I hope anyone and everyone interested in social justice and ethnic issues in China will take the time to read the letter a Hui individual in Xinjiang has sent to the new Secretary, Zhang Chunxian. It is translated into English below.

I’ll come clean. Reading this letter has made me extremely excited and has thrown a significant amount of optimism into what generally is a personal reservoir of negativity regarding the situation in Xinjiang.

On one hand, this is just a blog post, and, as pretty much most of us blogosphere residents have learned first hand, blog posts can only do so much (if anything at all).

On the other hand, it has always been my conviction that the most probable and fair solution to the “Xinjiang Problem” is a broad, consciousness-raising social movement, a Civil Rights movement, if you will, with both Uyghurs and Han participants, that asserts Uyghur ethnic identity and political rights through creative work, political participation, legal challenges, and civil disobedience.

Such a movement can only work if members of the majority stakeholders, in this case, the Han, participate. Until then, it will only be perceived with hostility as a proto-nationalist separatist movement with harmful designs on the People’s Republic of China. I believe, unfortunately, it is on this point that a resolution to Xinjiang issues is most distant: allies among the PRC majority are few and far between. Besides Wang Lixiong, there are hardly any Han allies to the Uyghur case, and Wang is derided enough as is.

Enter Hui blogger Lüqi Piaopiao (his Chinese pseudonym, 绿旗飘飘), who goes by Green Flag in English. In some ways it is perfectly appropriate that a Hui individual, a Muslim of otherwise “Han” cultural and linguistic background, would be the person who would write the most thorough, fair, and empathetic defense of Uyghur issues I have seen thus far. Green Flag’s exhortations nail, in my opinion, almost every “real issue” that can significantly contribute to solving problems in Xinjiang: respect for the existing legal framework, the concept of genuine autonomy, bringing about tranquility and content through loosening, rather than tightening, religious policy, cultural education for government leaders, and more. But it would be a mistake on my part to put words in Green Flag’s mouth, since he speaks quite wonderfully on his own.

Writing on a blog with a banner that prominently features Mahatma Gandhi, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela, Green Flag conspicuously associates his efforts as a social activist with the style of consciousness-raising social movements that I have come to conclude is the only practical hope for the region. It is with great excitement and optimism, then, that I’ve translated Green Flag’s letter to Zhang Chunxian into English, hoping that in this small way I can contribute to the work of someone, on the ground, in China, who truly has the right ideas. Please read and share!

Dear Secretary Zhang,

After Hunan, a land made legendary by its people, you’ve come to vast and wealthy Xinjiang. The burden you carry truly is not light.

There once was a time when I would blithely sing the song “Our Xinjiang is a Good Place,” ¹ and watch Red Flowers of Tian Shan ² over and over again. To be frank, I miss those times, but that was just me appreciating creative work. Only last year was I able to do away with this imaginary Xinjiang of my dreams.

My first epiphany occurred in February of 2009, when, because of the “February Incident” ³ which happened in Yili some years ago, police vehicles were patrolling the streets of Huocheng County. On February 5th, a little past 5 in the afternoon, I saw a Uyghur youth inexplicably kicking over bicycles parked in front of a supermarket…

In the middle of February of this year, I departed north out of Urumqi with several friends to go to Altai and enjoy the snow up there. We didn’t go west, because we weren’t willing to deal with the inconvenience of having to show our ID papers on the side of the road. After returning home, I posted some pictures from the trip on my blog, and even sent a travelogue I had written in all earnestness and affection to a news periodical in the south; the editor wrote back, asking me to understand how the article I had written was too “sensitive” for the magazine. Ultimately, what was too sensitive was the story of a Uyghur youth from Xinjiang who, after graduating college, was in the end not able to find any employment in Xinjiang and ended up working for the China branch of an American oil company.

The truth is that the situation in Xinjiang has already affected the thinking of all kinds people and has attracted the concern of surrounding regions. However, since I myself am a Muslim, it is easier for me to speak with other Muslim individuals throughout society, including Uyghurs. I believe that several issues in Xinjiang are worth a high level of serious attention, as the potential crises hidden among these issues are clearly detrimental to tranquility in Xinjiang and clearly could influence Xinjiang’s future.

1. Relaxing Religious Policy

In Xinjiang, at least half the population are Muslim adherents of Islam. There is no doubting that terrorist incidents have occurred in Xinjiang due to the influence of “East Turkestan” thinking. This is an unbearable tragedy for all people, including Muslims throughout the country. The events of last July caused unprecedented anguish for everyone.

