• The PRC is promoting a new program of  “ethnic unity education“.
• There has been a surge in cases involving charges of “endangering state security” in Xinjiang, with regional numbers (1,295 arrests on that charge between January-November 2008) almost as high as national totals.
• A critical analysis of the “Opinion on deepening the promotion of rural reform and development” promulgated in December highlights both economic plans for improving economic equity between North and South Xinjiang, including exporting workers to the Chinese Intetior, and the political programs that accompany it, including “bilingual” education.
• Two young Uyghurs were arrested back in December for distributing leaflets calling for an anti-tobacco and -alcohol protest.

If you haven’t already subscribed to CECC’s newsletter, I would recommend it.  They have lately expanded their focus on Xinjiang, and their policy analysis has been increasingly balanced and insightful, much more so than most policy work on Xinjiang.

There are, however, a few details about the latest incident which has caught my attention. First of all is the surprising and most obvious detail of violence by Uyghurs against Uyghurs. This situation is gaining new dimensions… or perhaps it is more appropriate to say that the conflict has always been far more nuanced than the “simmering Uyghurs” summary that is most often put forward by Western media outlets touching base with the region. The fact of the matter is, the Uyghurs’ involvement in Han develoment/colonization on one hand and East Turkestan freedom fighting/terrorism on the other hand is far from black and white. In an area is remote as this one we can expect both a strong anti-Han sentiment, as rural areas tend to be predominantly Uyghur and mostly more traditional, and a local party/government structure that is mostly Uyghur, since, well, there are less Han around to run things. So we see loyal Uyghur police officers falling in the line of duty, and who I believe inevitably will be put forward by the CCP as model minorities and to further reinforce the “extremists on the fringes” model of Uyghur discontent. But we also see this interest quote from the RFA article:

“After the Yamanya incident, we organized large public gatherings and asked people to help us find the suspects. We also said we would offer a 50,000-yuan reward to anyone who helped. But still nobody has come forward,” Omerjan said.

The Uyghur authorities in the region, representing the government and the party, was asking for help to resolve the Yamanya incident. But nobody stepped forward – this is a big deal. The silence is a form of support for what happened. And the support for the recent violence goes beyond tacit agreement – individuals of all stripes, from the young, female Anargul, to the presumably older community leader and cleric Shukur (who was apprehended earlier) are actively pitching in, in either the violence itself, which seems to be the case with Anargul, or sheltering and aiding the vigilantes like Shukur. Inadvertently, and thanks to the efforts of the RFA, the attacks are giving us a tiny, fleeting opportunity to see how Uyghurs can and do get directly or peripherally involved with this new type of violent, proactive resistance that has come out in recent weeks.

But again, its never that simple, and the agreement and support of action against the government is obviously not total as the reason the police were searching the field was they were tipped off, and although I’m certain there may well be Han families in the area, statistically and realistically speaking it was probably a Uyghur who called in. And this introduces the contrasting realization that some Uyghurs are willing to fight in the other direction – for what reasons, we cannot know now, but it could either be out of patriotism towards the CCP, or the more sinister (and in my opinion more likely) possibility that in Xinjiang a system of incentives and punishments is creating an “informant” environment among the Uyghurs.

And finally, although there is undeniably a trend of rising violence that cannot be ignored, the most recent violence in some ways adds more conviction to my belief that the spree of attacks are situational and comparatively crude rather than an indicator of suddenly cascading discontent and of increasing sophistication/international involvement. I mentioned in my thoughts on the Yamanya attack that it can be legitimately suspected that the attackers were pressured, in that situation and in that moment, to attack the inspectors because of something they were hiding, either on their person or in their thoughts. Similarly, this latest violence wasn’t a sophisticated, Al-Qaeda style attack that was planned and sends a deep ideological message of intimidation, rather, this was the inevitable result of fugitives doing what they do when they get cornered – they attack, and its both savage and uncoordinated. It seems that Anargul’s middle-aged mother and young son were hiding in the fields that day as well.

As usual, Xinjiang watchers must continue to play “wait and see,” forced to deal with only ephemeral glimpses into the reality in the area – but I definitely feel that in this situation we’ve been given a window much bigger than the glimpses we’re usually handed.

From the Xinhua article, it seems that Kucha is under lockdown, with businesses shut and security checks everywhere. This sounds a great deal similar to what was said to have happened in Qitai, north of Urumchi, on 25 June: according to rumor, ten soldiers had been killed in a raid on a munitions depot at the headquarters of the 102 Regiment of the People’s Liberation Army, 6 km from Qitai proper. Following this incident, the city’s businesses and institutions were closed or open on a limited basis for several days after, while armed police patrolled the streets at regular intervals, frequently performing identification checks. Although the veracity of this rumor cannot be verified, the circumstances and reaction seem very similar.

