyewitness testimony, which I believe is in one sense more reliable given the source (a bunch of tourists over a state run propaganda mouthpiece) but in a different way is more unreliable given the circumstances of the observation (unexpected, sudden eyewitness and reliance on human memory).

For example, the tourists noted that a non-uniformed individual staggered out of the truck after it crashed, greatly injured. This, we can postulate, was Azat. According to the Xinhua account most victims were indeed killed by the impact of the vehicle itself, and even if Azat were extremely incapacited on exiting the truck it is no stretch imagining him successfully using an explosive device after leaving.

The NYT account then says the scene turned even “more bizarre” when fighting started breaking out between uniformed officers. Should we look to the Xinhua account, this likely was when Hemit dashed into the scene wearing the same uniform as the other officers which would understandbly cause some confusion, both to the survivors and the eye witnesses. Enough confusion that the testimonies of the three eyewitnesses get a little muddled and contradictory at this point. The number of uniformed individuals doing the attacking is unclear among the eyewitnesses but is always “one or two,” which I would venture to say is within the margin of error for “one Kurbanjan Hemit wearing a police uniform plus the possibility of uniformed survivors retaliating.” I call attention to one of the eyewitness accounts in particular:

He said a man in a green uniform walked from the direction of the truck. “A policeman who wasn’t injured ran over and started hitting him with a machete,” the relative said. “He hit him a few times, then this guy started fighting him back.”After being hit several times by the machete, the uniformed man fell down, and at least one other police officer came over to kick him, the relative said.

An uninjured policemen suddenly appearing on the scene and attacking one officer with a machete until other policemen figure out what’s going on and take him down – it fits the Xinhua description. I feel that other discrepancies revealed by the New York Times account could also be explained by one of the perpetrators wearing a uniform – for example, why did officers carrying machetes freely mingle with other officers in the aftermath? Presumably after the attackers were subdued some of the surviving officers would be carrying the weapons of the perpetrators. Why were there uniformed officers hacking at bound individuals on the ground? Either they were seeing Hemit attacking prostrate, injured individuals, or possibly furious survivors using the perpetrators weapons against the suspects after they had been bound or detained. The bottom line is, if we take for granted that one of the attackers was indeed wearing a uniform, the ensuing chaos is enough to ensure that eyewitness testimonies would have their mental boundaries between “attackers and victims” quite mixed up.

I’ll take a moment to call out the New York Times on sloppy – or rather, greedy journalism. Interestingly, in the article written yesterday by the New York Times covering the sentencing was the only one that I saw that showed any evidence that they had someone look over the Chinese language press release. Unlike the AFP or Reuters, which simply mentions the whole deal in passing, the New York Times includes details from the press release. However, what they fail to mention at all is the Xinhua account’s claim that Hemit was wearing a police uniform.

At the same time, the Xinhua account said, Mr. Hemit tossed explosives toward the gate of the security compound and brandished a knife at the police officers who had been felled by the truck. Mr. Hemit killed one officer and wounded another, Xinhua said.

Shame on you, New York Times. By failing to mention that Xinhua at least alleges Hemit was wearing a uniform, the rather ungraciously decide not to acknowledge the state version of events steals some thunder from their exclusive eyewitness piece, which they in fact quite smugly link in yesterday’s article as still “at odds with aspects of the official version.” That may be true – the eyewitnesses didn’t hear explosions after the truck crash – but describing the press release while omitting the one major detail of the incident which would in many ways reconcile the eyewitness accounts with the state accounts was just bad journalism.

So, what of it? While the Xinhua version of events does mesh quite well with the only existing independent account of events, I still hesitate to go so far and say its the real deal. After all, if you want to ascribe really sinister motives to the PR machine of the CCP – and why wouldn’t we? – it’s completely possible that the story was fabricated precisely to be compatible with the one eyewitness account that “got away” and hit the Western press. Or, the Xinhua version, which was the product of a trial proceedings which probably included the interrogation of the suspects and a lengthy investigation, may indeed by exactly what happened on August 4th. Or it could be somewhere in between. I have to come to the conclusion that, sadly, as with most things Xinjiang, in spite of this extremely detailed account of events, independent observers still can’t make a solid call on what really went down, and why.