The incident in and of itself bore no relation to religion. However, a few issues preceding the incident are worth analyzing earnestly. For example, the doucments of both the media and the government in Xinjiang include wording along the lines of “They (Uyghur Muslims) advocate the doctrine of the Oneness of God” ⁴ and it seems that because of this believe the Uyghurs reject the leadership of the government and the party. However, many other prominent religions believe in “the Oneness of God,” holding it as their guiding principle. In Yili Prefecture, some of the “Places for Religious Activity are Absolutely Not Permitted” policies promulgated by government ministries are incompatible with the historical traditions of mosques and actual capabilities on the ground. For example, in regards to the “Collecting of Fees Not Permitted” policy, mosques have always been places that collect taxes, and furthermore the contribution of these fees are a religious obligation and a public service among Muslims, to be used to aid the poor and as public welfare. The “Worship not Permitted for State Cadres” policy violates Article 36 of the Constitution ⁵. During Ramadan, Uyghur Muslims are not permitted to hold iftar ⁶ meals at mosques and restrictions on Uyghur Muslims desiring to go to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage are quite strict. Originally mosques served an additional role as places of learning, and in this capacity passed on religious knowledge and trained religious leaders. With restrictions limiting students at mosques to about two or three individuals, Muslims are now in a situation where they are hardly able to pass on their traditions. Also, there are various measures which forbid mosques and foreign language schools in China proper from accepting students with Xinjiang residence, especially Uyghurs.

In some regions, government agencies forbid Uyghurs from growing beards, forcing individuals who do not comply to attend “Legal Training Classes,” sometimes for up to three months. People now call these classes “Beard Training Classes” without hardly knowing that among Muslims, growing a beard is sacred behavior following Islam’s Prophet and constitutes a holy religious ritual.

I hope that Xinjiang cadres will, when convenient, take the time to study the fundamental doctrines of religions and gradually transform the above conventions. Religion needs to be able to flow freely and must not be blocked up as if under the “Eliminate Religion” methods from the Cultural Revolution. The minorities of Xinjiang are closely bound to their religion, and if religious policies are relaxed, many people will feel more free and more at ease when it comes to believing and practicing their faith. Doing this would aid in resolving other problems, creating a more contented popular sentiment, and benefit social tranquility.

2. The Employment Gap

As I mentioned above, there was a Uyghur youth who studied in a “Xinjiang Class” in inner China and got into a university, and despite expending his efforts over ten times, was ultimately unable to find employment in his own homeland and was forced to go to distant Tianjin to work for an American company. From any vantage point this is absolutely incomprehensible. In large and mid-sized cities, employment opportunities for minorities, particularly Uyghurs, are few, and in work units with several hundred people there are barely any minority employees. In Yining, all janitors are, without exception, Uyghurs.

Furthermore, many Uyghur girls from Southern Xinjiang are sent to Southern China under “Poverty Alleviation” programs. This, however, is not the desire of many families since Muslim tradition does not support women going far from their homes in search of work and while they’re away it’s hard to avoid interfering with the daily habits and ethnic dress style of these women.

As all people know, Xinjiang is a treasure trove of natural resources and is China’s peerless, bountiful province. The inner provinces make use of natural gas and other resources that come from Xinjiang. As a sort of repayment, the indigenous peoples of Xinjiang should at least be entitled to part of the local employment opportunities so that they may be able to make a living in their own land.

I hope that with some necessary changes in policy, local peoples can be given appropriate employment opportunities, so that the income gap may be gradually lessened and bring about even greater social peace.

3. Improving the Lives of the People

In Urumqi I’ve noticed that districts where Uyghurs have congregated tend to be antiquated and on the decline. Even though the proportion of populations in Urumqi today is not as before, I still hope the government will take into consideration the layout of the city, addressing both development and maintenance of minority areas, and making the citywide disparity less blatant.

“Han Street” in Yining City, which now exists in name only (referring to residential areas where Han originally lived), is quite dirty and messy. The roads have yet to be paved, and if it rains or snows, the surface of the roads turn to mud which makes getting around very inconvenient.

