What you see below is the 新疆總圖 or “General Map of Xinjiang.” This particular version is from the work 欽定新疆識略 Imperially-Commissioned Outline of Xinjiang, produced in 1821 by Song-yun, published again in 1894 as a typeset and annotated edition, and reproduced from that version by lithograph in 1962 in Taiwan. By the magic of modern digital technology, I have arranged the two halves of the map, previously printed conveniently on either side of a single page, into a complete image for your edification and mine.

"General Map of Xinjiang" - Click to enlarge!

The map was made by imperial decree in 1755 and completed four years later along with several other maps of the region. Although the map’s production apparently involved Jesuit missionaries under the leadership of an imperial censor, it does not resemble later maps that the Jesuits produced for the Qing court.

First of all, it’s oriented with south on top, as in older Chinese maps. Check out the place names. Along the top, from left to right, we have… Lop Nor (羅布淖爾, with all of the little circles). Then, in the middle, there’s Khotan (here 和闐), and, above it, a pass to Tibet. Heading down and to the right, we pass through Yarkand (葉爾羌), a place name now used for the nearby town of Qarghiliq, while Yarkand itself is translated as 莎車. You will see the latter name nearby, marking an ancient kingdom recorded in Chinese texts. Then come Yengisar (英吉沙爾) and Kashgar (喀什噶爾), both of which’s names were “corrected” by this text. East of these is Badakhshan and, if you look southeast/down and to the right, you will find Andijan (安集延), which seems to have been contemporary Chinese writers’ main point of reference for the Ferghana Valley and much of Central Asia. Turning down and to the left, we pass through Ush-Turfan, Aksu, and Kucha. West/left of there is Qarashahr, marked here next to Ancient Yanqi (焉耆), as it is known in Chinese today. Crossing the mountains to the north/down, there’s Urumqi, and, to the east/right, Ili! This puts us just over the mountains from Lake Balkhash (巴勒喀什), which is a short ways east across the plains from Tarbaghatai (塔爾巴哈台), now known also as 塔城 and, in Uyghur, Chöchäk. You will notice that, north/down of here, some areas are marked with names of peoples, such as Kazakh (哈薩克) and Khalkha (喀爾喀). Anyway, if you go back to Urumqi and follow the road east/left, you will wander through Turpan (吐魯番), Qumul (哈密), and even Ancient Loulan (古樓蘭) before arriving at Dunhuang (敦煌).

Besides being oriented to south, rather than north, as later maps increasingly were, as well as having mountains that are artistic more than they are accurate, this map also lacks lines of longitude and latitude. Instead, in the Outline, it is preceded by several pages of very tedious explanatory notes detailing distances between the places marked on the map (pp. 169-175).

In any case, for an especially good discussion of mapmaking in the Qing Dynasty, specifically in the context of Xinjiang, I recommend Peter C. Perdue’s China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, pp. 442-257.

On 15 June 2009, around 10:30 AM local time, wrecking crews working on the “renewal” of Kashgar’s Old City demolished the Xanliq Madrasa. Eyewitnesses report that the medieval Islamic college, listed as an Autonomous Region-level protected cultural site, was knocked down without any protest or ceremony. According to speculation, the “royal” madrasa, apparently located in the yard of Kashgar No. 1 Elementary School, may have been torn down to make room for an athletic field.

Mahmud al-Kashgari, the 11^th-century scholar who compiled the Dīwānu l-Luġat al-Turk, is said to have studied at the Xanliq Madrasa in its heyday. In the 1860s, following a lengthy period of decline at the Xanliq Madrasa and in the Islamic scholarly community in East Turkestan in general, a wealthy merchant from Atush named Abdurusulbay funded its renovation. In exchange, the Xanliq Madrasa was to host primary schools funded by local luminaries. In 1883, it became home to the first experimental school in Xinjiang to mix Islamic and “scientific” curricula. This was founded by Abdurusulbay’s grandsons, Bawudunbay and Hüsäyinbay Musabayov. Although that school was short-lived, its successor, Atush’s Hüsäyniyä School, produced generations of students educated using modern methods. It also spawned a broad-reaching network of similar schools that played a major organizing role in pre-1949 social and political movements. Many of today’s Uyghur intelligentsia can trace their philosophical, political, and sometimes family roots back to the educational efforts that began at the Xanliq Madrasa. The ideology that arose from these movements still resonates today, often in opposition to official communism.