Regardless of how well the state version and the one independent testimony mesh together, there is still one magic ingredient missing, and that is transparency. A smoothly knit story does not a truthful one make. And again, the fault rests with the Chinese authorities. The fact of the matter is, if events occurred precisely as the authorities are now describing it, there is very little to lose, if not nothing at all, to be transparent with the global community about the evidence and the results of investigations related to the case itself. Coming forward with genuine evidence linking these two to greater Islamic extremism – after all, the article does mention the two to be victims of extremist propaganda – would provide more credibility to the PRC and their own domestic war on terror. By sharing with the Chinese public and the globe at large a 9/11 Commission report style document detailing all the relationships, preparations, and ideological motivations relevant to the attack, the authorities can finally provide a solid foundation to claims that they have been making for years – that the threat is real and must be dealt with. And while being open will assuredly draw in credibility, the opposite – jealously keeping all evidence and investigations under tight lock and only releasing court documents that must be accepted as truth – only damages credibility and causes critics, both domestic and abroad, what could possibly need hiding. Until the policy towards criminal investigations of terrorist incidents changes, people interesting in knowing what happened are only left with potentially compromised governmental accounts, and, if they’re lucky, a hapless tourist who ended up being at the wrong place at the wrong time.

A translation of the Xinhua article follows.

The Intermediate Level People’s Court of the Kashgar Prefecture in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region recently conducted, in accordance with the law, hearings regarding the August 4th violent terrorist attack against the police on in Kashgar, and has pronounced defendants Kurbanjan Hemit and Abdurahman Azat guilty of illegally manufacturing firearms, ammunition, and explosive devices, as well as first degree murder, sentencing them to death and lifelong deprivation of legal rights.

During proceedings at the Kashgar Prefecture Intermediate Level People’s Court it was revealed that the defendants Kurbanjan Hemit and Abdurahman Azat, over a long period of time, received religious extremist ideological propaganda and were incited to, on many occasions, premeditate and plan the theft of firearms, surprise attacks against military police forces, and violent terrorist activities such as explosions and assassinations.  On February and March of 2008, the two defendants purchased materials to produce firearms, ammunition, and explosives, illegally manufacturing 11 explosive devices, 2 firearms and much ammunition, and furthermore designated officers of the Kashgar Frontier Defense Support Unit of the People’s Armed Police as the target of their terrorist surprise attack. On August 4th, at around 6 in the morning, the two defendants used a stolen, heavy self-loading truck to bring their self-manufactured guns, ammunition, explosive devices and purchased knives and hatchets to an area near the Kashgar Prefecture Frontier Defense Support Unit station. At around 8, when the Armed Police officers were exiting the front gate of the Frontier Defense Support Unit station for their morning run, Abdurahman Azat, immediately drove in a mad dash towards the rear of the assembled soldiers, plowing into them and causing 15 deaths and 13 injuries before the truck lost control, collided into the side of the road, and flipped over. Abdurahman Azat exited the car and attempted to use his homemade firearm without success, and then proceeded to detonate one of the homemade explosive devices causing one death. Kurbanjan Hemit, wearing a People’s Armed Police summer uniform, first threw a homemade explosive device towards the sentinel posted at the front gate of the Frontier Defense Support Unit station, then went on to use two knives to hack at the soldiers injured by the truck, leading to one death and two injuries. The two defendants were arrested on the scene.

The Kashgar Prefecture Intermediate Level People’s Court maintains that the defendants Kurbanjan Hemit and Abdurahman Azat carried out violent terrorist activities, the illegal manufacture of 11 explosive devices, 2 firearms and ammunition, seriously harmed public security, and that the actions of these two individuals thus violate laws against the illegal production of firearms, ammunition, and explosives. The two defendants, with the aim of sabotaging the otherwise smooth opening of the Beijing Olympics and producing internationally felt adverse repercussions, carried out preparatory measures by observing several times when and where the Armed Police exercised, prepared the necessary criminal implements, using a vehicle, knives, and explosives to kill officers of the Armed Police, which is tantamount to the crime of intentional homicide. The actions of the two individuals resulted in 17 deaths and 15 injuries. It was a particularly vile plot, its methods particularly merciless, its harm on society extremely significant, and it ought to be punished according to the full extent of the law. The Kashgar Prefecture Intermediate Level People’s Court therefore passes the above described sentence in accordance with the law.

And so for now, I’d just like to share just a few links to some post-Olympic stories of note.

The biggest thing, of course, is the post-Olympic crackdown that is currently going down. It so far has taken the form of a religious clampdown, going so far as to put pressure on outward signs of religiosity like beards and the veil during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. It goes beyond that, of course, but for analysis and discussion I direct you to Michahel’s Collective Punishment and Anti-Ramadan campaign posts. The Shanghaiist has done the great task of finding some of the original documents with the crackdown guidelines, such as this Huocheng County site and this blogger’s thoughts on the newly minhted regulations.