Uyghur peddlers have spread out to every part of the country, selling specialty Xinjiang products but also leaving impressions and influences on the local community. I saw a Uyghur kid selling nan once at the Guangzhou train station, carrying around a stack of nan. Police suddenly appeared, and, with the crowds of bystanders watching, knocked the stack of nan the kid was holding to the ground. Each time the kid stooped over to pick up nan, the police kicked him in the butt until he finally picked up all the nan.

4. Strengthen Autonomy

Xinjiang is China’s largest ethnic autonomous region. Under Secretary Zhang’s new administration, the government should carefully research the ethnic autonomy methods of Xinjiang. Broadening autonomy and allowing, in a planned, measured fashion, local people to manage local affairs, appears to be the best ultimate solution, in Xinjiang and in Tibet.

The unity and strength of China should be the collective responsibility of all Chinese people of good conscience. The burden is heavy and the road is indeed long!

Under the principles of the Constitution and the Ethnic Autonomy Law, the first step must be establishing communication and dialog between social classes, excising the tumor that exists in the hearts of ordinary folks of all ethnicities, including the Han. Please change the old way of doing things, serving both the interests of the state and the peoples in it, bringing about a genuine change of heart, timely healing an open wound, and truly realizing long-lasting peace in ethnic areas.

Best wishes to Secretary Zhang!

Best wishes to Xinjiang!

Best wishes to China!

-A concerned citizen

—

[1]:^ The song “Our Xinjiang is a Good Place” is a kitschy song which of course extols the virtues and tranquility of Xinjiang. Almost everyone in the region knows of this song. From a personal, anecdotal standpoint, I usually only hear this song referred to in a non-derisive tone by native Mandarin speakers (e.g. Han and Hui). View a video of this song here.

[2]:^ Produced in 1964, Red Flowers of Tian Shan is a heavily Xinjiang-flavored propaganda piece which tells the story of a young, female Kazakh commune leader who, through indefatigable socialist spirit, overcomes both the natural challenges from living a pastoral life in the Tian Shan and the shenanigans of the requisite counter-revolutionary villains. Watch Red Flowers of Tian Shan here; this is part 1 of 8 parts, which are all linked on the playlist to the right of the video.

[3]:^ Roused by the execution of Uyghur independence activists and harsh restrictions on the traditional Uyghur activity meshrep, Uyghurs of Ghulja took the streets in February of 1997 and were met with by a violent military crackdown by the authorities. The “February Incident,” known to many Uyghurs as the “Ghulja Massacre,” is very hush-hush in today’s Xinjiang it is rather courageous and surprising that this individual is mentioning it in a letter he has sent to Secretary Zhang. This demonstrates that socially active and Hui individuals are at least aware of the incident, which, under information restrictions in Xinjiang, passes further into obscurity every year.

[4]:^ In Chinese, “认主独一”. This is a reference to the Muslim concept of tawhid, a belief in the oneness of God, or, less obscurely, monotheism in Islam. The author is astutely criticizing the government’s tendency to accuse tawhid in Islam as redirecting Muslims’ loyalty away from the nation and the government, since several other approved religions in the PRC are also monotheistic.

[5]:^ Article 36. Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.

[6]:^ Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset during the holy month of Ramadan. The iftar meal is the highly anticipated community event where Muslims break their fast together and eat their first meal after going without food the whole day. These meals are often hosted at mosques and are significant social events for local communities.

This situation, of course, is not from neglect or lack of trying – journalists and academics come to Xinjiang frequently with the express purpose of ferreting out elusive Uyghur commentary on various subjects – the Olympics, the Uyghur way of life, terrorism, inter-ethnic relations, etc.  Naturally, there is no one Uyghur voice on these topics, and we can hold as axiomatic the fact that across the millions of Uyghurs in Xinjiang there are a wide range of stances, from one extreme to the other and everything in between. However, a robust network of rules,(some written, some not), surveillance, and punishments works quite efficiently in curtailing access to Uyghur opinions on a significant scale. Thus we are left with isolated, anonymous, and often furtive voices that crop up in media reports and academic treatises, to stand alongside the very vocal and hardly unchecked accusations of diasporic Uyghur activist groups. Furthermore, those voices are mediated – delivered to us through a writer who despite even the best efforts to be objective nonetheless has an agenda in writing the report or thesis, one that may differ from the objectives of the Uyghur source referenced.