Judging from online message boards, reactions to the destruction have been a mix of righteous anger and self-criticism. Having heard that the Xanliq Madrasa was torn down, many Uyghurs have expressed resentment towards the PRC government. Those who have spoken out feel that the destruction is part of a government “plan” to destroy physical vestiges of Uyghur history and “rewrite” it. This is connected closely to a sense that the government favors Han Chinese development over Uyghur industry and Han Chinese historical sites over Uyghur ones. These feelings of ethnic repression and conspiracy are reinforced by the knowledge that the Xanliq Madrasa was recognized as a protected historical and cultural site, a status that, in this case, clearly afforded it no special status or opportunity for preservation. Many have invoked the destruction of the Cultural Revolution, when many such sites were torn down all across the PRC. Some look back even before 1949 to a historical disregard for Xinjiang culture on the part of “those foreigners” – the Han.

Others, while angered by what has happened, have expressed frustration over Uyghurs’ own lack of initiative in protecting what they see as their history. A frequent refrain is, “If only we had held a protest, maybe we could have stopped this.” Such complaints are typical of those gripes found on message boards all over the Web. Others have pointed out that the very lack of a protest shows that Uyghurs, while mourning for the squandered legacy of their “Grandpa Mahmud,” actually possess a very weak sense of history. Certainly, no one seems to have bothered photographing the madrasa before, during, or following its destruction, and no one on the Web seems to know anything about it, save for Mahmud al-Kashgari’s having studied there.

Perhaps the kindest conclusion we can draw is that there is no real institutional mechanism in place for dealing with ethnic and cultural grievances or, for that matter, for reporting problems of interest to a specifically ethnic audience. The Chinese system of regional autonomy does not allow for official organization by or on behalf of ethnic groups per se. While the Xanliq Madrasa, an institution that should resonate with all Xinjiang Muslims, has been claimed both by everyday Uyghurs and by official narratives specifically as an artifact of Uyghur history and culture, there was no clear way for someone who might have seen the demolition order to publicize it to Uyghurs. Even if word got out, there was no obvious way to organize on behalf of the madrasa’s preservation. All the same, any protest or other actions would certainly have been stunted by a pervasive feeling of helplessness where the preservation of non-Chinese historical sites is concerned, as well as a lack of leadership.

According to statements by a Säpo Chief Inspector, the suspect’s activities, conducted from January 2008 through June 2009, were not limited to Sweden. In Sweden, he is accused of being responsible for collecting information on Uyghur immigrants on behalf of the Chinese government. Sweden is home to a vibrant Uyghur community, including Küresh Kösen, who passed away in 2006, and more recently Adel Hakimjan, formerly a Guantánamo detainee and resident of Albania, who received asylum earlier this year. The historical connections between Sweden and Xinjiang run long and deep, and knowledge about Xinjiang is widespread in Sweden.

Formal charges must be leveled against the suspect by 18 June, at which time we should know more about the situation. In the meantime, Radio Free Asia, which makes a point of the suspect’s fluent Chinese, has been receiving calls from members of the Swedish Uyghur community reporting various unspecified suspicions about the man’s identity.

We may speculate more sympathetically, perhaps, about the man’s motives. It is, of course, entirely possible that this individual was sent by the PRC some years ago to keep tabs on members of the Uyghur community, that he is a mole and a shill for the Chinese state. I wonder, though, if he does not have family in Xinjiang, family who may be unable to follow him and whom the Public Security Bureau might harm if he does not follow their orders. It would be remarkable, I suppose, for someone who has spied in several countries to be a minor player in a larger game. It is worth noting, however, that he is accused of spying only over the course of the past year and six months. Do people usually begin their intelligence careers at the age of 59 or 60? Rather, I think that he is a typical example of “refugee espionage”: someone who is blackmailed into spying for their home country. It seems that this is a common problem in Sweden, and it is sad to see that a country that has accepted so many people in need has also taken on so many security risks, as well.