A story from the Shanghai Daily, less about Xinjiang itself, but nonetheless occured in Xinjiang and is of note: a shocking family tragedy comes to a violent close with the execution of Abduhalik Muzht on the 4th. Muzht went to his daughter’s school in December of 2006 wielding a knife, ultimately killing two students and injuring a teacher and two other students. Worse yet: the alleged motivation for Muzht’s attack was revenge for his daughter’s death – who was strangled by her brother, Muzht’s son, because he was embarassed by her poor grades. Now that is a lot to digest – something so tragic and convoluted it would be more likely in a soap opera than among a Xinjiang family. Again, I emphasize that on this information alone there is nothing particulary “Uyghur” or “Xinjiang” about this tragedy – given the stress one places on success in China, and the stresses the education system places on the children, this could’ve happened in Xinjiang, Guangdong, or anywhere in between. Still, who was this brother and why was he that obsessed over his sister’s grades (note that this was a younger brother still in primary school)? Why did the father kill his daughter’s classmates in revenge, when she was killed by her brother? Where was mom, and what will happen to the original murderer, Muzht’s son?The story is so bizarrely moving I’m compelled to look further into it when I have the time and I’ll post anything of note here.

The next story: the economic relationship between Xinjiang and the rest of China I feel is elegantly illustrated by the natural gas pipelines between the two. The first goes from Xinjiang to Shanghai. The second goes via Shanghai to Guangdong. Now, feasibility studies for the third pipeline have begun, according to the People’s Daily. One notices that poor Fujian, another economic titan of the East Coast, gets bypassed by both of the original routes. The solution, of course is another pipeline, and Fujian is the projected destination of the third pipeline should the plans go through. Railroads in, pipelines out. Does anyone know if the second pipeline passes through Zhejiang? If not, 浙江真可怜!

Finally, a fascinating report from Reuters on Nur Bekri, chairman of XUAR. Since Nur Bekri’s ascension to the Chairmanship back in December, I’ve been wondering who exactly Nur Bekri is and what he’s like – it was hard to find anything other than his official biography which unhelpfully lists all the positions he held. This Friday, however, in a speech to communist party officials, Bekri in no unclear terms stated his firm conviction that Western powers are directly supporting unrest in Xinjiang, likely alluding to the attacks that occurred back before the Olympics. From Reuters:

The region’s governor, Nuer Baikeli, said “Western hostile forces” unhappy with China’s rise were directly supporting groups opposed to Beijing’s rule in the region in the name of democracy and human rights.

“They all along have been direct behind-the-scenes backers and patrons of the ‘three forces’ at home and abroad,” Baikeli said, referring to terrorism, separatism and extremism.

“They are the most important external factor in the continuing rise of ethnic splittist, destructive activities in Xinjiang, and the large threat they pose from abroad to our national security and social stability will exist for a long time,” he added.

“Our struggle against ethnic splittism, in essence, is a struggle against Western hostile forces’ plots to ‘Westernise’ and ‘split’ our country, it is the continuation of the struggle the Chinese people have had for 100 years or more against imperialist plans to split China.”

I feel this is pretty significant, and can’t help but wonder how much of this is official party belief (either among officials in Xinjiang or national level officials) and how much of this is Bekri’s personal opinions, but the Reuters article does note some indirect sanction of Bekri’s words: his speech was hosted on the Central Government’s website on Friday. While unpersuasively accusing Xinjiang unrest to have backing from Muslim extremists in Central Asia and international terrorist networks is quite expected, claiming that the Western governments are directly supporting the same unrest Bin Laden himself is supposedly helping out is a very new development. Confidently accusing a foreign government of backing terrorism on one’s own soil is a profound thing, as anyone in the United States can tell you. The question, thus, is the one I asked before and I bring up again: as Chairman of the XUAR, how much respect should we ascribe to Bekri’s words? What does the Central leadership think about these statements? After all, VP candidate and governor of “America’s Xinjiang” (If I may take liberties to call Alaska that) Sarah Palin has been posturing quite aggressively towards Russia recently, but again, on the other hand, the democratically elected governor of a state in a Federal union is quite different from the de facto appointed mouthpiece in one of China’s “Autonomous Regions.”  Thoughts?

There are, however, a few details about the latest incident which has caught my attention. First of all is the surprising and most obvious detail of violence by Uyghurs against Uyghurs. This situation is gaining new dimensions… or perhaps it is more appropriate to say that the conflict has always been far more nuanced than the “simmering Uyghurs” summary that is most often put forward by Western media outlets touching base with the region. The fact of the matter is, the Uyghurs’ involvement in Han develoment/colonization on one hand and East Turkestan freedom fighting/terrorism on the other hand is far from black and white. In an area is remote as this one we can expect both a strong anti-Han sentiment, as rural areas tend to be predominantly Uyghur and mostly more traditional, and a local party/government structure that is mostly Uyghur, since, well, there are less Han around to run things. So we see loyal Uyghur police officers falling in the line of duty, and who I believe inevitably will be put forward by the CCP as model minorities and to further reinforce the “extremists on the fringes” model of Uyghur discontent. But we also see this interest quote from the RFA article:

“After the Yamanya incident, we organized large public gatherings and asked people to help us find the suspects. We also said we would offer a 50,000-yuan reward to anyone who helped. But still nobody has come forward,” Omerjan said.