The IHT’s report also quotes IntelCenter, which conducted some analysis of the first video released by the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), as saying that that organization is, in fact, the same as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the terrorist group blamed by the PRC for most dissident activity in Xinjiang, the existence of which has not been independently verified. The evidence from IntelCenter as put forth in the article, based primarily on the organizations’ names, seems sketchy. We had a look at the relationship between Xinjiang separatism and radical Islam in Xinjiang at the TIP back in April, when a video of an execution of Chinese workers in Peshawar, Pakistan, distributed in the name of the TIP, was released.

The internet has been positively buzzing the past few days over the sentencing of 15 Uyghurs for terrorist activities in Kashgar a few days ago, particularly because the trial was public and because it resulted in the instant executions of two of the suspects. While most of the major news agencies remain rather conservative with reporting on the details, the RFA article claims that according to a woman who was at the public trial (allegedly, the community members were forced to attend), the sentenced and executed individuals were the scheming terrorists who were apprehended during the Akto daring raid of January 2007. The RFA articles as well as the bigger news companies name the two executed parties as Mukhtar Setiwaldi and Abduweli Imin.

This is where things get slightly confusing for us writers here at The New Dominion.

I’d like to direct your attention to one of our very first posts way back in November, that’s when we were still maintaining the painstakingly time consuming “News Roundups” which involved taking Chinese language news stories and providing English language summaries. One of the more notable stories we found buried in Xinjiang’s massive and unorganized pile of Mandarin-language reports was a lengthy summary of a recently concluded terrorism case, where six individuals were sentenced for terrorism activities that had gone on for a year and a half until they were apprehended almost a year before, in January of 2007. I quote what we wrote then:

Six defendants in what has been dubbed the Kashgar “12-25″ Threat to National Security Case have been sentenced for attempting to split the country. Under the charges of splittist activities, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the illegal production of explosives, 4 death sentences and 2 life imprisonment sentences were passed down. The Xinhua article announcing this sentence also includes a detailed list of the alleged suspects’ activities, including running a terrorist training camp for two months with the Hollywood name of “Black Canyon,” conducting an explosives collecting operation dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn,” resisting PLA counterinsurgency efforts by sabatoging communications facilities, blowing up public buses, and occupying the Kusilafu village’s government building and declaring independence. Kusilafu is a village in Akto County (Location in Google Earth), a hotbed of resistance to Chinese rule.

Here’s the clincher: the two individuals who were singled out as ringleaders for the terrorism operation and summarily executed in November of 2007 were named Abduwali Yiming (阿不都外力·依明) and Muhataer Setiwalidi (穆合塔尔·色提瓦力迪) – or, the Chinese transliterations of Abduweli Imin and Mukhtar Setiwaldi.

So, therein lies the mystery: what exactly is going on here? RFA claims that on the 9th, these two individuals were executed summarily after a public trial, during which they were accused of plotting terrorist activities and managing a hidden terrorist base of operations starting from August 2005. The plot was broken up when the police raided their hideout in January of 2007. However, we found a Chinese language article describing an uncannily similar trial being conducted in November of last year, with the same charges against the same individuals, with the same result (two summary executions, two delayed executions, and a number of other non-capital sentences). I vividly remember recalling when we looked at the article at the time being quite surprised that no international news agencies were picking up on the execution of alleged East Turkestan terrorists – only to be quite surprised to find out they finally picked up the scent, only 8 months later. We are thus facing a time-traveling trial and execution: did this happen just a few days ago, or did it happen last November?

I think the most obvious evidence for the trial occuring in November is the fact that the Chinese-language article describing the trial and dated in November is still up and viewable. While it’s possible that the two immediate executions were stayed for 8 months, particularly in light of new laws in the PRC mandating that executions be reviewed by higher courts, even if that should be the case the fact remains that the trial was done a while ago, and not recently, unless this second, public trial was intended to be a show trial to intimidate the local Uyghurs. After all, if we do a little sleuthing, we find that the original source of this new information is indeed the RFA article (all the other articles out for now are just repeating what the RFA said), and thus the RFA could be mistaken, or, it possibly doesn’t have the complete picture. RFA is known for basing most of its stories on reports by disgruntled locals, Han, Uyghur, or otherwise, making clandestine calls to their international hotlines. Via this manner RFA may have learned from local Uyghurs that a show trial and execution occured, but may be unware of the official sentences passed in November.