The New Dominion will keep you updated.

Sources:

8 June 2009 (Radio Free Asia) “Sweden arrests Uyghur who spied for China”

6 June 2009 (The Local) “‘Refugee spy’ remanded into custody”

4 June 2009 (The Local) “Security police arrest ‘refugee spy’“

Here is my translation, doubtless below par, of a recent interview with Rabiyä Qadir (Rebiya Kadeer, رابىيە قادىر) published on 6 May 2009 in the Italian Communist daily Il Manifesto.  Commentary follows.

Independence is impossible, we will struggle for autonomy

Rebiya Kadeer has lived her sixty years as though on a rollercoaster. The leader-in-exile of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang (a region of northwestern China, with a Muslim majority) has experienced long years of poverty and a brief, enormous wealth as a result of her trade throughout China; the honor of a seat in the National People’s Congress and the suffering of five years in police detention. These and other chapters of Kadeer’s life – three times a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize – are recounted in her biography, The Gentle Warrior [Die Himmelsstürmerin], just published by Corbaccio. A member of the Transnational Radical Party, on Monday and Tuesday, the “Mother of the Uyghurs,” as she likes to call herself, was in Rome, where she yesterday took part in a meeting of the Committee for Human Rights of the Chamber of Deputies. Over the next few days, she will address the assembly of the World Uyghur Congress, where her reconfirmation as President appears decided. We have discussed with Kadeer the strategies of the movement and the situation in Xinjiang, where the Uyghurs (about 8 million) complain of an attempt to assimilate them on the part of Beijing.

In the most recent stage of your life, you lead the World Uyghur Congress (WUC). What mark have you left while at the top of the umbrella of this Uyghur diaspora organization?

At the end of 2006, my objective had been to unite all of the Uyghurs dispersed across the four corners of the world, creating various associations that would be recognized in the World Uyghur Congress. These groups are making the world aware of the problems of our people and are busy promoting our language, history, and culture among the new generation forced to live far from East Turkestan (the name by which the Uyghurs call Xinjiang –ed.). And in the last three years, for the first time, our petitions were brought to the attention of the Parliament of the European Union, United States, and Germany, where I had the opportunity to speak.

Have you managed to maintain contacts with Xinjiang, despite the strict security measures enacted by the authorities in Beijing?

Since we have been branded a “terrorist organization” by China, it has been particularly difficult. Nevertheless, we have our ways. This is despite the fact that anyone who tries to access an internet page that talks about me or our organization will be treated as a “terrorist.”

Do you not believe that China’s economic development – which has brought construction and infrastructure to Xinjiang – is also to the benefit of the Uyghurs?

The only advantage in the development of East Turkestan is Beijing’s. While our natural resources – natural gas, petroleum, uranium, and others – are transferred to the Interior, we Uyghurs are excluded from the labor market and, through the prohibition of instruction in the Uyghur language, our culture will be wiped out. The economic marginalization of the Uyghurs has been achieved through the bingtuan [Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps – trans.], an enormous organization for military production – distributed mainly along the border with Central Asia – is intended to provide homes and work for millions of Han immigrants.

In your book, you recount the spontaneous protests staged during the 80s and 90s by the Uyghur population against the presence of Han colonizers. What about today?

Now, the only expressions of dissent that are allowed are those abroad. Since the opening up of the 80s and 90s, we have returned to a situation similar to that of the Cultural Revolution.

How are their relations with the Han, the ethnic majority in China?

They can have excellent relations with the Han, of understanding and of mutual respect. But the situation changed with the immigration to East Turkestan. Here we have made life impossible: The very fact of discussing politics, the problems of our people, brings the Uyghurs to be labeled as “separatists,” “Islamic fundamentalists,” “terrorists.”