The Uyghur authorities in the region, representing the government and the party, was asking for help to resolve the Yamanya incident. But nobody stepped forward – this is a big deal. The silence is a form of support for what happened. And the support for the recent violence goes beyond tacit agreement – individuals of all stripes, from the young, female Anargul, to the presumably older community leader and cleric Shukur (who was apprehended earlier) are actively pitching in, in either the violence itself, which seems to be the case with Anargul, or sheltering and aiding the vigilantes like Shukur. Inadvertently, and thanks to the efforts of the RFA, the attacks are giving us a tiny, fleeting opportunity to see how Uyghurs can and do get directly or peripherally involved with this new type of violent, proactive resistance that has come out in recent weeks.

But again, its never that simple, and the agreement and support of action against the government is obviously not total as the reason the police were searching the field was they were tipped off, and although I’m certain there may well be Han families in the area, statistically and realistically speaking it was probably a Uyghur who called in. And this introduces the contrasting realization that some Uyghurs are willing to fight in the other direction – for what reasons, we cannot know now, but it could either be out of patriotism towards the CCP, or the more sinister (and in my opinion more likely) possibility that in Xinjiang a system of incentives and punishments is creating an “informant” environment among the Uyghurs.

And finally, although there is undeniably a trend of rising violence that cannot be ignored, the most recent violence in some ways adds more conviction to my belief that the spree of attacks are situational and comparatively crude rather than an indicator of suddenly cascading discontent and of increasing sophistication/international involvement. I mentioned in my thoughts on the Yamanya attack that it can be legitimately suspected that the attackers were pressured, in that situation and in that moment, to attack the inspectors because of something they were hiding, either on their person or in their thoughts. Similarly, this latest violence wasn’t a sophisticated, Al-Qaeda style attack that was planned and sends a deep ideological message of intimidation, rather, this was the inevitable result of fugitives doing what they do when they get cornered – they attack, and its both savage and uncoordinated. It seems that Anargul’s middle-aged mother and young son were hiding in the fields that day as well.

As usual, Xinjiang watchers must continue to play “wait and see,” forced to deal with only ephemeral glimpses into the reality in the area – but I definitely feel that in this situation we’ve been given a window much bigger than the glimpses we’re usually handed.

Interestingly, buried in the swelling posts on the anticipated post-Olympic crackdown was an AP article covering the same topic yet incredibly also included quite graphic pictures allegedly depicting the aftermath of the attack. While at this day and age a picture can no longer immediately count as evidence, these pictures are quite convincing. I’ll let them speak for themselves:

And there you have it. As can be seen in the second picture, this location is indeed in front of the Yiquan Hotel (see movie in this post), the place where the attack is said to have occurred, and the utter carnage is quite plain. In the second picture we apparently can see the dump truck used during the attack, burrowed into the entrance of the hotel which is now famously tarped over. Where these pictures came from (I’m guessing crime scene photographer or passerby with cellphone), how they became public (leaked), and why AP journalist William Foreman decided to tack them onto an article on a less relevant topic rather than making his own sensational article all about it, these are the questions of the moment.

The internet has been positively buzzing the past few days over the sentencing of 15 Uyghurs for terrorist activities in Kashgar a few days ago, particularly because the trial was public and because it resulted in the instant executions of two of the suspects. While most of the major news agencies remain rather conservative with reporting on the details, the RFA article claims that according to a woman who was at the public trial (allegedly, the community members were forced to attend), the sentenced and executed individuals were the scheming terrorists who were apprehended during the Akto daring raid of January 2007. The RFA articles as well as the bigger news companies name the two executed parties as Mukhtar Setiwaldi and Abduweli Imin.

This is where things get slightly confusing for us writers here at The New Dominion.

I’d like to direct your attention to one of our very first posts way back in November, that’s when we were still maintaining the painstakingly time consuming “News Roundups” which involved taking Chinese language news stories and providing English language summaries. One of the more notable stories we found buried in Xinjiang’s massive and unorganized pile of Mandarin-language reports was a lengthy summary of a recently concluded terrorism case, where six individuals were sentenced for terrorism activities that had gone on for a year and a half until they were apprehended almost a year before, in January of 2007. I quote what we wrote then:

Six defendants in what has been dubbed the Kashgar “12-25″ Threat to National Security Case have been sentenced for attempting to split the country. Under the charges of splittist activities, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the illegal production of explosives, 4 death sentences and 2 life imprisonment sentences were passed down. The Xinhua article announcing this sentence also includes a detailed list of the alleged suspects’ activities, including running a terrorist training camp for two months with the Hollywood name of “Black Canyon,” conducting an explosives collecting operation dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn,” resisting PLA counterinsurgency efforts by sabatoging communications facilities, blowing up public buses, and occupying the Kusilafu village’s government building and declaring independence. Kusilafu is a village in Akto County (Location in Google Earth), a hotbed of resistance to Chinese rule.