But the exposé linked in the last post is notable because it includes surprisingly frank, critical, and penetrating commentary by Uyghur members of the Uighur Biz online community. This, of course, is not “unmediated” Uyghur opinion nor can we call it representative. Searching for opinions on the internet unleashes a whole separate type of skepticism – who can own a computer, who navigates online BBS’, who is willing to put forward their ideas, what does anonymity do to peoples’ self-expression. Nonetheless, it is, I believe, an untapped source for ascertaining Uyghur thoughts on these issues and it is far more direct and open than what comes out of an encounter with a journalist in a Kashgar alleyway. And so what is said in the commentary accompanying the notice is a lot more substantial and eye-opening than the usual one-liner delivered in a press release. And this is what I’d like to share with our readers today.

An important disclaimer – my Mandarin has lots of limitations. I welcome corrections.

Son of the West (西域的子) tells us how these policies personally effect people by describing the arrival of two PhD holding Uyghurs from Germany to watch the Olympics.

I had two friends from Germany come over, originally to watch the Olympics, they arrived at Beijing at noon on August the 6th, I went to pick them up, they received extra scrutiny when they passed through security, I had to sit around and wait at the airport for two hours until they came out, furthermore, I received a call from the police, and they made me report their travel arrangements, and they called me every two hours to ask about their every action, I brought them to an office run by Xinjiang folks to arrange lodging, but mysteriously the charge per night was 980RMB (usually it doesn’t approach 200RMB), but they thought that was too expensive, so they started looking for a place to stay, they went to several hotels but were rejected by all of them, and by the time it started getting dark they still hadn’t found a place to stay, originally they were planning on calling 110, but that was too much trouble and they didn’t call, and they had no choice but to buy a ticket for that day to go back home to Urumqi. These two got their doctorates in Germany, they both got scholarships, and have participated in important research projects. They’ve lived in Germany for four years now, and when I met them the first words they said were, “It’s great to be back home, and it’s really exciting to hear again the sounds we were used to hearing.” But they were very disappointed in Beijing, even in their own country they weren’t able to find a place to stay.

The notice posted on the wall in Beijing required inn owners to report Tibetan and Uyghur lodgers to the police, but we may speculate from the story above, and from other stories on Uyghurs being refused lodging, that hotel owners may have decided to circumvent the inconvenience simply by refusing Uyghur and Tibetan guests or charging unreasonable prices.

Several commentators observed the legal significance of this situation. This is first indicated by the rhetorically challenging title of the article itself, “Netizen Takes Picture of Notice Below, Reminding Us of Former Times in South Africa.” While the reference to apartheid obviously is meant to draw attention to the inherent racism of the police policy, one assumes that it also is a reference to the gradual and peaceful legal evolution which ultimately resulted in a fairer South Africa. Even more vexing to some commentators is the fact that technically the legal framework that renders these kinds of policy illegal already exist, and simply are just being flouted by the police. One solution, according to Gulzar, is making public knowledge of the law more widespread and available.

Even the police are issuing these kinds of emergency notices, so who’s left to protect our legal rights? With this kind of police notice, what kind of inn would be willing to take in Uyghurs or Tibetans? Whatever happened to the essence of the State Council’s document no. 33?

Actually these so-called “national regulations” are simply excuses certain departments have found for their local policies. National lawmakers should make the law publicly available to the masses, ensure that all people are aware of it, and resolve what it stands for and what it doesn’t stand for. So obviously, this statement of “national regulations” is absolutely an excuse, a strategic decision ejected from the ass of some public servant. It simply doesn’t have any legal foundation.

Of particular interest in Gulzar’s words is the insistence that these civil rights incidents are the work of corrupt and evil local officials who are ignoring and flouting a national legal framework and the edicts flowing forth from the centralized government. This is actually a growing theme in China that extends far beyond the Uyghurs – even in cases like the Sanlu Milk scandal and shoddy architecture in Wenchuan, “evil local despots” are decried by the people in contrast to the wiser rules at the center.

Other commentators pointed out that an entire ethnicity should not be punished for the actions of a small, violent minority – a rather poignant point since official documents regarding terrorism in Xinjiang always insist that the discontent is confined to an extreme and isolated group of people (极少数). Should this be the case, two different users named Azamat ask, why should all be punished?