Before the Olympics in August 2008, Beijing had distributed news of attacks in Xinjiang. What information do you have about these events?

They were staged. What we must stress is that[?], before the Games, 15 000 Uyghurs were arrested and locked up under accusations of “terrorism.” Thanks to the platform offered by the more important sports events, the Beijing authorities had manufactured a belief around the world that there were thousands of terrorists in East Turkestan, thus legitimizing further oppressive constraints on our people.

Last February, the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Beijing, said: We will pressure for human rights, but, in these economic times, other things come first. Have you lost your chief ally?

Unfortunately, at this time, the economic crisis is at the top of the agenda for the great powers. But our pressure on the State Department has continued, and I trust that we can continue to receive the support that we need from Washington.

You protested because Islamabad has recently extradited to Beijing nine Uyghurs who trained in Pakistan to attack China. Doesn’t Beijing have the right to defend itself?

In recent years, Pakistan extradited 21 Uyghurs captured in Afghanistan to the United States. These people were then declared innocent by Washington: Some of them found asylum in Albania, and the others still await freedom.

Let us leave the alleged terrorists aside. Are you not afraid that, in the condition of isolation in which Xinjiang has been constrained, there may have prevailed among its people a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam?

Traditionally, the Uyghurs have had nothing to do with fundamentalism. Every day, however, in East Turkestan, some Uyghurs are arrested because they have been accused of being Islamic fundamentalists. For Beijing, a “terrorist” and an “integralist” [one who adheres to an extreme or traditionalist interpretation of Islam, rather pejorative; some prefer "active Islam" or "political Islam" – trans.] are the same thing. These are labels that are applied to hide their policies towards us: prohibition on the distribution of Uyghur literature, the forced transportation of Uyghur girls into the Chinese interior, birth control, limitations on Islamic practice, immigration of millions of Han and the lack of work for us, execution of political prisoners. Xinjiang is the only region of China where they still condone death sentence for political prisoners.

If China grants real autonomy, will you renounce the dream of an independent East Turkestan?

We demand freedom. Today, only a minority of our people hope for independence. We fight for a true autonomy, such as that demanded by the Dalai Lama for Tibet. And this autonomy can only be obtained within a more general process: that of the democratization of China, one that benefits the whole population, not only the Uyghurs. If they give us liberty, we would be prepared to live with the millions of Han settlers who have been sent to our homeland.

Some thoughts:

Rabiyä Qadir is a politician. Just as the Dalai Lama, Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, Tarja Halonen, Abdullah Öcalan or anyone else in a position of leadership must satisfy the demands and play to the sentiments of a diverse community, so must she. Previously, it has been easier to dismiss her as a figurehead, an actor in political theater, prone to yelling and ranting and riling up her base of angry Uyghurs, pan-Turkists, sympathetic Westerners, etc. In this interview, Rabiyä Qadir comes across as a much savvier player. The talking points are broadly the same, but she makes some key concessions.

The most surprising is when she declares that the goal of her movement is not independence, but human rights and autonomy, not only for Uyghurs, but for all of China. This is not just an imitation of the policies of the Dalai Lama, who is an obvious point of comparison; that, I think, is a useful conceit for helping a European audience understand her movement and the situation in her homeland. Rather, this broader humanitarian goal has been a theme of Rabiyä Qadir’s for some time, albeit one not usually shared or emphasized by the broader Uyghur or East Turkestan movement. Early on, she framed herself not only as the “Mother of the Uyghurs,” taking a page from the early modern nationalist playbook digested fully by her cohorts abroad, but also as someone fighting for the rights of everyone in Xinjiang, even Han Chinese. The Uyghur independence movement, as I know it, is a fractious organization staffed by elites whose navel-gazing obsessions with self-definition prevent it from being taken seriously or achieving much internationally. If Rabiyä Qadir can successfully get them to become a much more broadly inclusive organization, then she may prove to be the leader the movement needs to gain real political traction. This pragmatic and less overtly hostile or racist stance gives the Uyghur rights/independence movement a much more mature face.