Here’s the clincher: the two individuals who were singled out as ringleaders for the terrorism operation and summarily executed in November of 2007 were named Abduwali Yiming (阿不都外力·依明) and Muhataer Setiwalidi (穆合塔尔·色提瓦力迪) – or, the Chinese transliterations of Abduweli Imin and Mukhtar Setiwaldi.

So, therein lies the mystery: what exactly is going on here? RFA claims that on the 9th, these two individuals were executed summarily after a public trial, during which they were accused of plotting terrorist activities and managing a hidden terrorist base of operations starting from August 2005. The plot was broken up when the police raided their hideout in January of 2007. However, we found a Chinese language article describing an uncannily similar trial being conducted in November of last year, with the same charges against the same individuals, with the same result (two summary executions, two delayed executions, and a number of other non-capital sentences). I vividly remember recalling when we looked at the article at the time being quite surprised that no international news agencies were picking up on the execution of alleged East Turkestan terrorists – only to be quite surprised to find out they finally picked up the scent, only 8 months later. We are thus facing a time-traveling trial and execution: did this happen just a few days ago, or did it happen last November?

I think the most obvious evidence for the trial occuring in November is the fact that the Chinese-language article describing the trial and dated in November is still up and viewable. While it’s possible that the two immediate executions were stayed for 8 months, particularly in light of new laws in the PRC mandating that executions be reviewed by higher courts, even if that should be the case the fact remains that the trial was done a while ago, and not recently, unless this second, public trial was intended to be a show trial to intimidate the local Uyghurs. After all, if we do a little sleuthing, we find that the original source of this new information is indeed the RFA article (all the other articles out for now are just repeating what the RFA said), and thus the RFA could be mistaken, or, it possibly doesn’t have the complete picture. RFA is known for basing most of its stories on reports by disgruntled locals, Han, Uyghur, or otherwise, making clandestine calls to their international hotlines. Via this manner RFA may have learned from local Uyghurs that a show trial and execution occured, but may be unware of the official sentences passed in November.

The second possibility, more sinister, sheds light on the fact that the CCP regime, with its struggle between increasingly uncontrolled and rabidly nationalistic domestic “flash media” and completely uncontrolled foreign media, has adopted a strategy of sometimes providing different versions of events in Mandarin and in English – one for home consumers, one for abroad consumers. Again, I bring up how surprised I was that there was such a detailed report on the trial and sentencing of alleged Uyghur terrorists that hardly made a blip on the international media – we’re talking juicy, sensational stuff like snap executions and crazy Muslims storming town halls. But perhaps the Mandarin language report was deliberately shoved into the rather mundane procession of daily news rather than plasted all over front pages for a reason – so that the “International Edition” could be unleashed at a more strategic time, say, when China publishes reports on Uyghur terrorist activities over the past half year to justify its current anti-terrorism agenda.

Under the break, I have a full English-language translation of the Chinese language article from November. For some great “Law and Order” style drama and some crazy allegations of what these folks allegedly did during their reign of terror, read on:

Sentences have been pronounced in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case; 6 individuals will be punished for attempting to split the nation. (2007-11-09)

The sentences in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case, which was tried in a Kasghar Prefecture Mid-level People’s Court, were pronounced yesterday. Abuduwali Yiming and five other defendants were sentenced either to death or life imprisonment for the crimes of attempting to split the country, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and illegally manufacturing explosives.

In order to achieve their secessionist goals, Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 defendants actively carried out extremist religious activities, declared “jihad,” organized a terrorist training camp, and made preparations to assist in the establishment of an “Islamic Caliphate” from August 2005 to January 2007.

Together the 6 defendants planned, organized, and implemented terrorist training activities, eventually recruiting several dozens of violent splittists to send to the “Black Canyon” terrorist camp, where they conducted training operations in secret for almost two months.

The 6 defendants also created a banner for their organization, drew up guiding principles and regulations, arranged goods and supplies for the terrorist training camp, manufactured explosives, and made preparations to conduct violent terrorist attacks.

The defendants twice conducted and participated in operations designed to seek out explosives-making materials, a campaign which they dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn.” They succeeded in acquiring 16 kilograms of explosives, eventually manufacturing 67 hand grenades and two suicide bombs.

The suspects formally established the “East Turkestan Islamic Party” and carried out two separate military operations while resisting capture by the authorities, during which the defendants destroyed communication lines, blew up buses, and occupied the Kusilafu Village government buildings to declare “independence.”