The second possibility, more sinister, sheds light on the fact that the CCP regime, with its struggle between increasingly uncontrolled and rabidly nationalistic domestic “flash media” and completely uncontrolled foreign media, has adopted a strategy of sometimes providing different versions of events in Mandarin and in English – one for home consumers, one for abroad consumers. Again, I bring up how surprised I was that there was such a detailed report on the trial and sentencing of alleged Uyghur terrorists that hardly made a blip on the international media – we’re talking juicy, sensational stuff like snap executions and crazy Muslims storming town halls. But perhaps the Mandarin language report was deliberately shoved into the rather mundane procession of daily news rather than plasted all over front pages for a reason – so that the “International Edition” could be unleashed at a more strategic time, say, when China publishes reports on Uyghur terrorist activities over the past half year to justify its current anti-terrorism agenda.

Under the break, I have a full English-language translation of the Chinese language article from November. For some great “Law and Order” style drama and some crazy allegations of what these folks allegedly did during their reign of terror, read on:

Sentences have been pronounced in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case; 6 individuals will be punished for attempting to split the nation. (2007-11-09)

The sentences in the Kashgar “12/25” Danger to National Security Case, which was tried in a Kasghar Prefecture Mid-level People’s Court, were pronounced yesterday. Abuduwali Yiming and five other defendants were sentenced either to death or life imprisonment for the crimes of attempting to split the country, organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and illegally manufacturing explosives.

In order to achieve their secessionist goals, Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 defendants actively carried out extremist religious activities, declared “jihad,” organized a terrorist training camp, and made preparations to assist in the establishment of an “Islamic Caliphate” from August 2005 to January 2007.

Together the 6 defendants planned, organized, and implemented terrorist training activities, eventually recruiting several dozens of violent splittists to send to the “Black Canyon” terrorist camp, where they conducted training operations in secret for almost two months.

The 6 defendants also created a banner for their organization, drew up guiding principles and regulations, arranged goods and supplies for the terrorist training camp, manufactured explosives, and made preparations to conduct violent terrorist attacks.

The defendants twice conducted and participated in operations designed to seek out explosives-making materials, a campaign which they dubbed “Operation Harvest Corn.” They succeeded in acquiring 16 kilograms of explosives, eventually manufacturing 67 hand grenades and two suicide bombs.

The suspects formally established the “East Turkestan Islamic Party” and carried out two separate military operations while resisting capture by the authorities, during which the defendants destroyed communication lines, blew up buses, and occupied the Kusilafu Village government buildings to declare “independence.”

After the above-mentioned crimes were discovered by the authorities, the 6 defendants gathered a number of terrorists and began an organized military resistance against the armed police force sent to apprehend them, resulting in one injury and one death among the officers.

The court holds that Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants disregarded national law, demonstrated a long-term commitment to the reactionary thought of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and violent terrorism, and vainly tried to split the nation and create an “Islamic Caliphate.” Moreover, they actively communicated with and sought aid from terrorist elements abroad and over a long period of time exploited religion to implant extremist ideology in the minds of other individuals, thus encouraging others to choose, adopt, accept, and seek out “second careers” as terrorist elements who engage in violent terrorist attacks, opposing national unity and socialism’s “dictatorship of the proletariat” system.

The actions of Abuduwali Yiming and the 5 other defendants constitute the crime of attempting to split the nation, the crime of organizing and leading a terrorist organization, and the crime of illegally manufacturing explosives. The judgments are as follows:

Defendant Abuduwali Yiming, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Muhataer Setiwalidi, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Kuerban Mamuti, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Aihemaiti Reheman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, death and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to death, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Yimin Miman, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is sentenced to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, deferred execution to be implemented after two years and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights. The punishment has been set to deferred execution to be implemented after two years, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

Defendant Paerhati Yakufu, for the crime of attempting to split the nation, is given a mitigated sentence of life imprisonment due to “meritorious actions,” as well as permanent deprivation of all political rights and confiscation of all personal property; for the illegal manufacture of explosives, life imprisonment and permanent deprivation of all political rights; for organizing and leading a terrorist organization, 15 years of imprisonment and 5 years deprivation of political rights. The punishment has been set to life imprisonment, permanent deprivation of all political rights, and confiscation of all personal property.

News Link

On January 5th, 2007, Xinjiang Police Forces destroyed an “East Turkestan Movement” terrorist training camp.

It is now understood that key members of the ETM were dispatched to muster a group of terrorists and enter the PamirMountains to establish a terrorist training base and conduct terrorist training exercises. On January 5th, 2007, as police forces undertook capture operations, the terrorist elements conducted an armed resistance which resulted in the death of one police officer and the injury of another. The police forces managed to recover, killing 18 and capturing 17 terrorists and confiscating 22 homemade grenades and 1500 incomplete explosive devices.