Rabiyä Qadir also dodges a sensitive question about the PRC’s right to defend itself. What would happen if she conceded that point? It would be of no help to Beijing, which has no interest in presenting her as an authority figure. It would certainly upset a certain section of her base, particularly actual supporters of Islamic fundamentalist and/or terrorist groups operating in or on behalf of East Turkestan. These are people who, I think, are not yet in the company of the broader, more ethno-nationalistic movement, but who could be drawn into it and away from violent action. This may account for her admonishment of the PRC for conflating terrorists and Islamic activists. I think, rather, that she did not want to say “No.” If Rabiyä Qadir claimed that the PRC has no right to defend itself, she would lose credibility as a mature leader and certainly provide fodder for PRC propagandists who, as she frequently reminds us, label her a “terrorist.”

Overall, I think we are seeing Rabiyä Qadir come into her own as a leader. At the very least, she is getting better advice on statesmanship. It is somewhat sad, I think, to see the Uyghur/East Turkestani movement give up on its central hope of a free and independent state, one that has always been imagined with lofty ideals in mind. This new vision, however, demonstrates that the movement is not entirely mired in the pre-1949 past, but that certain influential segments of it are willing to engage with present-day political realities.

In the autumn of 2004, upon the implementation of this program, which required all teachers to have attained a certain level of proficiency in Mandarin, many minority teachers lost their jobs. At the time, Xinjiang already had a shortage of teachers, and there have never been enough qualified teachers of Mandarin. These are problems reported in Chinese academic journals and books and the Xinjiang Daily. Late in 2005, and especially since 2006, the Xinjiang and national governments have made efforts to train non-Chinese teachers in Mandarin, usually by sending teachers selected by local ministries of education to major universities for 18-month courses and teaching practica. In light of this, the report on Xinhua’s site announcing plans to train 16,000 more “bilingual” teachers
over the next six years seems slightly disingenuous, since it emphasizes the preservation of “culture” along with the promotion of Mandarin as a national standard. However, the acknowledgement that this policy has a long way to go before it can be implemented properly is refreshing and shows a certain realism. The government is clearly interested in establishing Mandarin proficiency among the next generation of non-Han Xinjiang people, and the renewed investment in this program demonstrates that they are dedicated to a more permanent implementation to what was basically a poorly-considered, political policy.

Xinhua further report plans for 1,237 new bilingual kindergartens in accordance with the “National ethnic minority ‘bilingual’ kindergarten construction project”. Under this project, the government has also raised rural bilingual kindergarten teachers’ salaries to 800 RMB/month. The PRC has dedicated 3.8 billion RMB to this project, with 1.7 billion RMB going to bilingual kindergarten teacher training. The goal is to have 80% of Xinjiang kindergarten-age children in bilingual schools by 2012.

The bilingual education program will make a special effort in southern Xinjiang, where 1,111 pre-school teachers and 575 students are already in two-year programs, as part of the “Xinjiang Poor Areas Pre-School ‘Bilingual’ Teacher Cultivation and Training Plan”. It is estimated that 5,600 teachers will be trained under this plan over the next three years.

Late in January, Tianshan.net also published a lengthy article concerning a visit to a bilingual school in a village near Kashgar. The author’s observations, although strongly colored by clear political leanings and a sickly-sweet adulation for bilingual education, make for interesting reading. Among points of interest: Teachers of Mandarin include local teachers who have studied the language themselves, graduates of Mandarin courses, and students sent from universities for practica. In bilingual kindergarten classes for children with the least Mandarin language, there are two teachers, one who speaks in Mandarin, and another who translates. The article pays special attention to the opportunity some Xinjiang students have to study in high schools in the interior of the country, an experience that many find more alienating than enlightening. (For more on Xinjiang students in the Interior, see a recent book by a Chinese author… the title escapes me.)