After the above-mentioned crimes were discovered by the authorities, the 6 defendants gathered a number of terrorists and began an organized military resistance against the armed police force sent to apprehend them, resulting in one injury and one death among the officers.

The court holds that Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants disregarded national law, demonstrated a long-term commitment to the reactionary thought of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and violent terrorism, and vainly tried to split the nation and create an “Islamic Caliphate.” Moreover, they actively communicated with and sought aid from terrorist elements abroad and over a long period of time exploited religion to implant extremist ideology in the minds of other individuals, thus encouraging others to choose, adopt, accept, and seek out “second careers” as terrorist elements who engage in violent terrorist attacks, opposing national unity and socialism’s “dictatorship of the proletariat” system.

The actions of Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants constitute the crime of attempting to split the nation, the crime of organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the crime of illegally manufacturing explosives. The judgments are as follows:

Defendant Abuduwali Yiming, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Muhataer Setiwalidi, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Kuerban Mamuti, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Aihemaiti Reheman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Yimin Miman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Paerhati Yakufu, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is given a mitigated sentence of life imprisonment due to “meritorious actions,” as well as permanent deprivation of all political rights and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, 15 years of imprisonment and 5 years deprivation of political rights. The punishment has been set to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

News Link

On January 5th, 2007, Xinjiang Police Forces destroyed an “East Turkestan Movement” terrorist training camp.

It is now understood that key members of the ETM were dispatched to muster a group of terrorists and enter the PamirMountains to establish a terrorist training base and conduct terrorist training exercises. On January 5th, 2007, as police forces undertook capture operations, the terrorist elements conducted an armed resistance which resulted in the death of one police officer and the injury of another. The police forces managed to recover, killing 18 and capturing 17 terrorists and confiscating 22 homemade grenades and 1500 incomplete explosive devices.

The Urumqi Education Bureau is currently holding talks with China Telecom over plans to install a municipal computer network electronically linking all schools and providing a platform for greater information exchange and more concise education research. According to current plans, the Urumqi Education Bureau will use the next 3 to 5 years install the hardware inside the institutions of learning and the appropriate network links in between them. The network will serve practical concerns, enabling activities like the sharing of lesson plans, opinions, and material among teachers, as well as aid in addressing theoretical questions, enabling researchers to see and analyze grades, attendance, and other statistics in one unified database.

12355 “Youth Service Desks” have been opened to provide, among other services, “psychological counseling” to the city’s young residents. The employee at each service desk will handle questions and issues that can be handled immediately on the spot; for more complex questions the counsel-seeking youth will be directed to more professional level workers. Questions can be submitted to Youth Service workers through telephone and fax. Currently, work on text messaging and internet services is underway.

In light of the rising inflation plaguing Xinjiang in recent months, the Urumqi Education Bureau is going to add 20 Yuan to the monthly special living expenses stipend received by students within the Urumqi educational district.

Early this March city police officers succeeded in busting a prostitution operation that involved text messaging to solicit clients. The operation’s ringmaster was a certain Mr. Li who throughout the course of his dealings sent over 5000 text messages and made over 20,000 yuan of illegal income. Police observed that this is the first time in the past several years they have seen text messaging as a method to advertise services.

After an arduous 17 hour search operation conducted on the 19th, the Urumqi police successfully apprehended two suspects for the robbery-murder of a taxi driver that occurred only the day before on the 18th. Though the article mentions that detectives and forensics experts were deployed immediately upon receiving a report of a corpse in a taxi near a coal factory, it opts to omit any information from how the police went from that step to arresting the two suspects the next day. Interestingly, the article uses the standard procedure of taking a Mandarin Chinese name and masking it by replacing the person’s first name with 某, as in “a certain Mr. Li, 李某.” However, the two suspects in this case are 帕某 and 买某, with neither 帕 nor 买 being standard Mandarin last names, pointing to the conclusion that the two perpetrators were not Han. After arrest, the suspects admitted they planned the attack, boarded a taxi, asked the driver to take them to a place they knew was secluded, then after disembarking, they stabbed the driver, took his sell phone and over 400 yuan, and attempted to ignite the car (they failed) before fleeing.

On March 23, Urumqi police shattered a drug smuggling ring that involved transporting narcotics from Sichuan to Urumqi on long-distance passenger buses. During the bust, police seized 4500 grams of ketamine, 100 grams of meth, and 25 grams of ecstasy. In January, the Sha District Anti-Narcotics Division were investigating a certain Mr. Li they knew was peddling drugs on the streets of their district. After a 3 month investigation during which police tracked Li’s inter-province movements, plainclothes detectives found themselves shadowing Li after quietly boarding the bus at a toll station. After arriving at the destination, Li met up with a waiting minibus and dawdled a while before concluding the coast was clear and handing over the drugs. At this point, the police seized the narcotics and arrested all involved.