Government measures have a direct influence on society. In any given country, inter-ethnic relations are a very sensitive and complicated issue. Criminal elements and terrorist extremists when all is said and done are an extremely small minority, if you can’t distinguish between these individuals and everyone else, you’re only going to proliferate the negative sentiments among the people. If a terrorist really wants to wreak havoc, he’s not going to check into a hotel and do business as usual. And as for these panicky prevention measures being carried out by the police, I’m afraid the only thing that’s being harmed are the sentiments of minorities. The police can ask hotels to strengthen safety measures in general but shouldn’t draw attention to ethnicity.

It’s the job of the government to combat criminal elements, but this absolutely must not come at the price of violating the rights of the people, and you simply can’t make an entire people the target of one’s suspicions, by doing it this way you’ll just strengthen the mistrust among certain sectors of society, create an even deeper chasm between peoples, to go from combating individual criminals to fomenting the mistrust of an entire people, this actually shows the incompetence of local governments and various departments.

Not only is the policy a type of collective punishment, the two Azamats observe, but it also has a very high chance of backfiring and simply increasing resentment among Uyghurs and Tibetans.

A user named Unique (唯一) points out that these types of policies are completely missing their target and are failing to address the fundamental problems behind the unrest in Xinjiang, interestingly invoking the Yang Jia, a 28-year old who walked into a Shanghai police station and killed 6 police officers. Interestingly, Yang Jia has become somewhat of an internet phenomena, receiving an outpouring of sympathy as a victim of circumstance, and later, of police shenanigans, despite his gruesome crime. Yang Jia expectedly got the death sentence, but Unique asks if the reasons compelling him to the crime in the first place were addressed.

The problem simply is not addressed by these kinds of methods.

It’s just like the Yang Jia incident. You kill someone, you pay with your own life. Otherwise the law is nothing but words. But the key here is why he resorted to murder.

And so the crux of the matter remains unresolved. You can’t keep on covering it up. The tension brought about by suppression will accumulate day by day, society itself will feel its effects, the feeling among the people will become more and more widespread until it spills over. And when the time comes the problem won’t be that of “a tiny cabal” or a few “unenlightened groups.”

Lastly, I’d like to end with the words of Yilihamu (伊力哈木), whose insightful analysis of history, various vested interests in Xinjiang, the “minzu” system, and the rise of a Uyghur ethnic consciousness is rendered even more powerful in that it is an authentic Uyghur voice. Yilihamu’s eloquent language for me evokes the powerful ideas explored by Ralph Waldo Ellison in The Invisible Man, a literary masterpiece on what it means to be a racially and ethnically marginalized stranger.

Both history and the present cycle of unpleasant disputes make it very difficult to resolve the complications that exist among Han Chinese and Uyghurs. During the times of authoritarian rule, the Uyghurs had the highest population and also the status of “autonomous ethnicity,” but because the resources they were able to take advantage of were relatively few, they continued to play the role of the “invisible people,” to retreat behind their own bodies. Further vexed by the so-called “East Turkestan” movement, Uyghurs wouldn’t dare come forward and hold their heads high, and gradually, they became the “unseen masses” and because of this the spirit of the Uyghur people faltered.  With further democratization, pluralization, and a growing feeling that their culture was gradually seeping away, Uyghurs started to acknowledge with ever-increasing awareness the presence of a crisis, and greatly inspired by the rise of the “human rights defense” movement, formed an ethnic Uyghur group consciousness. This, for the Uyghurs, is actually ethnic dignity and this self-awareness is actually a form of self-defense.  Society in modern Xinjiang is a fragmented society, and the antagonism among ethnic groups has caused a widespread crisis of confidence among the people of Xinjiang, on one hand everyone is a “person of Xinjiang” but each ethnic group has various, conflicting interests, each group disdains and quarrels with the other. Let’s think about this – Xinjiang has over 20 million people and it has been divided into several antagonistic ethnic categories, and at the same time within each ethnicity there are different groups, in this kind of situation anyone can be taken advantage of, oppressed, or sold out by someone else, in this kind of situation who else can someone from Xinjiang trust? On top of that in today’s Xinjiang various groups with vested interests are jostling with each other, the different administrative regions, the XPCC, centralized industries, the common people, these groups often clash for the sake of their own interest and often are antagonistic towards one another, in this type of situation both among ethnic groups and among groups with vested interests there is absolutely no trust, and there is a universal lack of confidence among the people.

I express my admiration to these individuals, not only for the insights they have put forward, but also for the courage to publish them on a website based in the PRC when similar sites have been closed before.