This landmark ruling follows a June decision by the Supreme Court allowing federal judges to review the cases of Guantanamo detainees. The Bush administration is fighting the ruling through the Department of Justice and continues to assert that the Uyghur detainees pose a threat to the United States as members of the possibly-fictional terrorist organization, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which the US recognized as a terrorist group only after the men were imprisoned. One week ago, however, in light of the continued lack of evidence for the charges on which they are held, all of the detainees in question were stripped of their status as enemy combatants. The decision to release or to continue holding the Uyghurs was itself a straightforward legal matter.

Now, the men and the United States are faced with the question of where they can or will go. Some of the detainees had families in Xinjiang with whom they have been unable to communicate since the beginning of their confinement – most have given up on returning. Members of the Uyghur community in the Washington, DC area have pledged to take them in. However, the Bush administration is expected to fight their final release to US soil, allowing the men to linger further in a “special” housing facility.

Sources:

MSNBC: “Judge: Let Chinese Muslims in Gitmo into U.S.”

Radio Free Asia: “Gu’antanamoda tutup turuluwatqan Uyghur mähbuslar Amerikigha qoyup berilishi mumkin”

CNN: “Judge orders Chinese Muslims freed from Gitmo”

Bloomberg: “Chinese Muslims must be released in U.S., judge says”

Washington Post: “Uighur detainees may be released to U.S.”

From the Xinhua article, it seems that Kucha is under lockdown, with businesses shut and security checks everywhere. This sounds a great deal similar to what was said to have happened in Qitai, north of Urumchi, on 25 June: according to rumor, ten soldiers had been killed in a raid on a munitions depot at the headquarters of the 102 Regiment of the People’s Liberation Army, 6 km from Qitai proper. Following this incident, the city’s businesses and institutions were closed or open on a limited basis for several days after, while armed police patrolled the streets at regular intervals, frequently performing identification checks. Although the veracity of this rumor cannot be verified, the circumstances and reaction seem very similar.

The IHT’s report also quotes IntelCenter, which conducted some analysis of the first video released by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), as saying that that organization is, in fact, the same as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the terrorist group blamed by the PRC for most dissident activity in Xinjiang, the existence of which has not been independently verified. The evidence from IntelCenter as put forth in the article, based primarily on the organizations’ names, seems sketchy. We had a look at the relationship between Xinjiang separatism and radical Islam in Xinjiang at the TIP back in April, when a video of an execution of Chinese workers in Peshawar, Pakistan, distributed in the name of the TIP, was released.

与人民为敌的，最终结果是自取灭亡！！！

For those against the people, the end result is to bring annihilation upon oneself!

向烈士致敬，一路走好

I salute the martyrs, and bid them farewell!

向死难的官兵表示最沉痛的哀悼,
恐怖行为，必须采取非常手段严厉镇压.

To those officers who died during the incident, I express my deepest sorrow.

As for the terrorist activities, we must implement extreme measures to thoroughly suppress them.

唉~~~缠头干的事。

Yeah… the towelheads did this.

恐怖行为越来越猖狂了，必须采取非常手段严厉镇压

Terrorist activities are getting even more savage, we must implement extreme measures to thoroughly suppress them.

哎~~~瞅瞅,咱中国办个奥运容易嘛…

Ah… can’t we Chinese host the Olympics in peace?

维吾尔族 的朋友们，我们都是同胞，我们都是中华民族，新疆自古以来就是中国的一部分，大部分的维族朋友们，是非常好客的，也是非常欢迎我们其他民族的，不过有极少 部分维族朋友，不满于现在的生活，不满于现在的政策。有时你们该想想，就算继续这样继续下去“继续100年200年还是这样“或者自取灭亡“`那又 是何必呢“知足常乐`！

My Uyghur friends, we are all fellow countrymen, we are all nationalities of China, Xinjiang has from ancient times remained a part of China, most Uyghurs are really friendly, and they genuinely welcome other nationalities, however, an extremely small amount of our Uyghur friends are unsatisfied with life today, are unsatisfied with current policies, sometimes they should think a bit, if things continue like this they’ll go on and on for 100 years or 200 years just like this, eventually bringing destruction upon themselves, or they can think “There’s no need for that!” and that’s enough to bring about real satisfaction.