With the National People’s Congress in session, most of the news has been dominated by stories meant to reassure the people of Xinjiang that all is well: Xinjiang officials and academics have expressed their satisfaction with Premier Wen Jiabao’s plans to prevent inflation both in the goods and real estate markets.

More interesting is the transcription of a press conference held with “foreign” (largely Hong Kong) reporters by XUAR Party Secretary and Politburo Member Wang Lequan with XUAR Party Chairman Nur Bäkri at the Xinjiang Office in the Great Hall of the People on the afternoon of 10 March. Highlights: Wang Lequan, who does most of the talking, downplays separatist sentiment, referring to Rabiyä Qadir as a representative of the “Three (Evil) Forces”: terrorists, separatists, and extremists. Wang states that, in the course of the Ürümchi raid, the terrorists threw three grenades, injuring seven police. Wang states that the terrorist cell involved was funded by the supposed East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM, 东伊运). He also notes that, although arrests have been made in the bombing of a China Southern flight from Ürümchi to Lanzhou on 7 March, the motives and funding of the actors involved is not yet certain. The rest of the conference is rather uninteresting talk about the bold strides made in Xinjiang’s economic development, with regret for the slow exploitation of natural resources.

There has been some crime news. Two women, referred to in this (rather overdramatic) article as “Big and Little Guli”, were found to have cheated at least 10 individuals between April 2005 and September 2007, offering false university-entry credentials in exchange for money. Both “Gulis” were apprehended on 25 February and are awaiting trial; however, due to a lack of evidence, they may receive light penalties. (“Guli” (古丽) is the way many Uyghur women’s names are transliterated in Chinese: -gül “flower” is often attached to the end of younger women’s names, which are, thus, a bit too long to fit into the standard Han Chinese name paradigm. It seems a universal rule that such women are referred to in Chinese, not by the first parts of their names or even by their father’s names — or, lately, surnames — but simply as “Guli” for their entire lives. This leads many Han to believe that nearly every Uyghur woman is named “Guli”, and I’ve even heard minkaohan women introduce themselves as such. My point is, I think a reporter, or the “gumshoe” from whom she obtained her information, should have provided the suspects’ actual names.)

The Ürümchi city government has “taken the lead” in releasing a book of regulations regarding military personnel in the city. The regulations are meant to clarify and codify rules regarding the actions of military personnel and the system in which they work, as well as act as a reference for use in the resolution of conflicts involving the military.

Xinhua Network News Xinjiang Channel 新华网新疆频道

• 24 December 2007: Over 100 thousand farmers and herders in remote regions have received benefits from the “Electricity for Every Household Project” and are now able to bid farewell to oil lamps and wood-burning heating. The “Electricity for Every Household Project” was started jointly by the XUAR People’s Government and the National Power Network Company in 2006. Since its inauguration, the project has been implemented far ahead of schedule, with a current total of 336 million yuan having been invested in the construction of power converters and power lines necessary to provide electricity to remote regions.
• 25 December 2007: A certain Mr. Xu was sentenced to two years in prison on December 24th for attempting to extort the Urumqi Carrefour for 50 thousand yuan two months previously. On the 5th of September, Xu called the Carrefour to tell them to deposit 50 thousand yuan in a designated bank account without informing the police, otherwise he would detonate a bomb he had planted in the storage room via remote control. The Carrefour administration immediately evacuated the store and informed the authorities, causing a swarm of armed police and explosives specialists to descend on the abandoned supermarket. No explosives were found, and detectives of the Urumqi police department arrested Xu at an Internet bar the next day.
• 25 December 2007: From January to the end of November, Xinjiang saw 400 thousand foreign tourists and received 148 million American dollars worth of tourism revenue. At 34%, Russians constitute the largest portion of foreign tourist.
• 25 December 2007: The economic efficiency of state-owned enterprise increased by a substantial margin from January to November of this year. Total sales revenues for SOEs reached 25.3 billion yuan, a 20.1% increase since last year. The metal, coal, chemical engineering, foodstuffs, textiles, and trade industries saw the most significant improvements.
• 25 December 2007: From the beginning of this year to the 24th ofDecember the Qaramay oilfields produced a total of 11.5 million tons of crue oil. This years total is higher than last year, and thus adds the 27th year to a continual changing of increasing oil output.
• 26 December 2007: The Xinjiang software company Sarka has developed a software that can recognize Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz text from image files and convert them into text. With this software, an individual can scan documents written in these languages or take photographs of texts and then convert them into editable text files. The program was the product of a join effort between the company, the Information Science and Engineering Institute of Xinjiang University, and Qinghua University’s Electrical Engineering Department.
• 26 December 2007: The Disaster Relief Office of the regional Civil Affairs Department has allocated 42 million kuai to aid residents stricken by natural calamities to make it through the winter. This winter a large number of Xinjiang residents are affected by natural disasters such as abnormally high snowfall, torrential rain, hailstorms, floods, landslides, mudslides, strong winds, droughts, and low temperature conditions. The disaster relief aid will be used to provide affected residents with food rations, clothes, and coal.
• 26 December 2007: By 2008, all agricultural and pastoral regions in Xinjiang will be covered by the New Model
  Cooperative Medical Treatment system. In acknowledgment of this complete coverage, the central and regional governments have decided to increase financial support for the program, which involves both financial subsidies to support those with illnesses and providing special training to residents so that emergencies and illnesses can be treated locally.
• 26 December 2007: Three Xinjiang gold mining companies will receive a total of 7.6 million yuan of funding from the national government, to be used for gold exploration and for environmental protection. Xinjiang’s gold mining industry has been receiving governmental funding since 2004, and this year’s addition pins the government’s total investment in the regional mining industry to 15.7 million yuan. Xinjiang is considered one of China’s most important gold industry bases; this year’s gold production statistics put Xinjiang at 8th place in China’s national gold mining industry.
• 26 December 2007: Urumqi International Airport was closed for the first time this winter due to heavy snowfall on the 26th from 11am to 6pm.
• 27 December 2007: In order to improve business relations between the XPCC and its clients and to promote even faster and better economic development through the Bingtuan’s myriad industries, Huaxia Bank has signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation agreement with Bingtuan officials which will grant XPCC controlled industries and XPCC work unit employees greater and smoother access to the bank’s resources, including loans, account management, and other financial services.
• 28 December 2007: This year the total value of Xinjiang foreign trade was substantially hire than the national average. The total value of imports and exports from January to November of this year reached 12.3 billion American dollars, a 50% increase compared with the same period last year and a 26.5 percentage points higher than the national average.
• 28 December 2007: The safe landing of a China Southern Airlines Boeing 757 airliner marked the official opening of Korla’s new airport. The construction of a new, larger airport to replace Korla’s previous one was a national level project aimed at consolidating Korla’s role as a hub between Northern and Southern Xinjiang and between Xinjiang and the rest of the country. A total of 630.3 million yuan was invested in the project.
• 28 December 2007: The XPCC Health Department announced plans to begin construction next year of comprehensive health archive which within three years will contain the basic medical information and statistics of all 2.58 million members of the XPCC. Upon completion of this medical archive, XPCC health services will be able to provide quicker outpatient services, develop more efficient immunization plans, improve health education, better monitor epidemic and contagious diseases, and give better recover and rehabilitation programs to XPCC patients.
• 29 December 2007: This year 1025 kilometers of highways were opened for use, an increase of about 136% compared to high construction over the previous five years. Before the 1990s, Xinjiang didn’t have even one kilometer of highway, now, the XUAR Transportation Department has managed to connect Urumqi with every prefecture and every prefecture-level capital with all of its internal counties. In all there are 145 thousand kilometers of highway in Xinjiang.
• 29 December 2007: Masses of people from Kuche, Xinhe, Baicheng, and as far away as Korla saw a massive fireball in the sky on the night of the 27th. At around 8:50PM, Beijing time, witnesses saw an object in the sky so bright that in some places it seemed like daylight. One witness described the object as a “red-hot chunk of iron” that left a bright trail in the sky similar to the contrails of an airplane. The object was visible for about 10 seconds, then, 5 seconds after the fireball disappeared witnesses report hearing a loud boom. Police from the Xinhe PSB dispatched two expeditions to find any trace of the object but none was found. Meteorite? Likely. Alien invaders? Well, let’s just say if I were an alien overlord I’d definitely choose Xinjiang as a nice, remote, resource-rich, sparsely populated, spacious base of operations to begin my nefarious conquest. I suppose time will tell.
• 29 December 2007: From the beginning of its operation to the 25th of this month, the China-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline has transported 4.7 million tons of oil, worth 2.4 billion American dollars.
• 29 December 2007: The 20th and final meeting of the 9th Regional People’s Political Consultative Conference ended on the afternoon of the 28th. The primary goal of the meeting was to elect delegates for the 10th Regional People’s Political Consultative Conference, whose first meeting will be held on the 13th of next year. The members of the 10th RPPCC can be found here.

Other News

•  26 December 2007: The People’s Daily Online provides some English language coverage on the recent closure of Urumqi airport.
• 26 December 2007: China View provides a picture gallery to celebrate the completion of the renovation of Kashgar’s old town.
• 28 December 2007: China Daily runs an article on Pimo, a small town on the southern edge of the Taklamakan Desert and home to some miraculous desert reclamation efforts.