早晚收拾他们

We should take care of them sooner or later.

我是新疆人“`
但我看到这些很伤心“`
这种极端的败类应该彻底消失“`
不然新疆永远都是一颗定时炸弹

I’m from Xinjiang

But when I see this it really gets to me

These kinds of extremist scum should really disappear

Otherwise Xinjiang will always be a time bomb

发生了那么大的事啊~快顶上首页给大家看~一定会是头条~奥运近了~危险近了~那些垃圾在作乱~

Something really big has happened… hurry and rate this video so it will reach the front page and everyone will see it… it really is a lead story… the Olympics are approaching… danger is near… those trash are blowing things up…

我是新疆人,当我早上看到这条新闻.我很震惊!
我是汉族,我有很多朋友是 维族 哈族. 他们跟我们一样都热爱伟大的祖国!
那只是少数的极端分子 蓄意破坏边疆的安宁与稳定.
我坚信少数极端分裂主义分子的阴谋不会得逞!
伟大的祖国只会越来越强大!
中国万岁!
中华民族万岁!

I’m from Xinjiang, when I saw the news this morning I was really shocked!

I’m Han, but I have many Uyghur and Kazakh friends. They’re just like us and really love the great motherland.

It’s only a small amount of extremists who plan on disrupting the peace and stability of the borderlands.

I firmly believe that the separatist ideology of this tiny minority will not succeed.

The mighty motherland will become more and more great!

Long live China!

Long live the people of China!

作为一个普通的维吾尔人，绝大多数维吾尔人是热爱祖国大家庭的，所以极少数分裂分子的阴谋是不会得逞的，我们反对分裂，维护统一；我为和平祈祷，为奥运的圆满举行祈祷。

As an ordinary Uyghur I can say, a large number of Uyghurs love the great family of the motherland, so the conspiracies of these few separatists will not succeed, we are against splittism, we are for unity, we pray for peace, and we pray for the success of the olympics.

奥运后，国家必须要采取强硬方法解决此类事件了，严惩不贷，彻底解决，还老百姓一安家和睦中国，中国加油！

After the Olympics, we must implement tough measures to resolve these types of incidents, we have to punish without excuses, completely resolve the problem, and give the ordinary people a calm and friendly China, go China!

And those are some of the interesting ones for now. Some themes: rapid unity over the death of the young officers, similar unity around fury towards the perpetrators. Note that although as of right now no news agency has made an explicit connection between Uyghurs and the attack, this is already a given in the discussion among the public. Several people have come forward urging calm among their (implied Han) countrymen, to not direct their anger in Uyghurs in general and repeating the mantra distributed by the state that the discontent is isolated among an extremely small majority, also, people coming forward and claiming themselves to be Uyghur while saying that the attackers do not represent the will of the majoriy (they invariably use the phrase 大家庭, or “great family” of which all the minorities are metaphorically a part of).

Also interesting are comments that state tough measures should be carried out after the Olympics. I find this fascinating. It seems to indicate to me that the ordinary citizens of China perceive all the tidying up that occurred before the games – including, one would imagine, the relaxation of censorship and the lip service to human rights – to only be temporary measures whereas analysts in the West have been praying (albeit with little hope) that the Olympics would be a catalyst for permanent changes. Instead, we can see here that even the 老百姓 ordinary Chinese are clearly aware that the stuff the government has been doing lately has been only for the Olympics and that the “normal Chinese way of doing things,” for example, harsh crackdowns, can return to the forefront when all the bleeding heart Westerners leave after the Olympics. Intriguing…

Of course, we can always count on some folks to throw in some comic relief…

杀死韩国猪

Kill the Korean pigs

喀什的事件 跟韩国猪什么关系？莫非你认为喀什和韩国相邻？你真的该学学地理了

What does the incident in Kashgar have to do with “Korean Pigs”? Could you possibly think that Kashgar is near Korea? You really should brush up on your geography